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Preface
This special issue is entitled “Military communications systems” and contains 15 carefully
selected papers, among them 5 papers presented during 5th NATO Regional Military Com-
munications and Information Systems (NATO RCMCIS 2003) while the rest 10 papers are
planning to be presented during this year 6th NATO RCMCIS 2004. The NATO RCMCIS
Conference is the annual event held in Zegrze since 1999. It is a joint activity of three or-
ganizations: Military Communication Institute from Zegrze (Poland), NATO NC3A Agency
from Den Haag (The Netherlands) and Military University of Technology from Warsaw
(Poland). The general aim of the conference is to gather the experts from NATO countries
and to discuss the issues corresponding to the development of military communications and
information systems.
Developing an effective military communications system is the inter-domain issue and de-
mands good familiarity of designers with such areas as networking techniques, network
management, network security and applications. Additionally, military systems should sat-
isfy the requirements of mobility, robustness, security and fast deploying. To satisfy these
expectations, a variety of different issues should be considered and this leads to co-operation
of many teams working on specific topics, as mentioned.
For this special issue, we have selected papers with good technical content and which cor-
respond to the main issues related to military communication system design.
As it was announced, the first 5 papers were presented during last year NATO RCMCIS 2003.
Two first papers correspond to the important projects in NATO and the U.S. The first
paper, by Christopher Echols, deals with the TACOMS Post 2000 architecture that is
aimed at providing full interoperability between national networks. It worth to mention,
that Poland actively participates in this project, and is represented by 2 organizations:
Military Communication Institute from Zegrze and DGT S.A. from Gdańsk. The second
paper, by Anh Ta and Scott Starsman, describes lessons learned from a U.S. Navy en-
terprise integration initiative called Web Enabled Navy (WEN). WEN was initiated in
April 2001 with the focus of integrating navy resources and providing a single-point-of-
access. The next 3 papers were prepared by the authors from different polish organizations.
The first one is addressed to the mathematical discrete problem connected with local combat
operations, written by Tadeusz Nowicki. This paper represents an approach to modeling of
the battlefield. The next paper, by Paweł Matusz et al., discusses networking techniques and
seamless roaming between UMTS and IEEE 802.11 networks. Finally, a heuristic algorithm
for a random generation of feedback functions for Boolean full-length shift register sequences
was described by Izabela Janicka-Lipska and Janusz Stokłosa. This paper belongs to the
cryptography area.
The list of selected papers from the NATO RCMCIS 2004 opens the paper prepared by
Douglas Wiemer and dedicated to technology solutions for coalition operations. The sec-
ond paper, by Esra C¸iftc¸ibas¸i Erkan and S¸enol Uzun, describes the user services imple-
mented in the modern TASMUS tactical system. Next, James Busch and Rita Russo propose
a strategy of sharing tactical data in a network-enabled coalition. In the following paper,
Pavel Eichelmann and Ludeˇk Lukáš provide us with the introduction plan of the Network
Centric Warfare concept to Czech Armed Forces. The next 3 papers correspond to different
cryptography issues, which are Cryptology Laboratory, by Robert Wicik, IP-KRYPTO cipher
machine for military use, by Mariusz Borowski and Grzegorz Łabuzek, and primality proving
with Gauss and Jacobi sums, by Andrzej Chmielowiec. The problems of switch architec-
tures are discussed by Grzegorz Danilewicz et al. Finally, we have two papers dedicated
to other specific topics: Henrikas Pranevicius proposes an approach for integrated analysis
of communication protocols by means of PLA formalism and Ferdinand Liedtke introduces
the adaptive procedure for automatic modulation recognition.
Wojciech Burakowski (Military Communication Institute, Poland)
Luigi Bella (NATO NC3A Agency)
Guest Editors
Paper Developing standards
for interoperability of tactical
communications systems
Christopher J. Echols
“The enemies of freedom have not stood still while free
nations adapted to meet their threats and tactics”.
Donald Rumsfield [1]
United States of America, Secretary of Defense
Abstract— The lack of interoperability in tactical communi-
cations systems has been a known fact in the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) since the end of the Cold War.
This condition still exists today. The only alternative to obtain
tactical communications systems with the interoperability ne-
cessitated by future operational requirements are through the
establishment of NATO standards. This paper examines the
tactical communications systems Post 2000 (TACOMS) project
whose aim is to develop technical standards that will allow for
achievement of interoperability between multinational tactical
communications networks.
Keywords— TP2K, TACOMS Post 2000, NATO Tactical Com-
munications Interoperability.
1. Introduction
Within NATO, interoperability is defined as: “The abil-
ity of Alliance Forces and when appropriate operate effec-
tively together in the execution of assigned missions and
tasks” [2]. As early as 1978, the Tri-Service Group on
Area Communications (TSGCE) (SG/1) recognized the re-
quirement for interoperable tactical communications sys-
tems. In 1985, the TSGCE formed Project Group 6 to
establish standards for tactical communications in the land
combat zone.
2. PG/6 Phase II Report
In 1986 NATO project Group Six, (PG/6) produced a re-
port of their findings to the TSGCE. PG/6 divided its work
into three phases. Phase I completed pre-feasibility studies
and produced a report to the TSGCE documenting a recom-
mended architectural framework. Phase II produced a sec-
ond report documenting the refinement of the architectural
framework upon which the draft STANAGs would be de-
veloped in Phase III [3]. The TACOMS Project Steering
Group (PSG) was formed to conduct the work specified
in Phase III. In April of 1998, the MOU was originally
signed by 12 NATO Nations: Belgium (BE), Canada (CA),
France (FR), Germany (GE), Italy (IT), Netherlands (NL),
Norway (NO), Turkey (TU), Portugal (PO), Spain (SP), the
United Kingdom (UK), and the United States of Amer-
ica (USA). Poland joined the TACOMS Project in 2004.
The TACOMS nations agreed to establish an International
Project Office (IPO), and fund the project with the ob-
jective of developing draft standardization agreements or
draft STANAGs to be implemented by NATO nations and
Coalition Forces in both peacekeeping and in war fighting
environments [4].
3. The IPO and contract team
The International Project Office (IPO) is located outside
of Paris, France, within facilities maintained by the Délé-
gation Général pour l’Armement (DGA). The IPO has over-
all programme and systems engineering management re-
sponsibility under the contract. Under the guidance of the
13-member nation PSG, the IPO serves as the focal point
for any technical guidance and/or direction necessary dur-
ing the conduct of the contract. The TACOMS contract was
Fig. 1. TACOMS Post 2000 STANAG methodology of develop-
ment.
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Fig. 2. TACOMS Post 2000 architecture.
awarded to the TAC ONE consortium in December of 2000.
TAC ONE, is an international joint venture consortium
with shareholders from five major defense telecommuni-
cations companies: International Telephone and Telegraph,
British Aerospace Systems, Marconi-Selenia, EADS, and
THALES-France. In addition, there are 13 sub contractors
representing the national industry of the TACOMS MOU
signatory nations. The initial contract period was for three
years. However, it was extended until March 2005 after the
reorientation of the TACOMS network was changed from
technology specific, to be technology independent.
4. TACOMS STANAG development
methodology
The TACOMS standards will be based to the maximum
extent possible on existing civil standards in order to fa-
cilitate the use of civil technology, and on commercial
off the shelf (COTS) equipment in the design of defense
communications systems. The methodology being used
in the development of the standards specified in the Phase II
report is being conducted in four stages as illustrated
in Fig. 1.
5. TACOMS Post 2000 architecture
The TACOMS Post 2000 architecture is based on the fol-
lowing four subsystems: Local Area Subsystem (LAS),
Wide Area Subsystem (WAS), Mobile Subsystem (MS),
and System Management and Control Subsystem (SMCS).
These subsystems are described in Fig. 2.
• Local Area Subsystem (LAS). The LAS provides
the means for local communications services in the
local area (Head Quarters) and provides its users the
connectivity to the Wide Area and Mobile Subsystem
as well as to other local area subsystems.
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• Wide Area Subsystem (WAS). The WAS provides
the backbone links for communications for the longer
distances. The WAS allows for transit and intercon-
nection of other subsystems and external systems. In-
terfaces with civilian and military strategic networks
are also available in the WAS. The WAS shall also
include a minimal access for users.
• Mobile Subsystem (MS). The MS consisting of
various radios (MRR’s) and connectivity to the
WAS and LAS that provide users the capability
to communicate reliable while stationary or mo-
bile in a physically and electronically hostile en-
vironment. The radios themselves and the Over
the Air (OTA) interoperability are not part of the
TACOMS project.
• System Management and Control Subsystem
(SMCS). Each of the subsystems have inherent net-
work management and control requirements. A man-
agement and control subsystem will implement the
network management protocol.
6. Implementing interoperability
In the 2002 Prague Capabilities Commitment it states that
individual NATO nations have now made firm commit-
ments to improve capabilities in more than 400 specific
areas. Included among them are command control and
communications, and combat effectiveness. “The many re-
forms, initiatives and programs agreed in Prague are the
beginning of a transformation process essential to guaran-
teeing the security of the territory, populations and forces
of NATO members against all threats and challenges” [5].
In 2005, the draft STANAGs will be presented to the PSG
then forwarded to the NATO Communications Network
Sub Committee (CNSC) to begin the promulgation pro-
cess. Depending on the time allowed for promulgation
and ratification of the STANAGs, TACOMS is not ex-
pected to be ratified until the year 2008. The TACOMS
STANAGs will be sufficiently detailed to allow national
industries of NATO nations to produce their own com-
pliant systems. The STANAGs will however not define
the switching technologies to be used. That decision is
based on national preferences. The STANAGs will de-
fine user services, network elements and their minimum
required performance, interoperability points (IOPs), the
directory, naming and addressing structure, etc. With this
capability, each nation should then evolve their existing
and soon-to-be-fielded systems towards the common stan-
dards, thus progressively enhancing interoperability in the
tactical communications systems of NATO nations and
coalition forces.
7. Conclusion
Achieving true interoperability will require full support
from all nations to support the sharing of security infor-
mation among coalition nations, and the development of
national systems. In addition to contributing the funding
for prototyping and testing of the draft STANAGs to val-
idate the TACOMS standards. It is desired to have the
TACOMS Interopability standards included in the NATO
Response Forces (NRF) requirements, just like the Multi-
lateral Interoperability Program (MIP) standards have been.
The inclusion into the NRF requirements will help to ensure
implementation by all nations, and provide multi national
coalition forces the capability necessary to interoperate and
communicate real-time without the interoperability prob-
lems they are faced with today. The PG/6 Phase II report
helped to established the TACOMS project which can be
used as a model for developing not only land but also air
and maritime interoperability standards.
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Paper Enterprise integration
lessons learned
Anh D. Ta and Scott Starsman
Abstract—This document describes the lessons learned from
a United States Navy enterprise integration initiative called
Web Enabled Navy (WEN). WEN was initiated in April 2001
with the foci of integrating navy resources and providing
a single-point-of-access, Web environment to all business
and operational applications. The navy’s applications operate
within a complex network environment that spans commands
afloat, ashore, and overseas. The challenges addressed are
similar to those faced by large, multi-national corporations
and include some unusual characteristics including islands of
intermittently, bandwidth-limited, connected information con-
sumers. Both technical and management lessons learned will
be described and denoted as either prerequisite or success
factors.
Keywords— web services, service oriented architecture, navy,
military, web enablement, Task Force Web.
1. Web Enabled Navy initiative
As the United States Department of Defense (DoD) is go-
ing through its Force Transformation in response to the
Quadrennial Defense Review, the United States Navy is
also going through a fundamental transformation into an
enterprise with integrated information and knowledge re-
sources – one integrated navy. In April 2001, an initia-
tive called Web Enabled Navy (WEN) was started to inte-
grate navy resources and provide a single-point-of-access,
Web environment to all business and operational applica-
tions. The tasking was in two parts: the first issued to the
Navy’s System Command’s to convert applications to web
services; the second to Task Force Web (TFWeb) to plan,
design, and implement a strategy that would allow the navy
to realize the WEN vision [1]. Additionally, TFWeb was
tasked to provide vision and guidance to both the ashore
and afloat system integration government agencies and
contractors.
In striving for the goal of one integrated navy, the WEN
initiative must deliver solutions addressing the following
issues:
– heterogeneous IT environments,
– multiple network architectures,
– diverse user communities,
– technological volatilities,
– distributed authority,
– multiple parallel IT efforts,
– limited financial resources.
These issues will be elaborated further on.
Heterogeneous IT environments. At the start of WEN
initiative, it was estimated that there were one hundred
thousand applications across the U.S. Navy implemented
in a variety of programming languages and technology
products. The U.S. Navy IT environment is analogous to
a multi-national commercial enterprise. For example, a typ-
ical ship might have thousands of applications, hundreds
of databases, and vendor unique solutions that didn’t sup-
port innovation, plus users with diverse needs ranging from
administrative activities (e.g., writing a performance re-
view) to mission-critical activities (e.g., to tracking poten-
tial threats). Furthermore, most applications are poorly in-
tegrated across functional boundaries. While ad hoc solu-
tions to cross-application integration issues have been im-
plemented in some instances, they tend to be slow, ineffi-
cient, and required a complex series of agreements between
application owners to maintain. Furthermore, as the navy
modernizes its fleets, there is a growing dependency on in-
formation technologies to monitor and operate the machin-
ery that sustains the ships in their vital missions. Finally,
significant authoritative data originates from ships, which
needs to be accommodated by the heterogeneous environ-
ment. Extending the integration problem at the ship level
to the fleet level and further scaling it to the navy enterprise
level involving both the afloat and ashore communities de-
scribes the scope of the technical challenges faced by the
Web Enabled Navy initiative – one navy with connected
communities.
Multiple network architectures. The WEN initiative is
required to leverage the existing U.S. Navy infrastructures.
Currently, there are four major information technology in-
frastructures. In no particular order, they are the Navy-
Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) infrastructure for the Con-
tinental US (CONUS) shore community, the Base Level In-
formation Infrastructure (BLII) for the Outside Continen-
tal US (OCONUS) shore community, the Marine Corps
Enterprise Network (MCEN), and the Integrated Ship-
board Network System (ISNS; commonly referred to as
“IT-21”) for the afloat community. Each of these infras-
tructures has a unique constituency, operational character-
istics, and programmatic along with business support. At
present, combat systems must retain their separate network
architectures. The challenge is to integrate these dis-
parate physical infrastructures into a single logical infras-
tructure – one enterprise services layer.
Diverse user communities. The targeted U.S. user com-
munities for the WEN initiative include active-duty per-
sonnel, reserve personnel, family members, retirees and
U.S. Navy contractors. Each user community has different
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Fig. 1. WEN transformation vision.
technical and security requirements matrixed across the
various network environments. Additionally, information
is shared with key coalition partners during multi-national
operations.
Technology and market volatilities. At the start of the
WEN initiative, the major integration technologies available
were middleware and enterprise portal products. While
middleware technology has been available for many years,
the industry sector lacks open interface standards result-
ing in numerous vendor-specific and proprietary solutions.
As for the enterprise portal sector, the technology was just
then emerging into its own identity. As characteristic of
an emerging market place, the available portal engines had
propriety interfaces and there were numerous mergers of
enterprise portal vendors. For a large initiative such as the
WEN, the risks associated with a single vendor solution
was unacceptable from both technical and acquisition per-
spectives. Furthermore, a single vendor approach would
limit the ability to share and innovate.
Limited financial resources. In addition to the techni-
cal integration challenges, a large organization such as the
U.S. Navy has to seriously consider the financial effects of
any initiative because of the vast number of applications in
use across the U.S. Navy enterprise. Further complicating
the issue, each application was at a different lifecycle stage,
supported by varying logistics infrastructures, and with
budgets already allocated to tasks spanning a multi-year
timeframe. Because the allocated budgets did not contain
resources explicitly designated to comply with the WEN
requirements, program managers were required to identify
existing application development and maintenance funding
to support Web enablement.
2. Navy enterprise architecture
The Task Force Web team has developed an enterprise ar-
chitecture and an integration strategy to realize the WEN
vision (see Fig. 1). These products address the enterprise
integration problem from two dimensions. The application-
to-user delivery dimension focuses on methods for in-
tegrating content across the U.S. Navy into a single-
point-of-access, Web environment. The application-to-
application integration dimension focuses on the integra-
tion of U.S. Navy resources within an end-to-end business
process perspective.
As an additional constraint on the TFW team, the resulting
solution must comply with the architectural guiding princi-
ples:
• Maintain a flexible architecture that can accommo-
date both mission changes and technological changes.
• Implement an architecture consisting of best-of-breed
components, where possible.
• Implement a standard-based, vendor-neutral architec-
ture that minimizes ripple effects to back-end appli-
cations when architecture components are changed
and allows innovation at the back end.
• Implement an architecture that minimizes informa-
tion overload with automated information flow.
• Implement an architecture that enhances “shared
awareness” through seamless integration of data
sources.
• Implement a cost-effective architecture that maxi-
mizes acces to information and services.
• Implement an architecture that leverages XML-based
industry standards to abstract from platform and pro-
gramming language peculiarities.
The success of the WEN initiative depends on a balanced
solution for both dimensions.
2.1. Prerequisites
A holistic approach was taken that addressed authoritative
data sources and interoperable infrastructure issues.
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Authoritative data sources. The U.S. Navy’s approach to
the establishment of authoritative data sources is through
an organizational structure called the Functional Data Man-
agers (FDMs). Each FDM is responsible for rationalizing
the large number of databases into an orthogonal subset
that more closely meets the navy’s needs within a func-
tional area. The expected benefits are:
1) the reduction of duplication among navy applica-
tions and databases,
2) the cost saving from items such as licensing costs,
management of change overhead (such as revisions
and updates), user training, etc.
A long-term goal is to align functional applications man-
aged by the Functional Application Managers (FAM), an
organization analogous to FDM, as a source for composite
application frameworks (CAF) [2].
Interoperable infrastructures. TFWeb is leveraging
the exiting infrastructures (i.e., NMCI, IT-21, BLII,
and MCEN) to provide many basic support services re-
quired to support WEN functionality. However, some en-
terprise requirements are so critical that distributed devel-
opment and/or deployment cannot meet target requirements.
Two of these critical enterprise services are global direc-
tory services for identify management and enterprise data
replication/synchronization providing ubiquitous data pre-
sentation.
The integration of the navy’s directory services into a uni-
fied Navy Global Directory Service (NGDS) is a key en-
abler for many important capabilities such as personaliza-
tion, enterprise single sign on, and enterprise rolebased
access control. To date, there have been few standards that
support cross-domain authentication. The Security Asser-
tion Markup Language (SAML) standard promises to be-
gin addressing this issue and is seen as a critical standard
in building a true enterprise-wide single-sign on solution.
These traditional infrastructure issues will have an unusu-
ally large effect on the user experience.
Currently, the data replication and synchronization strat-
egy is predominantly being addressed through existing
file-based replication solutions such as Collaboration at
Sea (CAS). A more comprehensive solution providing true
data synchronization between Relational Database Systems
is planned but has yet to be implemented.
2.2. Vendor-neutral portal architecture
Given the challenges described and the recognition of the
rapid rates of technological changes, Task Force Web fo-
cuses on bringing to bear multiple parallel efforts by gov-
ernment and vendors to create the desired environment.
When possible we select best of breed recognizing that
speed and facilitating vendor neutrality are key elements to
be considered. The Navy Enterprise Portal (NEP) architec-
ture has the following key characteristics:
• Presentation layer:
– a standard-based, component based, modu-
lar enterprise portal architecture to provide
U.S. Navy users with a single-point-of-access,
Web environment that supports and integrates
both the afloat and the ashore communities;
– XML-centric design to support multiple display
formats (e.g., HTML, Wireless Markup Lan-
guage – WML, VoiceXML).
• Portal abstraction layer:
– a portal connector component to provide an
abstraction between the portal and content
providers that minimizes ripple effects to con-
tent providers from replacement of the portal;
– an external portlet registry component to pro-
vide a registry that further enhances indepen-
dent from the portal.
• Business logic layer and data store layer:
– XML-centric design to support capturing meta-
data and flexible customization (e.g., CSS,
XSD, XSL);
– an XML Web services integration strategy to
provide a flexible environment for composite
application leveraging resources across the het-
erogeneous IT environments.
The portal architecture focuses on standards-based inter-
faces, which will enable the U.S. Navy to develop its en-
terprise architecture and Web-enabled systems incremen-
tally along with maintaining vendor neutrality. For areas
where an industry standard is not available, TFW has de-
veloped an abstraction layer that provides vendor neutral-
ity. For example, in the absence of a portlet API standard
(e.g., JSR-168 and WRSP), TFWeb developed a “portal
connector” component that provides an abstraction between
the portal and content producers’ applications. The portal
connector satisfies several key requirements:
• It provides URL rewrite to ensure the seamless ac-
cess of resources across the navy, where many of
the resources are behind firewall with strict security
filtering rules (e.g., IP filtering at the proxy server).
• It invokes an XSL engine to provide a consistent,
server-based XSL transformation.
• It provides access to the portal context information
such as user name and selected style template. This
information is similar to the information defined in
emerging portlet standards such as Web Services for
Remote Portals (WSRP) and Java Portlet Specifica-
tion JSR-168.
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As the result of having a portal connector component, the
navy enterprise architecture can integrate any portal with
minimal ripple effects to content producers’ applications
and services.
2.3. Pragmatic integration strategy
Redesigning all U.S. Navy applications as Web applica-
tions is an imposing task in the near term given financial,
operational, and organizational constraints. TFWeb en-
courages content producers to either develop their appli-
cation from the beginning as Web application with Web
services interface or to provide a Web services “wrap-
per” for key functionality of the existing application. This
Web services-enablement of applications is referred to as
a TFWeb content integrated application (see Fig. 2). Via
the Web services interface, the returned data and metadata
should be formatted in XML along with the associated eX-
tensible Stylesheet Language (XSL) stylesheet specifying
the default display format (e.g., an HTML XSL stylesheet
for desktop Web browsers or a WML XSL stylesheet for
mobile Web browsers). The associated content provider
can be referenced/accessed either through a URL over
HTTP protocol (e.g., REST style Web services) or as Web
services over SOAP/HTTP protocol. Display content is
rendered by transforming the XML data using the provided
XSL stylesheet.
Fig. 2. Content integration requirements.
The expected benefit from TFWeb’s content integration ap-
proach is a foundation for a Service-Oriented Architec-
ture (SOA) with composite applications based on Web
services. In addition, the approach focuses on an Enter-
prise Application Integration (EAI) strategy that allows
leveraging of existing investments through existing Web
standards.
For Commercial off the Shelf (COTS) products, the in-
tegration requirement is content integration. To support
application-toapplication integration, the vendor shall pro-
vide supporting data showing how its Web services in-
terface can be used to achieve the equivalent capabilities
as the “out-of-the-box” HTML interface. The granular-
ity of the Web services interface should correspond to the
granularity of business logic codified in the product. If
a COTS product does not have a Web services interface
then an estimate of the level of effort required to develop
such an interface (e.g., using a vendor toolkit) must be
provided. “Out-of-the-box” HTML interfaces can be inte-
grated into the NEP via URL references (i.e., reference
integration). However, the HTML interface needs to be
tested in the NEP because some HTML constructs that
work in a stand alone Web browser mode (i.e., access-
ing the COTS’ HTML interface directly) will not work
within a portal environment (e.g., dynamically generated
relative URL, frameset, etc.).
3. Lessons learned
3.1. Management
This section presents organizational and process lessons
learned from the management perspective.
Identify and overcome social resistance. In general,
management commitment on all IT initiatives is impor-
tant. However, management commitment is essential for
enterprise-wide IT initiatives. Voluntary compliance with
strategic business changes will generally not produce the
speed or depth or change required. Program managers have
previously defined assumptions, program requirements,
schedule, and budget. Furthermore, the Web services ar-
chitecture fundamentally changes the business model within
which program managers work. The reason many of our
systems are built as vertical stovepipes is that it is easier to
design, deploy, justify, and support a system that is entirely
controlled by a single program manager. The complexity of
operations and synchronization of business data are trans-
ferred to the operational user or decision maker. Interop-
erability woes are suffered by virtually every user of these
systems. Web services technology breaks this stovepipe
approach by forcing a separation of data, business logic,
and presentation and the accompanying decomposition of
customary monolithic applications.
The TFWeb team has commitment and support at two
levels. Senior navy leadership consisting of flag officers
and Senior Executive Service (SES) civilians have all been
given and acknowledged the mandate from the Chief of
Naval Operations (CNO) that all navy applications be Web-
enabled. The other layer demonstrating support and com-
mitment for the enterprise Web enabling effort is the layer
of technicians, engineers, and programmers who implicitly
understand the technical drivers for Web enablement. In-
deed, this layer did not need to be “sold” on the value of this
initiative as they’ve been battling with the consequences of
stovepiped systems for years. The most challenging layer
to convince has been the middle layer of program managers
who have specific program and budget goals and have in-
centives to continue the existing system of funding and
development.
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Fig. 3. Architectural decisions.
Simplify integration. A majority of the resistance to any
enterprise-wide IT initiative is motivated by the perceived
complexity and level of effort required to comply. This
resistance is compounded if the developers and/or program
managers perceive that the standards to which they must
develop is in flux or is incomplete.
TFWeb began with a very aggressive schedule and re-
leased a pilot portal and development documentation within
180 days of its establishment. Unfortunately, this resulted
in the external developers bearing the brunt of the learn-
ing experience as the Web-enabled environment took shape.
By the time the NEP architecture had stabilized, many de-
velopers had become wary of the changing development
standards and continued development at a much more cau-
tious pace.
In order to overcome this problem, the architecture should
be developed and deployed to a very limited audience
consisting largely of developers eager to make the sys-
tem work. Their feedback should be incorporated into de-
sign revisions. External developers should not be included
until the design has stabilized to the point where back-
ward compatibility is reasonably assured as the architec-
ture moves forward. Future architecture releases should be
publicly scheduled far in advance and adequate backward
compatibility must be ensured over a reasonable period
of time.
Once the design has stabilized, a set of small, completed
examples should be developed and distributed. “Learning
through examples” is a popular learning approach among
software developers. In addition to distributing examples,
the process of compliance should be simplified.
Identify and integrate key enterprise content/services.
The first production version of the NEP was deployed as
a piece of the infrastructure where content was to be pro-
vided by the existing application owners. Initial acceptance
of the NEP instance would have been accelerated had it ini-
tially included a set of tools in common use across the en-
terprise. In this case, basic collaborative tools such as chat,
message boards, content management, and white boarding
are excellent examples of enterprise content that proved
compelling to our user base.
The initial non-availability of these services arises from the
fact that the navy enterprise does not acquire and deploy
applications in an enterprise fashion. Instead, each navy
program supporting a specific user community will pur-
chase implementations of these functions. This has yielded
a costly, duplicative, and noninteroperable suite of tools
that were difficult to individually integrate into the NEP.
Ultimately, TFWeb elected to use some of the broadest ex-
isting licenses to deploy an initial capability and address
the need for enterprise procurement to fulfill longer-term
requirements.
3.2. Technical
This section presents architecture and/or integration and
content lessons learned from the technical perspective.
In reviewing the progress of TFWeb, there were several
architectural decisions that were fundamental to the qual-
ity of the current WEN architectural. Figure 3 illustrates
the important architectural decisions and their outcomes.
First, the recognition of the importance of XML as an in-
terface technology among the U.S. Navy’s heterogeneous
IT environments laid the foundation for adopting enter-
prise focused technology such as Web services. Second,
the decision to adopt server-side XSL transformation led
to the development of the portal connector component that
provides an abstraction interface between the portal engine
and the back-end applications. In addition, the server-side
XSL transformation decision led to the emphasis on in-
tegrating content as XML formatted data. This emphasis
is the motivation for the TFWeb’s content integration re-
quirements. The TFWeb’s content integration requirements
are the foundation of the application-to-application integra-
tion strategy allowing data to be accessed without requir-
ing parsing through HTML or propriety formats. Overall,
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the emphasis of Web services in the TFWeb’s content in-
tegration requirements provide a simple yet powerful so-
lution to issues such as portal-to-portal communication,
where portlet content can be syndicated to other portals
(e.g., syndicating portlets content from constituent portals
to the enterprise portal). (NOTE. It is important to note
that while emerging portlet standards such as WSRP and
JSR-168 provide a standard interface for integrating con-
tent into portal addressing TFWeb’s application-toportal
integration dimension, they do not solve the TFWeb’s
application-to-application integration dimension because
their interface can only return data embedded in HTML
fragments for display. Thus, if the content consumers want
the raw data, an HTML parser is required. As for TFWeb’s
content integration approach, the data is always available
in XML.)
Develop architectural guiding principles. Architectural
guiding principles convey the criteria, aligned with program
vision or requirements, for selecting candidate solutions or
technology products. This aspect is essential in an IT initia-
tive that involves many organizations with often-conflicting
objectives.
Develop a technology roadmap. In general, a technology
roadmap document promotes an active technology manage-
ment approach that helps organizations identify and track
candidate technologies for adoption. Specifically, a technol-
ogy roadmap is the best place to provide the rationale for se-
lecting a candidate technology/product because it contains
comparisons at both the technology and technology product
levels (e.g., identifying dead-end technology). With a tech-
nology roadmap and its taxonomy of technology, organiza-
tions can quickly evaluate emerging technologies or avail-
able technology products. In addition, proof-of-concept
prototypes should be performed to gain insights into
potential implementation risks. A technology roadmap
document should be developed as a companion document
to an architecture document. While a technology roadmap
captures the rationale for adopting technologies, an archi-
tecture document mainly focuses on describing the archi-
tecture with emphasis on describing the interactions and
functionalities of architectural components.
Emphasize server-side implementation. In any enter-
prise-wide deployment, the mandate of one client device is
not realistic. Hence, server-side implementations of candi-
date technology should be considered to facilitate the rapid
technology insertion while avoiding software distribution
problem such as Web browser upgrade. An example is
the adoption of XSL technology. Through prototypes, the
TFWeb team discovered that XSL client-side processing is
only available starting with Microsoft Internet Explorer 5.5.
In addition, there were several server-side XSL engines with
different interfaces. To ensure consistent XSL engine inter-
face and behavior, TFWeb team adopted a specific server-
side XSL engine.
Emphasize portal abstraction. The enterprise portal mar-
ket is still evolving. In fact, many of the risks that TFWeb
team faced during the beginning of WEN initiative are still
valid (i.e., market volatility). TFWeb developed two archi-
tectural components to provide an abstraction around the
portal engine to minimize ripple effects when the portal
engine is replaced. The first component is the portal con-
nector. Its function (e.g., portlet context info) is similar
to the set of interfaces being defined in emerging portlet
standards such as WSRP and JSR-168. The other com-
ponent is an external portlet registry. The original inten-
tion for the external portlet registry was primarily manage-
ment of portlet information, where the portlet many not be
Web services- based. However, as the NEP architecture
evolved to adopt Web services the external portlet registry
has evolved to become a Web services registry that com-
plies with the Universal Description, Discovery and Inte-
gration (UDDI) standard.
In the striving for maintaining an abstraction layer between
the portal and the content providers, NEP use of the por-
tal has been limited to just presenting the portlets’ content.
A desirable goal is to access more of the portal’s func-
tionalities (e.g., virtual community, federated search) via
a standard interface.
Develop a comprehensive content integration strategy.
The major challenge in any integration effort is implement-
ing a common protocol and data format for disparate sys-
tems to communicate. Figure 4 illustrates the design of
a Web services complying with the TFWeb’s content inte-
gration strategy. TFWeb’s approach of using XML to for-
mat data along with metadata and document-centric Web
services as the common protocol provide a flexible foun-
dation for integration with some unexpected benefits:
• XML-enabled database. Most available database
products provide support for formatting result set data
in XML, thus, providing content producers an effi-
cient method to produce XML-formatted data.
• Web services interoperability. Since TFWeb adopted
an XML-centric design before adopting Web ser-
vices, most of the content providers were already pro-
ducing XML-formatted data. As a result, their mi-
gration to a Web services interface was easy. Specif-
ically, the Web services method parameter for ac-
cessing the data can be string type because the data
is already in XML. The use of string type elimi-
nates a common Web services interoperability prob-
lem between different Web services implementation.
In fact, it is consistent with the recommendations in
WS-I basic profile [3].
• Multiple XML namespace data. One of the profound
benefits of the TFWeb’s content integration strategy
is the ability to produce the same data for different
XML namespaces. Although most databases can for-
mat the result set into XML, the XML tag names are
often mapped to the database column names. One
can build custom Web services serializer to format
the XML tag but this effort is not trivial. A recom-
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Fig. 4. Benefits of content integration requirements.
mended approach is to apply an XSL transforma-
tion to the generated data in order to obtain XML-
formatted data complying with the requester’s XML
namespace.
• Support both integration dimensions. The approach
of using Web services offers a solution that simul-
taneously addresses both the application-to-portal
(i.e., vertical integration – integrated presentation)
and application-to-application (i.e., horizontal inte-
gration – automated business process) integration di-
mensions. For example, portlet content in a con-
stituent portal can be syndicated to an enterprise por-
tal using Web services. As the result, the portlet
content is available at both the enterprise and local
levels. In addition, the presentation of the portlet
content can be easily transformed to comply with the
enterprise “look and feel” because the data is already
in XML.
Emphasize XML-based formats for content. Given that
the main objectives of the WEN initiative are to pro-
vide access to all resources and to support application-to-
application integration, content formatted in using an XML
standard (e.g., Rich Site Summary – RSS) is more efficient
to process and repurpose for different presentation devices.
In addition, XML-formatted data when use with compres-
sion produced bandwidth efficient content.
Emphasize bandwidth efficient content. Communication
bandwidth is always a resource in demand and increas-
ing bandwidth for the whole enterprise is often financially
infeasible. Hence, content producers should be encour-
aged to review their implementations with an emphasis on
reducing file and storage size through the use alternative
formats. For example, the width and height attributes of
an HTML < IMG/ > tag should not be used to present
a small image of a picture. Instead, the HTML < IMG/>
tag should reference a file of an image that was reduced
using an image editor. Beyond the scope of HTML, graph-
ical content can be represented more efficient in terms of
file size and display quality using new vector-based graph-
ics standards such as Scalable Vector Graphics (SVG) and
Extensible 3D (X3D) Graphics.
TFW has developed several proof-of-concepts demonstrat-
ing that using vector-based graphic formats with compres-
sion can dramatically reduce file size of graphical con-
tent while not compromising the content quality. Further-
more, it was discovered that the combination of JavaScript,
XML-based formats (e.g., SVG, X3D), and Synchro-
nized Multimedia Integration Language (SMIL) support of-
fline content manipulation via the XML Document Object
Model (DOM) interface and only require burst communi-
cation with the server.
4. Summary
Enterprise-wide IT initiative requires a flexible, innovative,
holistic solution that addresses both the technical and man-
agement perspectives. Furthermore, the candidate solutions
have to be evaluated in the larger enterprise context to avoid
selecting local-optimized solutions. While the TFWeb team
has learned many lessons and solved many problems, there
are still some remaining challenges:
– enhance identify management with emphasis on sin-
gle sign on capability;
– enhance portal personalization with an enterprise-
wide replication and synchronization strategy;
– increase core enterprise services to reduce duplica-
tion in implementations among content providers;
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– ensure common “portlet behavior” in addition to
common “look and feel” at the enterprise presen-
tation level;
– increase adoption and usage of metadata across the
enterprise through the use of ontologies.
One remaining challenge for WEN is a typical struggle for
IT initiatives; it is the struggle between developing a long-
term, enterprise-wide solution and developing a solution
that produces results immediately whether or not the so-
lution is consistent with the long-term, enterprise-wide di-
rection. From the beginning, TFWeb has chosen to fo-
cus on developing a long-term vision emphasizing flexi-
bility and robustness of the architecture over portal con-
tent. While a vendor-specific stovepipe approach would
have been much more rapidly fielded, TFWeb opted to deal
with interoperability issues proactively rather than reac-
tively. I hope you will remember Aesop’s fable of the hare
and tortoise when you consider the results of this effort.
We may be viewed as the tortoise in some minds but our
version of a tortoise is scalable and reliable while moving
at the Internet speed.
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Paper Modelling and simulation
of combat operations in SimCombCalculator
application
Tadeusz Nowicki
Abstract—The basis of the article is mathematical discrete
problem connected with local military battle. The problem
consists of two dependent problems. One of them shows how
to find our troops allocation to enemy’s troops. The bat-
tle damage assessment function for the problem is proposed.
The second problem is connected with finding global strategy
of attack. Local battle is described by modified Lanchester
model. Two level logistic model is built for describing materi-
als and munitions resupply management processes. This idea
was used in computer simulator SimCombCalculator. The pa-
per shows how to use this simulator for finding attack strategy
from the platoon to brigade level.
Keywords— battlefield model, decision support, mathematical
modelling, computer simulation.
1. Introduction
This article extends the previous research on mathemati-
cal models of military battlefield [1, 2, 4–6] and proposi-
tion of logistic support during the battle [3]. Many up-to-
date mathematical and simulation models of military bat-
tlefield are dedicated to operation and strategy levels of
decision processes. The idea of building battlefield sim-
ulator for lower levels of military structures is interesting
from the practical point of view. Mathematical problems
formulated for finding strategy of attack are usually compli-
cated. Methods for solving these problems are complicated
as well. They need high computer speed and memory.
For lower levels of decision processes on the battlefield we
have not so complicated problems. It comes from number
of troops, not so large terrain, rather poor logistic pro-
cesses, etc. Implication from these assumptions is chance
to design computer simulator for commanders which will
be used and perform on for example palmtop.
In the paper the problem of mathematical designing the at-
tack against enemy in the local battle is shortly described.
In order to prepare the best plan of attack in a short time
there should be investigated special methodology. Mathe-
matical or other formal models, optimization problems and
methods for solving these problems are very important in
that methodology.
In the model a battlefield area is divided into sectors small,
quadratic and nearly homogeneous in the sense of size. Our
site in the local battle has finite number of military units
used in strategy of attack. Each military unit should be
displaced to appointed target. The route of military unit to
target is described by sequence of sectors.
Military units are described by many characteristics. We
can divided them into subgroup: localization, military
equipment, weapon, warfare, combat material, petrol and
munitions, and so one. Each sector on the battlefield is
characterized by enemy defense power in that sector. From
this point of view routes of military units to targets are dif-
ficult for covering. This paper is prepared to show a few
formal problems that should be solved during an attack de-
signing:
– model of battlefield terrain reducing into sectors
which depends on defense abilities;
– the problem of military units allocation to selected
targets;
– the analysis of probabilistic characteristics of sectors
crossing by military units;
– the problem of solving local battle;
– the problem of dynamic route modification;
– the problem of start and finish point and circum-
stances in simulation model.
It was built computer simulator SimCombCalculator (sim-
ulation of combat, calculator – SCC). Simulator is based
on primitive database that contains information about both
sides of conflict and terrain. Procedures connected with
methods finding strategy of attack and user interface is
made in Delphi environment.
2. The model of attack against enemy
We assume that strategy of attack made by single military
unit against enemy is represented by i’ts target, located in
particular sector, and sequence of many small and nearly
homogeneous sectors as a way to this target.
Let
S = {1, 2, 3, . . . , s, . . . , S} (1)
is set of sector indexes (numbers). Information about sec-
tors neighborhood is defined and described by matrix
D = |di j|s×s (2)
where di j = 1 when ith sector is in neighborhood (is so
called “next”) of jth sector and di j = 0 otherwise.
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If we assume that number of our military units taking part
in attack is N then: an is index of initial (starting) sector for
nth military unit (n = 1, . . . , N), bn is index of final sector
for nth military unit and there is sector in which target of
nth military unit attack is (n = 1, . . . , N), tn is the moment
of nth military unit start to mission (n = 1, . . . , N), vns is
mean time passed by nth military unit to cross the distance
of sth sector area, (n = 1, . . . , N, s = 1, . . . , S).
So that
a = (a1, a2, . . . , an, . . . , aN) (3)
is vector of starting sectors for our military units,
b = (b1, b2, . . . , bn, . . . , bN) (4)
is vector of final sectors for our military units (in which
there are targets for military units),
t = (t1, t2, . . . , tn, . . . , tN) (5)
is vector of starting moments of our military units.
We decide to make discrete intervals of time during an
attack performance. So, let
T = {1, 2, 3, . . . , t, . . . , T} (6)
is set of essential moments considered in our model.
The schedule of an attack strategy can be described by
matrix
x =
[
xnst
]
N×S×T , (7)
where xnst = 1, when nth military unit is in sth sector while
tth moment and xnst = 0 otherwise.
In general point of view the schedule of an attack strategy
described by matrix have to satisfy conditions given below:
xnst ∈ {0, 1}, n = 1, N, t = 1, T , s = 1, S, (8)
in one moment each military unit should take place only in
one sector
S
∑
s=1
xnst = 1, t = 1, T , n = 1, N , (9)
after obtaining final sector military unit don’t move in our
model
xnbnt ≤ xnbn(t+1), t = 1, T−1, n = 1, N , (10)
before beginning the mission military unit is continuously
in start sector
xnant = 1, t = 1, tn, n = 1, N, (11)
military unit should cross borders only of next sectors
xns1t + xns2(t+1)−ds1s2 ≤ 1 (12)
for s1, s2 ∈ S, t = 1, T−1, n = 1, N, military unit cross
sector not longer than vns
T
∑
t=1
xnst ≤ vns, s = 1, S, n = 1, N (13)
military unit should cross sector continuously
vns∑
k=1
xns(t+k) ≥ vns
(
xns(t+1)− xnst
)
(14)
for t = tn, T−vns, s = 1, S, n = 1, N.
3. Probabilistic parameters of sectors
The probability ζs(m) of a single military unit down and
out in the sth sector when m enemy’s military units are in
this sector must be determined. It is done in two steps. At
the first step, the probability of single military unit down
and out is considered separately. At the second step, the
allocation of targets (may be enemy’s units) in every sectors
to our military units is considered.
Let assume, that the one type of enemy’s military units
are in the sector. Than the probability of down and out
the single military unit is known from for example Lanch-
ester model or each other. We can estimate the number of
required enemy’s units that are needed for destroying our
single military unit. The rule of military unit destroying is
determined in dependence on type of our military unit and
enemy’s unit type.
We can estimate probability ζs(m) even from models pre-
sented in [1] and [2] where many schemes like Bernoulli
scheme, Poisson scheme are used or described on the
basis of semi-regenerative process ϕ(t) = ηv(t)
(
t−SN(t)
)
t ≥ 0, where v(t) is semi-Markov process with state
space Y = {0, 1, 2, . . . , m}, which describes a process of
number military units changing in the sector, SN(t) is
the last moment of v(t) changing and N(t) is the num-
ber of the process state changing in the [0, t) interval.
The ηi(t), (i∈Y ) processes are independent with states, de-
noting of military units numbers, which are ready to fight.
The {ηi(t),τi, i ∈ Y} is a class of death processes ηi(t)
on the interval 0 ≤ t < τi, particularly, there are homoge-
nous Markov chains, which describe ways of regeneration
and decreasing of units military means in dependence on
semi-Markov process v(t) state.
4. The Battle Damage
Assessment Function (BDA-F)
Another problem is to determine the allocation targets to
our military units. We suppose that two sides are on the
battlefield. We consider situation in which weapon of our
N military units are used to destroy M units of enemy’s
side. It is possible to accept such simplify conditions:
– weapons which belongs to decision maker are homo-
geneous in the sense of its destroying and additive
potential;
– argument of BDA-F function is the destroying power
potential which decision maker decide to attach in
order to damage a specific target;
– BDA-F function of targets is increase function;
– zero value of destroying power potential causes zero-
value of BDA-F function of target;
– BDA-F function accumulate target’s destruction ob-
tained during the local combat because it is a closed
process;
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– above a certain value of destroying power potential
attached to a target it’s BDA-F function is nearly
equal to it’s total value;
– we know the probability of destroying effectiveness;
it depends on the number of elements of side A which
try to destroy side B and depends on the number of
element of side B being damaged;
– for every element we know that the value of BDA-F
function indicate the level of element’s losses ade-
quate to a certain value of destroying power potential
attached to this element;
– we can accept an assumption that each kind of de-
stroying power potential can be represented by real
number as multiplicity of a certain standard destroy-
ing power potential.
The last assumption comes form a real military method
connected with a certain standard representation for every
destroying power potential.
Assumptions listed above enable us to approximate BDA-F
function of target, for the side A, by real function as fol-
lows [2, 5]:
hn(y) = Cn
(
1− e−αn pnyn
)
, n ∈ 1, N , (15)
where: yn – destroying power potential of our side allocated
to the nth target of enemy’s side, Cn – value of mth target,
pn – probability of successful attack, αn – function which
represents sensitiveness of nth target of side B to unitary
destroying power potential allocated to it.
5. The military units allocation to targets
Let we assume that there are M enemy’s objects as targets
for our military units. For enemy’s looses estimation we
assume that we know global destroy potential of our units.
We are looking for optimal allocation vector of destroy
potential of our military units to targets
y =
[
ym
]
M , (16)
where ym is the global destroy potential of our military units
attached to mth enemy’s target in order to damage it. In the
first step we assume that vector y has continuous variables
as coordinates.
It is easy to show that the problem of finding the strategy of
fighting is as follows: if K is the global destroying poten-
tial K of our military units we are looking for such y∗ ∈ Y
which meets
N
∑
n=1
Cne−αn pny
∗
n = min
y∈Y
N
∑
n=1
Cne−αn pnyn , (17)
where
Y =
{
y ∈ RN :
N
∑
n=1
yn ≤ K, yn ≥ 0, n = 1, N
}
. (18)
Lagrange function for this problem is as follows:
L(y, u) =
N
∑
n=1
Cne−αn pnyn +u0
( N
∑
n=1
yn−K
)
−
N
∑
n=1
unyn . (19)
Kuhn-Tucker differential conditions for the problem above
can be presented as below:
∇yn L(y, u) =−αn pnCne−αn pnyn +u0−un = 0 , (20)
n = 1, N ,
∇u0 L(y,u) =
N
∑
n=1
yn−K ≤ 0 , (21)
∇un L(y,u) =−yn ≤ 0, n = 1, N , (22)(
∇uL(y,u), u
)
= u0
( N
∑
n=1
yn−K
)
−
N
∑
n=1
unyn = 0, n = 1, N .
(23)
We can show [1] that the problem can be solved by very
effective method that uses the final formula (it is effect of
solving Kuhn-Tucker differential conditions) [2, 5]:
y∗n =
−1
αn pn
ln
(
e−K
N
∏
m=1
(αm pmCm)
)g
αn pnCn
, (24)
where
g =
1
N
∑
m=1
1
αm pm
. (25)
If all elements of vector y are nonnegative than this vector
is optimal for our problem. If not, we put all negative
elements of vector y into zero and for the other elements
we use the formula given above.
Now we should allocate our military units to targets that
give us similar destroying potential as we calculate from
solution above. So, we modify vector y to discrete vector.
This provides us additionally to obtain values of vec-
tor b coordinates.
It is worth to remark that parameter pn we can calculate
as product of values ζs(m) from the shortest paths from
starting sectors to target sectors. The problem of finding
the shortest paths we can solve with one of the well-known
methods in theory of graphs.
6. The criterion function for strategy
of attack
We propose objective function for attack evaluation in the
following form:
F(x) =
N
∑
n=1
wn
S
∑
s=1
T
∑
t=2
xnst
1
vns
ζs
(
N
∑
k=1
xks(t−1)
)
, (26)
where
wn ∈ [0, 1], n = 1, N,
N
∑
n=1
wn = 1 , (27)
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are coefficients connected with values of targets which
will be destroyed by particular military unit, ζs(m) :
{1, 2, 3, . . . , N}→ℜ, is the function connected with prob-
ability of a single military unit (of m military units being
in sth sector) success crossing.
We are looking for such x∗, which gives us
F(x∗) = max
x∈X
F(x) . (28)
7. Recurrent method for solving
the problem
The recurrent algorithm for searching the best attack sched-
ule is proposed. At first we should have the shortest routes
for each target. Then we can solve the problem of military
units allocation to targets. Having solution of allocation
problem we are able to looking for first estimation of op-
timal attack schedule. We solve problem (28) with condi-
tions (8)–(14) for decision matrix (7). It is easy to show
that this problem can be solve by well known dynamic pro-
gramming method, because of recurrent formula
xns(t+1)
1
vns
ζs
( N
∑
k=1
xkst
)
. (29)
The solution obtained is input data for improving last mili-
tary units allocation. After that, we can improve last attack
schedule, etc. Finally, if we achieve attack schedule good
enough, for global criterion, we finish our searching.
8. Simulator
Computer simulator SimCombCalculator has possibility to
choose number and kind of troops. It was built special edi-
tor that help us to define every military units on battlefield.
For defining concrete or only type of military troops for
both sides we can use windows given in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1. Interface of SimCombCalculator scenario editor.
We can edit basic characteristics for every military units:
number of unit, level of military structures, kind of unit,
average speed, etc. (Fig. 2).
Fig. 2. Interface for setting basic characteristics of troops.
It possible to describe damage potential connected with
weapons used by military units. Even level of materials
can be defined for each military unit (Fig. 3).
Fig. 3. Interface for any troop materials defining.
Number of tanks, artillery, infantry fighting vehicle, and
people can be described (Fig. 4).
Attrition processes of petroleum oil and lubricants can be
described (Fig. 5).
Attrition processes of munitions can be described as well
(Fig. 6).
The palette in which troops can be located on the battlefield
has following form (Fig. 7).
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Palette is scalable so it is possible to make sectors more
smaller (Fig. 8).
If digital map is necessary to use than simulator offer such
possibility (Fig. 9).
If it is necessary basic information about troops can be
displayed on windows (Fig. 10).
It is possible to put several parameters for simulation, for
example: length of time quantum, frequency of steps, fre-
quency of database recording, etc. (Fig. 11).
Results during the simulation processes are shown on the
window (Fig. 12).
Many characteristics connected witch results of local battles
can be displayed. We can see how many peoples, materials,
and weapons has given military unit in selected moment in
time (Fig. 13).
Fig. 4. Interface for any troop armament defining.
Fig. 5. Interface for main material attrition processes defining.
Fig. 6. Interface for people and munition attrition processes
defining.
Fig. 7. Palette for locating military troops.
Fig. 8. Scalability of SimCombCalculator palette.
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Fig. 9. Digital map as background of SimCombCalculator.
Fig. 10. Monitoring of information about individual troop.
Fig. 11. Palette for simulation parameters setting.
Fig. 12. The fight of troops.
Fig. 13. Monitoring of troops material attrition.
Fig. 14. Monitoring of material attrition in material bases.
Processes of resupply military units with people, materi-
als and other things from company, battalion and brigade
loading points can be shown during simulation (Fig. 14).
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We can see elementary characteristics of military units dur-
ing simulation (Fig. 15).
Fig. 15. Characteristics of military units during simulation.
It is possible to change every selected details during simu-
lation.
The time to obtain the solution is good enough for it’s prac-
tical use in simulation environment for battle description
and analyse.
9. Conclusions
It is proven that simulation application for lower level of
military processes on battlefield can be designed. Even
complicated mathematical problems that are used in sim-
ulator procedures are perform in not too long time. Our
application is rather prototype and professional equipment
for lower level commanders should be built from the be-
ginning. Thus the idea of building mathematical models of
the battlefield and using computer environment for testing
these models is important, necessary and possible at all.
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Abstract—Mobile Internet access is currently available mainly
using 2G/3G cellular telecommunication networks and wire-
less local area networks. WLANs are perceived as a local
complement to slower, but widely available cellular networks,
such as existing GSM/GPRS or future UMTS networks. To
benefit from the advantages offered by both radio access net-
works, a mobile user should be able to seamlessly roam be-
tween them without the need to terminate already established
Internet connections. The goal of this paper is to present an
overview of the profitability of performing vertical handovers
between UMTS and IEEE 802.11b using Mobile IP. Several
simulations have been carried out using NS-2, which prove
that handovers from IEEE 802.11b to UMTS can, under cer-
tain circumstances, be profitable not only when there is no
more IEEE 802.11b coverage. Simulation results show that
a mobile user should be able to roam between these networks
depending on the current available channel bandwidth and
quality, generated traffic type and number of users in both of
them.
Keywords— UMTS, IEEE 802.11b, handover, roaming, Mo-
bile IP.
1. Introduction
Both universal mobile telecommunication system (UMTS)
and wireless local area network (WLAN) technologies en-
able fast Internet access. While UMTS is generally still
in the phase of development with only a few existing in-
stallations, WLANs are already widely deployed. Devices
supporting the IEEE 802.11a and IEEE 802.11b [10] stan-
dards are being manufactured by many companies and are
widely available. Hot spots are installed at most large air-
ports and in other public places such as hotels, train sta-
tions, and restaurants. Users of PDAs or notebooks with
IEEE 802.11 network interface cards can easily access the
Internet in such places, benefiting from the relatively high
bandwidth of WLANs (11 Mbit/s in case of IEEE 802.11b
and 54 Mbit/s in case of IEEE 802.11a).
On the other hand, the coverage offered by WLANs is
quite limited. Those who need to have access to the In-
ternet from almost everywhere must use a cellular net-
work such as GSM/GPRS or UMTS. GPRS offers very
low bit rates (theoretically up to 170 kbit/s, practically
about 50 kbit/s [6]), which is often not satisfactory. 3G net-
works, such as UMTS, offer higher bit rates, theoretically
up to 2 Mbit or even over 10 Mbit using HSDPA and
20 Mbit additionally using MIMO. Practically, for slow
moving mobile users (pedestrians) the available bit rate
should be about 384 kbit/s, although higher bit rates can
be achieved depending on some conditions, such as good
radio conditions or below-average cell load [9].
To enable switching between two different radio access net-
works, mobile users should have a terminal equipped with
two network interface cards or a dual network interface
card, e.g., supporting IEEE 802.11b and UMTS [1]. The
terminal should be able to seamlessly switch (roam) be-
tween both networks without the user noticing it. Such
a mechanism can be provided by Mobile IP [5]. In gen-
eral, when available, the mobile terminal should connect
to the Internet via WLAN to benefit from a higher bit rate
and when it leaves the area covered by WLAN, it should
automatically switch to UMTS. This is an obvious solution
when the user roams between areas with WLAN coverage,
while constantly being in the range of UMTS.
But, under certain circumstances, the efficiency of Internet
access using WLAN could become much worse than us-
ing UMTS. Congestions may occur at the radio interface
(multiple terminals trying to access the same access point
at the same time), in the LAN connecting all APs with an
Internet gateway or on the link connecting the gateway to
the Internet (for example an often used 2 Mbit DSL connec-
tion). It would then be profitable for a terminal to switch
from WLAN to UMTS, despite the still available WLAN
coverage.
There has already been some research done in the field
of using Mobile IP to switch between IEEE 802.11 and
2G/2.5G (GSM/GPRS) networks. Some of the conclu-
sions, such as TCP-related issues, apply to UMTS [11].
But, mainly due to higher available data rates, lower packet
delays and usage of WCDMA in UMTS [9] there are many
issues that have never been discussed before.
In this paper handovers between UMTS and IEEE 802.11b
using Mobile IP are analysed and discussed. The goal
is to determine whether switching from IEEE 802.11b to
UMTS can be profitable when there is both IEEE 802.11b
and UMTS coverage. In the proposed scenario, a mobile
user, equipped with a dual network interface card, accesses
the Internet from a place with overlapping IEEE 802.11b
and UMTS coverage. The mobile terminal may seamlessly
switch between the two available radio access networks us-
ing Mobile IP. The profitability of performing such han-
dovers is analysed, depending both on radio and network
conditions – number of WLAN users, volume and type of
traffic generated by those users, available UMTS channel
bandwidth, and channel BLER. It is proven that, in case of
UMTS, handovers between IEEE 802.11b and UMTS can
be profitable.
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The situation when the terminal leaves the range of the
IEEE 802.11b access point is not analysed, because in such
a case the only possibility is to switch to UMTS, regardless
of available conditions. Such analysis has already been
done for GPRS and in general applies to UMTS.
2. Mobile IP handover overview
Handover describes a mechanism when a user moves
through the coverage of different wireless cells. A han-
dover between wireless cells of the same type is referred
to as horizontal handover, while a handover between cells
of different type is known as vertical handover [4]. Be-
cause IP protocols were designed for stationary systems,
some extensions have been proposed to introduce mobility
support.
The main problem of a handover is that an IP address
uniquely identifies both the end point and host locations.
Because the mobile host can change its localization, there
is a need to update the host’s IP address and route pack-
ets to the mobile host’s new subnetwork. Because of this,
all active connections using the mobile host’s previous IP
address, e.g., TCP connections, would be broken.
There are some solutions to the mobility problem in IP
networks, e.g., IETF Mobile (MIP) IPv4 [5], IETF Mobile
IPv6 [7], Cellular IP [8] and HAWAII [13, 14]. Because of
hierarchical network division into domains the mobility can
be divided into Inter-domain mobility and Intra-domain mo-
bility. Inter-domain mobility (also called Macro mobility)
is related to a movement from one domain to another. A do-
main is defined as a large wireless network under a single
authority. On the other hand Intra-domain mobility (also
called Micro mobility) refers to user’s movement within
a particular domain.
Almost all solutions that address Micro mobility (e.g., Cel-
lular IP and HAWAII) assume that Mobile IP is only used
for Macro mobility. Because IPv6 is not often used in to-
day’s networks, Mobile IPv4 is perceived as a appropriate
current solution. The protocol aims at continuous TCP con-
nections even though the IP address changes when the han-
dover occurs. The mobile host is assigned a Home Address
that identifies the host in its home network. To solve the
problem of IP addressing, Mobile IP introduces a tempo-
rary Care-of-Address (CoA) in a foreign network. Two new
functions are added to the network infrastructure: a Home
Agent (HA) and Foreign Agent (FA). After the mobile host
moves to the new IP domain it obtains a Care-of-Address
from a Foreign Agent (Foreign Agent Care-of-Address) or
through some external means (Co-located Care-of-Address)
such as DHCP. In the next step the mobile host registers
the new address with its Home Agent. From now on, the
Home Agent tunnels all packets for the mobile host through
the Foreign Agent.
An important issue concerning handover performance is
movement detection. Mobile IP supports three movement
detection schemes: Lazy Cell Switching, Prefix Matching,
and Eager Cell Switching [10]. In the Lazy Cell Switch-
ing scenario the mobile host waits until the lifetime of its
registration expires and then tries to reregister again or to
discover a new Foreign Agent to register with. If Agent
Advertisement messages are not received, then the station
attempts to solicit an advertisement using an Agent Solic-
itation message. In the Prefix Matching scheme the mo-
bile host uses the “prefix extension” to determine whether
a newly received Agent Advertisement is from the same
subnet. If the prefix is different, the mobile host knows
it is connected to a new subnet and registers. Eager Cell
Switching is based on the mobile host receiving beacons
from multiple FAs simultaneously. Once the current FA is
no longer available (e.g., because the mobile has moved)
then it selects a new one form this list.
There are additional movement issues concerning vertical
handover. When the mobile is registered with the FA at the
higher level (with higher cells) and moves into the cell cov-
erage of the lower level (downwards handover) Mobile IP
advertisements can be continuously received. In that case
Eager Cell Switching cannot be used because the mobile is
connected to the previous Foreign Agent.
3. Simulation setup
To simulate handovers between IEEE 802.11b and UMTS
a detailed and realistic simulation environment was created
using Network Simulator 2 (NS2) [12]. In addition to the
already available components such as mobility management
and IEEE 802.11 MAC, support for UMTS radio access
has been implemented. This support takes into account
all significant features of WCDMA and the UMTS radio
protocol stack.
The simulated network architecture is presented in Fig. 1.
It consists of two radio access networks, the UMTS and
IEEE 802.11b access networks, connected via Internet.
The IEEE 802.11b radio access network consists of a single
access point (AP), connected to a 100 Mbit Ethernet LAN,
which is in turn connected to the Internet through a gate-
way, using a 2 Mbit/s link (e.g., DSL). Other APs can be
connected to the same LAN (and the same gateway, which
is not simulated), forming a wireless radio access network.
Moreover, the particular number of mobile terminals are
simulated, all associated with the same AP.
The UMTS architecture adheres to UMTS Release 4 spec-
ifications. The simulated UMTS terrestrial radio ac-
cess network (UTRAN) consists of a single radio ac-
cess network (RAN) controlled by a radio network con-
troller (RNC). One Node-B (working in FDD mode) con-
nected to the RNC via a 155 Mbit/s (STM-1) ATM link
is simulated. A number of mobile terminals can be simu-
lated, all located in the same cell and therefore using the
same Node-B. The RNC is connected to a serving GPRS
support node (SGSN) in the UMTS core network (CN)
via a 655 Mbit/s (STM-4) ATM link. The SGSN is con-
nected via a 655 Mbit/s ATM link to a gateway GPRS sup-
port node (GGSN) that connects the CN to the Internet via
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a 2 Mbit/s link. Only a part of the packet switched (PS)
domain is simulated. Other network elements in the CN
(such as the whole circuit switched (CS) domain, HLR,
VLR, etc.) are neglected, because they do not affect the
simulation. AAL2 is used for transport between RNC and
Node-B and AAL5 between RNC, SGSN and GGSN.
Fig. 1. Simulated network architecture.
Mobility management is performed by the Mobile IP
mechanism, as described in [1, 2] and [5]. The Home
Agent (HA) is located somewhere on the Internet
(where the mobile host obtained its address) and Foreign
Agents (FA) are located in the WLAN’s gateway and in
the SGSN. When a mobile terminal is using the FA,
all traffic must first be sent from the server to the HA
where it is encapsulated and then transferred to the FA,
which performs decapsulation and routes it to the termi-
nal. TCP acknowledgements generated by the terminal
are routed directly to the server, without having to pass
through the HA.
A scenario with overlapping UMTS and WLAN cover-
age, which is the most common scenario in urban envi-
ronments, is considered. It is assumed that the mobile ter-
minal is equipped with either two wireless interface cards,
or a dual UMTS/IEEE 802.11b interface card. Both inter-
faces operate independently, i.e., UMTS and IEEE 802.11b
connections can be active at the same time. This facili-
tates seamless handovers, because there is no time wasted
for a new connection setup (assuming overlapping network
coverage). During a handover from WLAN to UMTS, the
terminal is authenticated and authorized in the UMTS net-
work and a dedicated channel (DCH) is allocated while
data transfer is performed by the IEEE 802.11b interface.
If DCH with satisfactory QoS parameters (generally
throughput and bit error rate) is allocated and the han-
dover is assumed profitable, the actual handover takes place.
During a handover from UMTS to WLAN, the terminal is
first registered, authenticated and authorized by the AP in
the WLAN while the data is still transferred using UMTS.
After successful registration, the handover (when assumed
profitable) takes place and UMTS channels are released.
Such a scenario is simulated, because traffic delivery de-
lays caused by the actual handovers are not additionally
prolonged by authentication, authorization, and resource
allocation mechanisms. User billing, authentication, radio
network ownership (the same or different owners of both
the UMTS and WLAN networks) and similar problems do
not directly affect the simulation and are out of scope of
this paper.
During simulations, the mobile user downloads a file from
a FTP server located on the Internet. This implies the need
for the best available bandwidth, which directly affects
download time. The user’s terminal can perform a handover
either when it leaves or enters the area covered by WLAN
range, or when a network congestion occurs in WLAN.
The average delay between the WLAN gateway
(or the GGSN) and the server have been set to 25 ms,
which is the average value of inter-Europe packet delay in
February 2003 according to Internet traffic measurements
performed by Stanford University [15].
4. IEEE 802.11b and UMTS
configurations
To carry out simulation experiments one AP and a num-
ber of mobile terminals (MT) were configured. Every MT
was associated with the AP. The medium access con-
trol (MAC) sublayer operated in distributed coordination
function (DCF) mode. In that mode the medium access al-
gorithm is fully distributed and every MT uses carrier sense
multiple access with collision avoidance (CSMA/CA) algo-
rithm to access the shared medium. The DCF function is
the basic and obligatory mode
Optional request-to-send and clear-to-send (RTS/CTS)
function was used for all frame lengths, to test the
worst case scenario by generating additional control traf-
fic. RTS/CTS handshake also alleviates the hidden node
problem, that is, when two or more MTs associated with
the same AP cannot hear each other.
In the simulated scenario every mobile station set up an
FTP connection with the server located outside the current
subnetwork. The node utilizes a 2 Mbit/s Internet con-
nection to reach the FTP server. The change of network
conditions has been simulated by increasing the number
of mobile stations. When a mobile station experiences the
lack of sufficient network resources or estimates that the
UMTS network can offer better resources, it can decide to
switch to UMTS.
The constant, one-way processing delay introduced by all
UMTS network elements in CN and UTRAN and by user
equipment (UE, the mobile terminal) is estimated as 60 ms,
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as specified in [3] and [9]. An additional delay is intro-
duced by link buffering and signal propagation, but be-
cause of fast ATM links (STM-1 and STM-4) this delay
is insignificant compared to the processing delay and de-
lay introduced by the radio protocol stack, and the radio
interface.
The configuration of the radio protocol stack in UTRAN
partially determines the delays that occur on the radio in-
terface between Node-B and UE. It is assumed that one
dedicated transport channel (DCH) is allocated for the user
in downlink and one in uplink to guarantee the required
bandwidth. Such a guarantee cannot be made when using
common or shared channels. In UMTS, dedicated chan-
nels with bandwidths up to about 2 Mbit/s can be allo-
cated for a single user, but theoretically only in a fixed
(indoors) environment. UMTS is required to support data
rates of 144 kbit/s for mobile terminals moving with ve-
hicular speeds and 384 kbit/s for terminals moving with
pedestrian speeds (up to about 5 km/h). Because the simu-
lation scenario may include user movement within the area
covered by both networks, it is assumed that a 384 kbit/s
DCH can be allocated most of the time. The available bit
rate can change depending on the load of the cell and on
radio conditions. This is why simulations have also been
performed for downlink channels with bit rates lower than
384 kbit/s, although all have been done for a 32 kbit/s up-
link channel. The uplink channel does not need to provide
high bandwidth, because it conveys mainly TCP acknowl-
edgements and RLC status messages.
Table 1
Radio protocol stack configuration
Parameters Downlink Uplink
Channel rate [kbit/s] 384 32
PDCP mode No-header
RLC mode AM
RLC block size [bits] 320
Logical channel DTCH
Transport channel DCH
TTI [ms] 10
Transport formats 0×320 0×320
1×320 1×320
2×320
3×320
4×320
8×320
12×320
Table 1 presents the radio protocol stack configuration used
in simulations for both the uplink (32 kbit/s) and downlink
(384 kbit/s) channels. Channels with other bandwidths
differ only by the number of transport blocks defined in
transport formats for those channels.
5. Simulation results
In UMTS, when using dedicated channels, the effective
channel throughput depends only on the radio channel
quality, described by the block error rate (BLER) param-
eter. This parameter represents the percentage of trans-
port blocks which encounter bit errors on the radio link
and therefore require retransmission. For BLER = 0%
(no retransmissions) the effective channel utilization is
about 95% because of the addition of UMTS radio pro-
tocol stack headers [1]. This figure can slightly change
depending on the radio protocol stack configuration.
Figures 2, 3, and 4 depict results of simulations in a sit-
uation when the mobile host is connected to the Internet
via UMTS. Average packet delay has been measured be-
tween the server and the mobile host as a function of packet
length, allocated channel bandwidth, and channel BLER.
Because the channel bandwidth, once assigned to a user,
does not change, the actual packet delay is one of the vari-
ables that should be considered while making a handover
decision.
Fig. 2. 100-byte packet delay for UMTS.
Fig. 3. 500-byte packet delay for UMTS.
As can be observed in Figs. 2, 3, and 4, the shorter the
average packet size, the less the average delays that the
packets encounter. This is caused by the fact that even
for small channel bandwidths short packets can be sent
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in just a few TTIs and do not have to be spanned over
several TTIs, as larger packets do. Additionally, shorter
packets fits in the smaller number of transport blocks,
so the probability of packet retransmission (as described
by [3]) is less than for large packets. Applications requir-
ing small packet delays should use short packets (at least
when using dedicated channels with small throughput) to
minimize the delays.
Fig. 4. 1000-byte packet delay for UMTS.
Throughput and packet delay experienced by a mobile sta-
tion in WLAN are depicted in Figs. 5 and 6. According to
the simulation scenario, in Fig. 1 the maximum throughput
is limited by the bandwidth of the leased line connecting the
WLAN to the Internet (2 Mbit/s). Generally, as the num-
ber of mobile hosts in the current subnetwork increases, the
network conditions deteriorate. This is because of limited
radio resources that must be shared by all stations.
Fig. 5. Average throughput per station in WLAN.
Bandwidth utilized by the mobile host depends on the
average size of transmitted packets. For shorter packets
the MAC protocol overhead becomes substantial and av-
erage throughput deteriorates. This is mainly because of
RTS/CTS handshake. When packets are short the data
transmission time is small in comparison to the control
frames exchange period.
Fig. 6. Average packet delay in WLAN.
Average packet delay increases as network load increases
and then saturates at a certain level. Packet delay is limited
because the TCP protocol does not send more packets than
can fit in the TCP window.
The handover itself does not cause any additional packet
delay nor interrupts packet delivery – a route to the mobile
host is always known by the Home Agent. This is because
two independent network interface cards for UMTS and
IEEE 802.11b are assumed to be used. Before perform-
ing the handover by the Mobile IP mechanism, the mobile
host is already connected to both radio access networks
and can access both Foreign Agents. These connections
must be already established, because the mobile host has
to have some knowledge about the available throughputs
and delays in each network before making the handover
decision. After the decision is made, the Mobile IPv4 han-
dover mechanism [5] is invoked to switch controlling the
Mobile Host from one Foreign Agent to another, in the
other radio access network.
During the Mobile IP message exchange packets are sent
continuously through one Foreign Agent and, after the
Home Agent receives the new Registration Request, they
immediately start being sent through the other Foreign
Agent. The only delay in receiving packets may be caused
by the difference in packet delays in both access networks
and can be estimated at the time of making the han-
dover decision (assuming that the average packet delays are
known).
6. Conclusions
Mobile users can roam between UMTS and IEEE 802.11b
not only when there is no WLAN coverage (which is the
typical reason), but also when resources offered by UMTS
are better than those offered by a reachable IEEE 802.11b
network. It has been proven through simulations that,
depending on experienced network conditions, handovers
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between IEEE 802.11b and UMTS can be profitable.
A mobile user equipped with two network interface cards
or a dual network interface card able to manage UMTS and
IEEE 802.11b radio connections independently can benefit
from the possibility of seamless roaming between the two
available radio access networks. UMTS, unlike 2G sys-
tems, offers satisfactory channel throughput and QoS for
most applications. Depending on QoS requirements of the
generated traffic, a mobile user can choose to switch to
a radio access network that offers the most suitable QoS
conditions, e.g., guaranteed throughput or average packet
delay.
Currently, work is being done to specify an optimal crite-
rion that the mobile host can use to switch between avail-
able access networks. It should take into account network
conditions, which can be hard to accurately measure or es-
timate. Simulation results presented in this paper may help
by providing some reference values.
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Paper Boolean feedback functions
for full-length nonlinear shift registers
Izabela Janicka-Lipska and Janusz Stokłosa
Abstract—In the paper a heuristic algorithm for a random
generation of feedback functions for Boolean full-length shift
register sequences is presented. With the help of the algorithm
one can generate n-stage Boolean full-length shift register se-
quences for (potentially) arbitrary n≥ 6. Some properties of
the generated feedback functions are presented.
Keywords— cryptography, shift registers, Boolean functions.
1. Introduction
Nonlinear shift registers generating full-length sequences,
also referred to as de Bruijn sequences, have many appli-
cations in modern communications systems, especially in
cryptography as components of complex devices and algo-
rithms in cipherment and decipherment processes. There
exists a number of methods for the generation of full-length
sequences (cf. [1, 2, 6]).
In the paper we present some results of experiments done on
nonlinear Boolean functions. The functions used as feed-
back functions of shift registers give full-length sequences
generated by these shift registers. We generated all func-
tions for n-stage shift registers, for n = 3, 4, 5 and 6. The
experiments led us to the heuristic algorithm for generating
n-stage full-length shift registers, where the number n of
stages is sufficiently great.
2. Preliminaries
Let Zn2 be n-dimensional vector space over the finite
field GF(2). An n-argument Boolean function is a map-
ping f : Zn2 → Z2. Let An be the set of all n-argument
affine Boolean functions. Every Boolean function which is
not affine is said to be nonlinear.
Let f (xn−1, xn−2, . . . , x0) = yz and let z be the decimal
equivalent of the function’s argument, i.e., such a positive
integer that for each argument (xn−1, xn−2, . . . , x0) we have
z = xn−1 ·2n−1 + xn−2 ·2n−2 + . . . + x0 ·20 .
Then [y2n−1, . . . , y1, y0] is called the truth table of f . The
value y0 is the least significant value in the truth table and
y2n−1 is the most significant value. We divide the table
[y2n−1, . . . , y1, y0] into two subtables: least significant
[y2n−1−1, . . . , y1, y0]
and most significant
[y2n−1, . . . , y2n−1+1, y2n−1 ] .
For each truth table of an n-argument Boolean function
we compute the decimal value of its 4-bit codes in the
following way:
1) divide the truth table into 2n−2 words; each word is
composed of 4 bits;
2) compute the decimal equivalent for every word;
3) compute the algebraic sum of all decimal equivalents.
As an example let the truth table of 5-argument Boolean
function be given:
[00000101100101001111101001101011].
There are eight 4-bit words in the table:
0000 0101 1001 0100 1111 1010 0110 1011
The decimal equivalents of the words and their sum are as
follows:
[0000 0101 1001 0100 1111 1010 0110 1011]
0 +5 +9 +4 +15 +10 +6 +11 = 60.
The definitions presented below are taken from [4]. The
Boolean function is said to be balanced if in its truth
table the number of ones equals the number of zeros. An
n-argument Boolean function f is a function with linear
structure if there exists a ∈ Zn2 such that a 6= (0,0 . . . , 0)
and for every x ∈ Zn2 either f (x)⊕ f (x⊕ a) = 0 or f (x)⊕
f (x⊕ a) = 1. The Hamming distance of two n-argument
Boolean functions f and g, presented with the help of
their truth tables, is the number of positions in which the
two truth tables differ. The distance of a function f to
the set An is defined as the minimum of the Hamming dis-
tances to all functions of An. The nonlinearity of f , denoted
by N f , is the minimal Hamming distance between f and An.
If f is n-argument, n≥ 3, and it is balanced then [5]:
N f ≤


2n−1−2
1
2 n−1−2, for n even⌊⌊
2n−1−2
1
2 n−1
⌋⌋
, for n odd,
where
⌊⌊
x
⌋⌋
denotes the maximum even integer less than
or equal to x.
An n-stage nonlinear feedback shift register over GF(2)
(nNFSR for short) consists of n cells (n ≥ 1) joined as in
Fig. 1, where symbols of a nonempty alphabet {0, 1} may
be put in as a Boolean function f of n arguments. The
content of all n cells is said to be a state of nNFSR. The
nNFSR works in the discrete time. The state of nNFSR at
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a given moment t + 1 (t ≥ 0) is determined by its state at
the moment t and results from shifting the content of the
cell number r to the cell number r +1 (0≤ r≤ n−2), and
putting the value f (xn−1, xn−2, . . . , x0) of the function f
for the state of this nNFSR at the moment t into the cell
number 0.
Let us mention that the numbering of register cells is
crucial for the algorithm of feedback functions choosing
presented later.
Fig. 1. An n-stage shift register with the feedback function f .
Let s = (xn−1,xn−2, . . . ,x0) be the state of an nNFSR. The
state s0 from which the nNFSR starts the work is said to
be initial. A sequence (si) of states of an nNFSR is pe-
riodic with period equal to T if T is the smallest positive
integer such that for each i = 1, 2, . . . the condition si+T = si
holds. An nNFSR generates periodic sequences of the pe-
riod T ≤ 2n. A sequence of states generated by nNFSR
is called a full-length sequence if T = 2n. Each nNFSR
generates B(n) = 22
n−1−n full-length sequences [2].
In the sequel a sequence (si) of states generated by an
nNFSR with a nonlinear n-argument Boolean function f
will be called a sequence generated by the function f . An
nNFSR that generates a full-length sequence is called full-
length shift register.
3. Properties of feedback functions of
full-length shift registers
Using the exhaustive search in the set of all n-argument (for
n = 3, 4 and 5) Boolean functions we chose all functions
which give, when used as feedback functions, full-length
sequences. We can state the following facts.
Fact 1: The least and the most significant bits of the
most significant truth subtable equal 0.
Fact 2: The most significant truth subtable has an
odd number of 1s.
Fact 3: The least significant truth subtable is the
negation (i.e., respective bits are negated) of the most
significant truth subtable.
Fact 4: The sum of decimal equivalents of 4-bit
words in the truth tables equals 2n+1 − 2n−3 = 15 ·
2n−3 (i.e., 15, 30, 60 for n = 3, 4, 5, respectively).
Fact 5: Nonlinear n-argument (for n = 3, 4, 5)
Boolean function generating full-length sequence is
balanced (follows from the Fact 3) and is of linear
structure.
Fact 6: The greater number of 1s in the truth table
the greater value of nonlinearity.
Fact 7: The nonlinearity N f of obtained function has
one of the values: 2, 6, 10, . . . , and in general it is
equal to 2+4i for i = 0, 1, 2, . . .. The nonlinearities
never have the maximum value 2n−1−2
1
2 n−1−2 for
n even and
⌊⌊
2n−1−2
1
2 n−1
⌋⌋
for n odd.
There is 226 6-argument nonlinear Boolean functions gen-
erating full-length sequences. Choosing all of them by ex-
haustive search in the set of 264 6-argument Boolean func-
tions is difficult with respect to the time needed for com-
putation. Therefore, it was assumed that Facts 1–4 are true
also for n-argument (n ≥ 6) functions. This assumptions
leads to the following algorithm.
4. Algorithm for choosing all
n-argument (n≥ 6) nonlinear
Boolean functions generating
full-length sequences
Input: The most significant truth subtable of n-argument
nonlinear Boolean function given by [y2n−1, . . . , y2n−1+1,
y2n−1 ].
Output: The set of all n-argument nonlinear Boolean func-
tions (given by the truth tables) generating full-length se-
quences, n≥ 6.
Method:
1. Let y2n−1 = 0 and y2n−1 = 0.
2. For i = 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, . . . , 2n−1 − 3 generate in the
lexicographical order the words y2n−2, . . . , y2n−1+2,
y2n−1+1 having i 1s; for each word:
a. Construct the most significant subtable.
b. Construct the least significant subtable by the
negation of all bits in the most significant sub-
table.
c. Concatenate the tables constructed in steps 2a
and 2b.
d. Verify whether the sum of decimal equivalents
of all 4-bit words equals 15 · 2n−3; if not then
process for the next i.
e. Verify whether the n-stage shift register with
the feedback function given with the help of the
truth table constructed in the step 2c generates
the sequence of period 2n; if so then store the
truth table.
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The number of all words of the form y2n−2, . . . , y2n−1+2,
y2n−1+1 with i 1s equals
(2n−1−2
i
)
.
Hence, the number of all words having the odd number
1, 3, 5, 7, 9, . . . , 2n−1−3 of 1s is equal to
s(n) =
(
2n−1−2
1
)
+
(
2n−1−2
3
)
+
(
2n−1−2
5
)
+ . . .+
(
2n−1−2
2n−1−3
)
= 22
n−1−3 .
If by the efficiency of the algorithm we understand the
quotient η of the number B(n) of all n-arguments nonlinear
Boolean functions generating full-length sequences and the
number s(n) of all examined functions, then
η = B(n)
s(n)
= 2−n+3 .
For example, if n = 16 the efficiency η = 2−13. It means
that on average one function in the set of 8192 functions
has the required property. The efficiency of the algorithm
is quite satisfactory.
If in the algorithm instead of “generate in the lex-
icographical order the words y2n−2, . . . , y2n−1+2, y2n−1+1
having i 1s” we allow “generate randomly the words
y2n−2, . . . , y2n−1+2, y2n−1+1 having i 1s” we can use the al-
gorithm for random generation of Boolean functions gen-
erating full-length sequences for an arbitrary n.
The computational experiment confirmed the efficiency of
the algorithm for 6-argument functions; for all 6-argument
functions Facts 1–7 are true. We verified the randomly
generated functions for n from 7 to 20 and in every case
Facts 1–7 were true.
The algorithm were successfully used in the synthesis of
nNFSRs for FSR-255 family of hash functions [3].
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Paper Technology solutions
for coalition operations
Douglas Wiemer
Abstract— As computer technology has advanced, informa-
tion processing in command, control, communications, com-
puters, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR)
systems has become highly complex. The information pro-
cessed by these systems is usually of a very highly sensitive
nature and is entered into specific systems that are physically
isolated from each other. The physical isolation of these sys-
tems makes it cumbersome to exchange information between
systems. The result is inefficient sharing of sensitive informa-
tion in situations where timeliness of exchange could be a life
or death reality. Since the mid 1990’s, increasing efforts have
been placed on improving coalition operations. Many systems
have been created with the goal to improve the sharing of in-
formation and collaborative planning across coalition bound-
aries. The usability of these systems have had mixed levels
of success and improvements will always be necessary. This
paper will briefly describe three advances in telecommunica-
tions technology that could be leveraged to significantly im-
prove coalition operations. These technologies are; the session
border controller (SBC), advances in pattern matching tech-
nology, and multi-protocol label switching (MPLS).
Keywords— C4ISR, coalition, CCIS, command and control, in-
formation technology, military, defence, telecommunications,
operations, SBC, session border controller, content inspection,
MPLS, multi-protocol label switching, pattern matching, trusted
downgrade, explicit route.
1. Introduction
As computer technology has advanced, information pro-
cessing in command, control, communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) sys-
tems has become highly complex. The information pro-
cessed by these systems is usually of a very highly sensitive
nature and is often sensitive in both hierarchical (top secret,
secret, etc.) levels and non-hierarchical (CANUS, CANUK,
AUSCANUK, etc.) levels. Often, this information is en-
tered into specific systems that are physically isolated from
each other so that mandatory access controls can be main-
tained. The physical isolation of these systems makes it
cumbersome to exchange information between systems of
overlapping security policy. The result is inefficient shar-
ing of sensitive information in situations where timeliness
of exchange could be a life or death reality.
Since the mid 1990’s, increasing efforts have been placed
on improving coalition operations. Many systems have
been created with the goal to improve the sharing of infor-
mation and collaborative planning across coalition bound-
aries. The usability of these systems have had mixed levels
of success.
In general, information domains are separated based on sen-
sitivity of the information that is processed within the do-
main. In some cases, such as in the case of multi-level
secure (MLS) systems, information of differing sensitiv-
ity may be processed within a single system. However,
in the case of MLS systems, the information is still con-
tained by the technology to prevent the inadvertent release
of information from a higher security domain to a lower
security domain. In each case, most systems still follow
the Bell-LaPadula security policy model [1] for control of
access to information of particular sensitivity levels. Ba-
sically, the Bell-LaPadula model allows access to informa-
tion objects based on a “write up” and “read-down” policy.
This means that a subject at a lower sensitivity level can
write into an equivalent or higher sensitivity level, while
a subject of a higher sensitivity level can have read access
to information of an equivalent or lower level sensitivity
level.
While the Bell-LaPadula model is a key policy model for
information security, considerations beyond strict hierarchy
of information causes complications. For example, many
national military systems maintain additional caveats on in-
formation that are not strictly hierarchical. These caveats
may be “eyes only” caveats like CANUS, CANUK, etc. – or
particular operational codewords. Another good example is
the NATO caveat that is placed on information generated
within that information domain. These caveats often cre-
ate subsets of information sensitivity (sometimes termed
“non-hierarchical”) equivalence that become complicated
to control in a coalition environment.
Furthermore, regardless of the presence or absence of par-
ticular sensitivity levels, each nation within a coalition has
national sovereignty considerations that must be handled
in a coalition environment. In most cases, each nation
connecting to a coalition information domain will place
a firewall between their national systems and the coalition
domain. The role of the firewall is to establish access and
information flow control between information domains. In
addition to firewalls, depending on the nature of the infor-
mation, additional cryptographic mechanisms will be used
to ensure the confidentiality of information in transit.
In addition, cryptographic mechanisms provide the means
to verify the integrity of information when received. While
firewalls and cryptography systems provide significant mea-
sure of control over access to and exchange of informa-
tion, they create a complex set of intermediary systems
between two operational users. A basic coalition connec-
tivity picture is provided in Fig. 1. This diagram repre-
sents the conceptual connectivity between any nationally
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sovereign operations environment to a coalition operational
environment.
In the diagram in Fig. 1 the national system operations
represent systems that are under the sole control of a sin-
gle participating nation. These would be systems that are
within the sovereignty of a particular nation. In the coali-
tion operation, there may be many such national systems
connected to the coalition operations domain. The coalition
operations domain is a shared domain of many participating
nations and may often be created for specific operational
purposes.
Fig. 1. Basic coalition connectivity.
Throughout the remainder of the paper, this basic coalition
connectivity diagram will be used to highlight the issues
related to operational needs, created as a result of the pres-
ence of intermediary systems. For the issues described, this
paper will also describe three advances in telecommunica-
tions technology that could be leveraged to significantly
improve current coalition operations. These technologies
are:
– use of session border controller (SBC) technology to
improve interworking of collaborative planning tools
across coalition boundaries;
– use of advanced pattern matching engines for im-
proved information sharing across national domain
boundaries;
– use of multi-protocol label switching (MPLS) explicit
routes (ER) to monitor/control packet flow of sensi-
tive traffic.
2. Collaborative planning tools
2.1. Connectivity and protocol issues
Referring to Fig. 1, systems operating in the UNCLASS na-
tional operational domain that are connected to the coali-
tion operational domain must pass traffic through a fire-
wall. Note that these information domains may alterna-
tively be at some other operationally equivalent sensitivity
level (i.e., sensitive but unclass (SBU)). The firewall con-
trols access and information flow between these information
domains. In general, the firewall policy will be set, such
that all traffic is blocked, except particular types of traf-
fic between particular individuals or machines. In general,
the policy will, as a minimum, place controls based on
a 5-tuple (IP source, IP destination, TCP source, TCP des-
tination, protocol type). Beyond the policies established by
the firewall, network address translation (NAT) compounds
the problem due to the need for mapping and manipulation
of IP addresses at the information domain boundaries.
Classified workstations operating in the national system do-
main are connected in a similar manner via a firewall. How-
ever, note also that Type-1 cryptographic systems are used
to protect the information as it passes through the UN-
CLASS (or other lower operational domains). As a result,
the traffic must be decrypted prior to the firewall in or-
der for the firewall to take appropriate policy decisions and
then be re-encrypted in the coalition environment until it
reaches the classified coalition domain.
In general, security policies are established such that con-
nections between national systems and coalition systems
must be initiated from within the national system and must
use well known (pre-defined) ports. Any unused port is
explicitly blocked. An example of such a policy has been
used by the Canadian Forces in the Joint Warrior Interop-
erability Demonstrations (JWID) and has been described
in [2].
The strict nature of such a policy ensures a strong mea-
sure of control over the flow of information; however im-
plementations limit capabilities for true collaborative plan-
ning. Many collaborative planning tools use a signaling
channel, on a known port, to negotiate a data or session
channel port. Since the data or session port is not known
a priori, the firewall policy is usually configured to block
such traffic. The alternative is to leave a block of ports
open such that the negotiated data port is allowed. While
leaving these ports open solves an operational issue, it also
creates additional security risk. This additional risk is usu-
ally deemed unacceptable and therefore the ports are closed
and the application is denied.
Collaborative planning tools that fall into this category in-
clude voice over IP (VoIP), whiteboarding, chat, video tele-
conferencing (VTC), instant messaging (IM), etc. All of
these applications serve a significant role in coalition col-
laborative planning and most remain a technology challenge
to allow the connection of these tools to national systems.
Thus, the utility of the collaborative planning tools is lim-
ited when national systems specifically deny connection.
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While it may be expected that these limitation have been
solved in recent years since publication of [2], this is not
the case. Since the beginning of 2004, the US government
has released at least two separate solicitations regarding the
issues surrounding collaborative planning tools [3, 4]. It is
recognized that “efficient, seamless ways to share informa-
tion of varying classification levels and political sensitivi-
ties over a single network do not currently exist” [4].
2.2. Session border controller
In 2003, SBCs were voted the number 1 hottest new tech-
nology by Telecom Magazine [5]. Used in the telecommu-
nications industry, SBCs exist “to provide a demarcation
point between two service providers’ VoIP networks, allow-
ing them to manage signalling and control routing for VoIP
traffic” [5]. The key ideas behind the SBC are the manage-
ment of signalling traffic and the routing of the data traffic.
Originally designed to facilitate call setup for VoIP traffic,
the concepts behind the SBC create a controlled interface
between two network domains that are ideally suited for
multi-media applications and protocols – the types of pro-
tocols that support coalition collaborative planning tools.
Sitting at the interface between two information domains,
the SBC intercepts the signalling protocol between two sys-
tems. Taking the example of VoIP, the SBC will monitor
for either of two dominant standards, the session initiation
protocol (SIP) or H.323. When intercepted, the SBC either
directly manages and controls the connection using an inter-
nal application level gateway (ALG), or it uses a separate
control interface protocol to communicate with an exter-
nal ALG system. The mechanisms required to support the
external ALG system are being defined by the Middlebox
Communications Working Group (MIDCOM WG) of the
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF).
While the details of SIP and H.323 differ significantly, the
goal is the same, to establish a voice connection between
two VoIP end points (phones). This paper will focus on
SIP as “some observers believe that SIP will become dom-
inant” [6]. SIP is “an application-layer control (signalling)
protocol for creating, modifying, and terminating sessions
with one or more participants. These sessions include In-
ternet telephone calls, multimedia distribution, and multi-
media conferences” [7]. One of the key benefits of SIP
in the context of coalition interoperability is the fact that
it is media independent. This means that the SIP itself is
not tied to a particular media type (i.e., voice), but can
be used for virtually any type of media traffic (i.e., video,
instant messaging, whiteboarding). This is because negoti-
ation of the media type and the parameters of the session
are negotiated during the call setup process.
SIP supports five facets of establishing and terminating
multimedia communications [7]:
– user location: determination of the end system to be
used for communication;
– user availability: determination of the willingness of
the called party to engage in communications;
– user capabilities: determination of the media and me-
dia parameters to be used;
– session setup: “ringing”, establishment of session pa-
rameters at both called and calling party;
– session management: including transfer and termina-
tion of sessions, modifying session parameters, and
invoking services.
A simplified illustration of SIP being used to initiate and
control a session between two end points is provided in
Fig. 2. The initiating end point sends an “Invite” request to
the recipient. Among other fields, the “Invite” will contain
several fields that relate to the routing of the call to the
recipient. These fields are the “Via” containing the address
expected for response; “To” containing the destination uni-
versal resource identifier (URI) and “From” field containing
the source URI.
Fig. 2. Session initiation protocol.
In addition, the SIP invite will contain a “content-type”
field that is used to identify the media application type
that will be described in the body of the SIP invite mes-
sage. For example, the content-type field may identify “ap-
plication/SDP” to identify the session description protocol
(SDP), used for voice. The body of the SIP invite would
contain parameters associated with the SDP that could be
processed by the recipient to enable the media type. The
“content-type” and the body of the SIP payload are critical
to the SIP message as it will contain the IP address and
dynamic port assignments for any collaborative planning
applications. This information is essential for the operation
of the session border controller, as will be described below.
Assuming that the parameters of the invite are accepted,
and then the recipient of the invite responds with an “OK”
message. This message is acknowledged by the originator
using an “Ack” and the media session is established.
During the course of a session, either end may add or re-
move other media sessions or types as required, by negoti-
ating these sessions through the existing SIP session. When
either end point terminates the session, a “Bye” message is
sent to the other party, which is acknowledged by an “OK”
message.
Not included in the illustration of SIP in Fig. 2 is the SIP
use of proxies. Within the definition of SIP, the protocol
allows for the use of intermediate proxies that are used to
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relay the messages from the initiator to the recipient. Typi-
cally a SIP call will not go directly between two end points
but will instead pass through proxies at the boundary be-
tween different network domains. In the case of a connec-
tion to a coalition network, a proxy would sit at the bound-
ary between the national domain and the coalition domain.
It is possible; however, that additional proxies will be re-
quired as the call request is passed through various points
in the network. This would depend on the overall network
connectivity.
A session border controller acts as a firewall that uses an
application level gateway programmed to understand SIP.
ALGs go deep into the data in the SIP packet and parse
the “content-type” and payload. This allows the ALG to
determine the IP addresses and dynamic ports that are re-
quired to enable the data ports of the collaborative planning
applications. By understanding which ports need opening,
the SBC dynamically opens only those ports needed by
the application, leaving all others securely closed. This
technique of opening small numbers of ports in the fire-
wall dynamically is called “pinholing”. One of the key ad-
vantages of the ALG is that the constant monitoring of
the session ensures immediate knowledge of call termi-
nation, allowing the “pinhole” to be closed immediately
as well.
As described earlier, NAT causes difficulties in the use of
collaborative planning tools. A SIP proxy is used to provide
NAT traversal. The proxy has knowledge of the IP domain
on both sides of the proxy, and separates the SIP call into
two separate calls: one from the end point in the national
domain to the proxy and one from the proxy to the coalition
domain. The proxy is an intermediary control point and
resolves the NAT issue. In most cases, the ALG will also
incorporate a proxy and therefore is able to handle both
NAT issues and the dynamic assignment of ports.
In some instances, the ALG of an SBC will be imple-
mented in a separate device from the firewall. In this case,
the SIP messages will be routed to the separate ALG for
processing. The separate device will then dynamically con-
trol the firewall by telling it the IP address and UDP
(or TCP) port information determined from the SIP pay-
load. This approach using a separate device is being pro-
moted by the MIDCOM WG in the IETF and is illustrated
in Fig. 3.
The advantage of the MIDCOM scheme is that the fire-
wall is not burdened by the impact of processing the SIP
messages. Once the session is established, and pinholes
are created, only the media streams are processed by the
firewall and the impact of media dependent characteristics
for latency, jitter and quality of service are minimized. In
addition, once implemented with a MIDCOM interface, the
firewall no longer needs to be upgraded for each new ap-
plication service. Instead, the ALG can be upgraded sep-
arately, thereby minimizing the operational impact on the
firewall.
In summary, the SBC provides a dynamic firewall solution
that can be used to improve coalition operations. The na-
Fig. 3. ALG as separate signaling proxy.
ture of the connectivity to a coalition network creates dif-
ficulties due to NAT and the firewall policies that block
applications using dynamic port assignments. The SBC
uses proxy enabled ALGs programmed to understand SIP
that dynamically open ports in the firewall. This dynamic
control of ports is termed “pinholing”. The ALG may be
implemented directly on the firewall, or it may be a separate
device that communicates with the firewall using a MID-
COM scheme. The use of the ALG could allow collab-
orative planning tools to span the national and coalition
information domain while minimizing the risks previously
associated with the dynamic port assignments.
3. Trusted downgrade systems
Another area of connectivity that causes difficulties to coali-
tion operations is the interface between higher and lower
level sensitivity domains. As shown in Fig. 1, a trusted
downgrade system would sit at the interface between the
classified operational domain and the UNCLASS or SBU
domain. The role of a trusted downgrade system is to al-
low the approved release of information from the higher
level domain to the lower level domain. Recalling the
Bell-LaPadula model, it is specifically denied by policy to
“write-down”, that is, to pass information from the higher
domain to the lower domain is forbidden.
However, this security model does not account for the “sys-
tem high” nature of the classified operational domain. “Sys-
tem high” refers to the concept that all information in an
information domain is treated as of the highest classifica-
tion of information processed on the system. This means
that despite the fact that some information may not be SE-
CRET, if it is contained in a system that operates at the
SECRET level then it is treated as if it is SECRET. Con-
sequently, strict enforcement of the Bell-LaPadula model
prevents the valid transfer of information from a higher
domain to a lower information domain.
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Recognizing this limitation, there have been several prod-
ucts developed and approved for operation that perform
a trusted downgrade operation. The Radiant Mercury [8]
is one such system developed by Lockheed Martin that
has been in service at least since the mid 1990’s. There
are other similar systems in operation such as the ISSE
Guard [9]. In general, these systems operate on a trusted
computing base (TCB) that has been evaluated and ap-
proved in accordance with one of the trusted computing
evaluation programs, such as the common criteria for in-
formation technology security evaluation (published as ISO
standard 15405). As well, these systems enforce the con-
trol of information release from high to low in one of two
manners. Either they use automated methods to approve
release based on a review of highly formatted messages
such as USMTF messages, or they rely on the approval of
a release authority (i.e., approved email from a valid user
with appropriate rights for release). A concise list of cur-
rent MLS systems in use, including systems used for trusted
downgrade is available at [10].
Taking the RM as an example, the RM release 3.0 serves
two main roles and operates on a Sun platform. The
RM has the capability to automatically review and approve
the release of highly formatted message according to pre-
defined rules. Due to the highly formatted nature of the
message and the extensive rule base, it is possible for ef-
fective controls to be established such that only information
appropriate to the lower sensitivity domain is released to
that lower domain. The second feature of the RM is to
approve the release of imagery files. In this case, the Ra-
dian Mercury operates in a manner similar to most trusted
downgrade systems; an authorized release authority must
identify the file as approved for release and pass the file to
the RM. The RM examines a header that has been applied
to the file by the release authority and passes the approved
image into the lower security domain.
The RM and similar products operate on a TCB that is
based on a trusted operating system running on a general
purpose processor. The operating system is responsible for
the secure containment of information on both the high and
low side of the system and is also responsible for the trusted
transfer of information from the high side to the low side.
This architecture has proved very useful, secure and is able
to meet the needs of some operational requirements. How-
ever, with the growing scope of coalition operations, these
systems may not be able to handle the increased demands
placed on them. The architecture used forces a complete
reassembly of the information content in order for the appli-
cation to scan, parse, review, modify, approve and release
all messages. This is a highly processor and memory in-
tensive process that can be impacted by increased demands
on the system.
On the other hand, modern networking equipment uses dat-
apath technology that is designed to scan, parse, review
and modify information at the packet level. For example,
as a packet is received by a router, the packet header infor-
mation must be scanned and parsed to extract the common
5-tuple information (IP source, IP destination, TCP source,
TCP destination, protocol port). This information is used
as a lookup key for access into a forwarding information
base (FIB). Effectively, the FIB provides instructions to the
datapath to inform it of the actions that should be taken
on the packet. Often, these actions may include the mod-
ification of the packet (i.e., in the case of NAT) prior to
forwarding to the release interface.
At first glance, the technology used in the switch and router
datapath may seem ideally suited to the problem of trusted
downgrade operations at very high rates. However, the
technology widely used in switches and routers has been
engineered for the specific problem of fast header inspec-
tion and forwarding. On the other hand, they are not well
suited to scanning and parsing of information deep within
the payload of a packet or where information spans across
multiple packets. However, the basic technology used in
switches and routers has formed the basis for advanced
pattern matching engines (PME) that support inspection at
higher layers.
3.1. Pattern matching engines
Pattern matching engines have been developed to sup-
port a variety of applications. These applications range
from content switching to intrusion detection and pre-
vention systems (IDS/IPS) to automated anti-virus plat-
forms. PMEs have also been called content inspection en-
gines (CIE) or simply search engines (SE).
There are two main types of PMEs, those that are based
on a Ternary Content Addressable Memory (TCAM) tech-
nology and those that are algorithmic based. PMEs may
optionally support both exact match and regular expression
matching criteria. The TCAM type of PME has a direct re-
lationship to the technology in use in the switch and router
datapath for packet forwarding.
PMEs provide considerable potential for the improvement
of the capability of trusted downgrade systems. The match-
ing engine provides the baseline technology needed to per-
form high speed parsing and review of received information
and the technology is intended to provide pattern match-
ing capability deep into packet contents and across packet
boundaries. An anti-virus scanning feature is a typical ex-
ample where the entire payload of a data stream may need
to be scanned. These applications exist in current products
available on the market.
In some cases, PMEs are available directly from component
suppliers. The PAX.portTM line of devices from IDT [11]
is an example of PMEs available from a component sup-
plier. According to the Linley Group, IDT, Inc. is cur-
rently the market leader in SE components, with Cypress
ranked second [12]. PME components hold promise for
the future of trusted downgrade platforms since they of-
fer a flexible program matching language that can support
a wide range of applications. Unfortunately, this also re-
mains their biggest challenge. Following development of
a system, considerable effort may be required to program
the device for particular application needs of trusted down-
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grade applications. Also, the technology is generally used
for matching against relatively short “keys” or “strings”.
Additional research is required to determine the suitability
of such devices for the multiple match criteria that may be
required, for example, in applications supporting military
message formats (i.e., USMTF).
In addition to the general device supplier category, there are
system vendors that have performed extensive research into
PME technology and use this technology in their platforms.
In this case, the technology is often tuned to the particular
application space. For example, the FortiGateTM line of
products from FortiNetTM makes use of the FortiASICTM
to perform fast pattern matching for anti-virus applica-
tions [13].
At this stage, additional research into the use of PME
technology to support trusted downgrade applications is
required. However, it appears that this technology could
provide better baseline platform capability than the general
purpose processors architectures in use today.
4. Controlled flow of sensitive traffic
4.1. Nature of provider networks
In a multinational coalition operation, connectivity for both
tactical and strategic networks is established through net-
work paths that are likely not a part of the normal grid used
by these nations. As new network paths are created, it is
often a requirement to lease the network from providers.
This leaves the network connectivity paths outside the con-
trol of the national military force requesting the service.
This creates a situation where the provider may route the
traffic through other nations where the owner of the data
may not want traffic to pass.
In fact, even using the standard strategic networks that pro-
vide for normal national operations, the provider may route
traffic through areas where the national military may not
want the traffic to go. Fortunately, in the case of normal
day-to-day operations, the provider provisioned network is
often controlled by strict contractual agreements that pre-
clude routing of traffic through particular areas of the world.
Before considering the mechanisms available to control the
flow of sensitive information, it is important to highlight
why the traffic routes are a concern. On the one hand, all
sensitive operational traffic will be protected from disclo-
sure by some cryptographic means. In the case of classi-
fied operational traffic, Type-I cryptography is used, thereby
providing the assurance that even if intercepted, the traffic
is unreadable and is therefore protected. This being the
case, there it can be argued that the route taken by the
traffic is not a concern.
On the other hand, information system security needs to ac-
count for the integrity, availability and accountability of the
information, not just the confidentiality. Integrity protec-
tion ensures that any modification of the traffic is detected.
In addition, it is desirable that opportunities to modify the
traffic be minimized. It may be beneficial to know that
the traffic has been tampered with, but this doesn’t help with
the fact that the correct data has not been received. Also,
availability concerns highlight the importance of ensuring
that that there are no interruptions to service guarantees
from the provider.
Given these concerns, an argument can be made that na-
tional bodies may still desire to have added control of the
path that traffic takes within a provider network. The nature
of routed data networks does not really support this type
of control. Routing protocols are designed to negotiate
best path options for traffic. While the network provider
can establish controls of the paths, the path options are
based on the provider considerations for best path, not the
considerations of the data owner. For example, a provider
will establish paths to maximize bandwidth utilization and
meet quality of service (QoS) guarantees. In some cases,
this may result in the passing of traffic over links that reside
in hostile locations. It would be beneficial for the coalition
operations partners to have some measure of control over
the approval of traffic.
4.2. Multiprotocol label switching and explicit routes
In traditional routed networks, the routing of traffic is based
on the address of the destination of the packets. In the
case of most networks today, this address is an Internet
Protocol (IP) address. By contrast, in label switching,
“instead of a destination address being used to make the
routing decision, a number (a label) is associated with the
packet. . . a label is placed in a packet header and is used
in place of an address (an IP address usually), and the label
is used to direct traffic to its destination” [14].
Label switching provides several advantages to the network
provider [14]; speed and delay, scalability, simplicity, re-
source consumption, and route control.
Route control is the key consideration in the context of
control over coalition traffic paths. Route control allows
the system to designate a specific route path from among
many that may lead to the same destination. This is sort
of like placing an “Air Mail” label on a letter. With the
“Air Mail” label, the letter will take a non-standard path
that, one would hope, has an improved delivery time. In
the same way, a label can be used in a system to control
the route taken. The provider can engineer the network
to route high priority traffic to one set of resources, while
lower priority traffic takes a different path. The removal
of lower priority traffic from the high priority resources
reduces congestion and ensures guaranteed service levels
can be met.
Multiprotocol label switching is published under
RFC3031 [15]. MPLS combines label swapping and
forwarding with network layer routing. “The idea of MPLS
is to improve the performance of network layer routing
and the scalability of the network layer” [14]. Within
MPLS, a label switch path (LSP) is established either
through a route negotiation protocol (i.e., link determi-
nation protocol), or through constraint-based routing. In
constraint-based routing, the LSP is established manually.
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It is possible to combine both automated route protocol
establishment and constraint-based LSP configuration. In
this case, the automated routes would be restricted by
the configured constraints. These constraints are often
associated with quality of service. A router that is aware
of MPLS is termed a label switch router (LSR).
There are two main methods that MPLS uses to choose an
LSP between nodes. In the first method, the LSR is free
to independently select the next hop LSR based on knowl-
edge it has in its routing table. The second method is
called explicit routing. ER is used to define constraints on
the LSP by identifying specific LSRs that are must be used
in the LSP. Assuming that provider networks are MPLS ca-
pable, the concept of ERs could be extended to define con-
straints on the LSP that prevent coalition traffic from pass-
ing through routers that reside on undesired traffic paths.
Note that to control traffic based on sensitivity, MPLS
would need to be extended. As described earlier, ER is
generally used to provide QoS guarantees. Within the var-
ious methods to negotiate an LSP, there is no real concept
of LSR location information, nor is there any notion of an
“approval to process” identifier. This information would be
critical to the extended use required to control the flow of
sensitive information. Furthermore, the constraint-based
link determination protocol (CR-LDP) used to establish
LSPs would need to be extended to include an authenti-
cation mechanism that includes both location and approval
to process criteria.
5. Evaluation considerations
The methods described in this paper are not specifically
related to security products. However, the use of these
methods to support coalition interoperability is identified
to ease the burden of constraints placed on coalition oper-
ations due to security concerns. Therefore, it is important
to note that incorporating these methods into systems sup-
porting coalition interoperability will require trusted prod-
uct evaluations and certification and accreditation for opera-
tion. Current research into the use of these technologies has
not included any consideration for product security evalua-
tion, though there is no known reason to believe that these
techniques could not be included in a secure system design.
6. Conclusions
This paper has examined several issues related to coalition
interoperability. These issues related to:
– the denial of collaborative planning tools across the
national to coalition boundary;
– processing requirements for trusted downgrade plat-
forms;
– the controlled flow of sensitive traffic.
Despite development and operational deployment of many
systems, each of these topics remains a challenge to coali-
tion interoperability.
This paper has identified three technology advances that
could be used to improve coalition interoperability. These
technology advances are:
– the session border controller;
– advances in pattern matching technology;
– use of multi-protocol label switching explicit routes.
Integration of any of these technologies will require trusted
product evaluation and certification and accreditation for
operational approval.
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Paper User services of tactical
communications in the digital age
Esra C¸iftc¸ibas¸i Erkan and S¸enol Uzun
Abstract—Increasing demands on an extensive amount of dig-
ital data and information flows for C4I is forcing the mod-
ern armies to freeze and omit EUROCOM based tactical area
communications system and to develop new concepts based on
the adoption of modern communication systems such as ISDN,
ATM described in the TACOMS Post 2000 Final Report II
in NATO. ASELSAN, as a leading company in the military
electronics arena, is following and participating all the activi-
ties of TACOMS Post 2000 together with Turkish Ministry of
Defense. Turkey’s tactical area communications system TAS-
MUS is a mature and fielded system, which will satisfy future
communication needs of the 21st century C4I systems. In
this paper, we describe the basic features and user services of
TASMUS. With the support of simultaneous voice and data
capabilities, TASMUS aims to form mobile, survivable, flexi-
ble and secure network to support all the present and future
communication requirements of the tactical commanders. Us-
ing the near real time data communications feature, TASMUS
is also significant for the network-centric warfare applications
such as tactical sensor and weapon systems, besides the com-
munication needs of the Turkish Army.
Keywords— tactical communications, IP, X.25, C4I systems.
1. Introduction
Tactical battlefield is now becoming a ground for extensive
digital data exchange where many sensors, weapons, com-
puters and command centres need to exchange high-speed
data in order to perform effectively and coherently. More
so, these units need to carry out their data exchange while
on the move because the new military doctrines heavily
emphasize mobility and flexibility.
Future battlefield, no doubt, will be a digitized one. The
emerging issues related to the implementation of the digi-
tized battlefield are listed below.
1. Common picture of the battlefield in near-real time.
2. Shared data among battlefield operating systems.
3. Ability to concentrate on combat power effectively
and decisively.
4. High-speed exchange of data.
5. Fusion and display of intelligence information to
commanders at all levels.
6. Rapid exchange of targeting data from sensor to
weapon.
All of these issues are related to reliable and efficient ex-
change of information on the tactical field.
On the battlefield, several command and control functions
such as fire support, manoeuvre control, intelligence, elec-
tronic warfare, and logistics support need to be executed
simultaneously. Command and control functions rely on
rapid and reliable exchange of information on the tactical
field. These command control functions may have differ-
ent communication requirements, however in consequence
what needed is an integrated solution that will provide the
necessary communication support to all of these command
and control applications.
Existing tactical area communication systems, such as EU-
ROCOM, are not sufficient to meet the demands of the fu-
ture battlefield. Even NATO, the originator of EUROCOM
standards has an ongoing project the Tactical Communica-
tions Post 2000. The aim of this project is to define the next
generation tactical area communication systems for NATO.
So, looking at the today’s tactical picture, new concepts
and state-of-the-art technologies need to be utilized in or-
der to meet the communication requirements of the future
battlefield. This is exactly what the TASMUS project is all
about. The TASMUS project has been realized to meet the
challenges of the future battlefield.
2. Digital information age and TASMUS
The tactical communication system TASMUS aims to form:
mobile, survivable, flexible, secure network to support all
the present and future communication requirements of the
commanders, and also to provide the commanders with the
communications background to form the real time picture
of the battlefield. TASMUS makes the crucial near real
time data communications needed by the tactical sensor
and weapon systems available.
TASMUS is deployed in area (theatre) of military op-
erations such that, seamless communication between the
army command and battalion/company commander level is
achieved. TASMUS provides interfaces to the strategic sys-
tems above the army level, while providing connection to
the existing CNR systems via CNRI.
TASMUS brings together the state of the art technologies in
military communications. It incorporates ATM and ISDN
switching technologies, together with digital ISDN termi-
nals with built-in crypto module, enabling simultaneous
voice and data capability with synchronous, asynchronous,
X.25 data, IP data and video interfaces. Video conferencing
is also supported over the TASMUS network.
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Mobile subscribers in TASMUS acquire service thorough
TDMA radios, namely, iSTAR (Integrated Services Tac-
tical Radio) acting as the mobile access terminal. The
iSTAR concept is based on radio networking and packet
communications. On the tactical field, TDMA radios use
time division multiple access technique for accessing the
medium and automatically form a radio network where all
the network management functions are carried out in a dis-
tributed fashion. The TDMA radio network can provide
multiple simultaneous voice and data connections to the
mobile users. The TDMA radios have built-in encryp-
tion/decryption, ECCM and LPI/LPD features enable se-
cure communications in the battlefield. The TDMA radios
are also equipped with GPS receivers. The TDMA radio
system automatically distributes the GPS information of
each mobile unit over the entire TASMUS network.
3. TASMUS features
In the tactical field:
1. TASMUS responds to all of the voice, data, fax
and video communication requirements of the bat-
tle groups, with an integrated system solution.
2. TASMUS presents a communication infrastructure,
providing survivable and reliable communication ser-
vices with prompt response to all kinds of sudden
changes using distributed routing algorithms and flex-
ible system topology upgrades.
3. ATM technology, incorporated in TASMUS nodal
points, enables efficient use of link capacities be-
tween switches and makes the support of flexible and
distinct services possible to its users.
4. ISDN technology, incorporated in TASMUS access
switches, furnishes integrated communication service
support such as simultaneous voice and data (asynch.,
synch., X.25, IP, video, video conference) to its users
through the tactical ISDN terminals.
5. ADSL technology, incorporated in TASMUS access
switches, gives the support of IP service to its users
through the tactical ADSL terminals. Each ADSL
terminal has 3 Ethernet interfaces for generating
LANs.
6. In terms of communication services, TASMUS pro-
vides plain and encrypted voice, async data up to
38.4 kbit/s, synch. data up to 64 kbit/s, X.25 packet
data up to 64 kbit/s, IP packet data up to 640 kbit/s,
video up to 64 kbit/s and video conference up to
384 kbit/s to its wired digital subscribers by using
tactical ISDN terminals and ADSL terminals. TAS-
MUS also provides plain and encrypted voice, async
data up to 38.4 kbit/s, synch. data up to 64 kbit/s,
X.25 packet data up to 9.6 kbit/s, IP data up to
64 kbit/s depending on the application and video up
to 64 kbit/s to its mobile subscribers by using iSTAR
TDMA radios.
7. All the voice traffic in TASMUS is carried with
4.8 kbit/s CELP voice coding.
8. In terms of information services TASMUS provides
communication background to figure out near real
time picture of the battlefield to the tactical com-
manders. At any time during the battle, comman-
ders are provided with the geographical positions of
all of their subordinate units on the tactical field.
Visualizing the real time picture of the battlefield
to the tactical commanders will enhance the tactical
decision-making process will also reduce the voice
communication traffic.
9. Near real time data communications is required by
tactical sensor and weapon systems. This kind of
sensor to weapon communication involves exchang-
ing target data and is intolerable to delays. The com-
munication system must deliver the information to
the destination in time. TASMUS provides near-real
time communications required by tactical systems.
10. TASMUS supports all of the teleservices, bearer ser-
vices and supplementary services including military
features such as “priority”, “pre-emption”.
11. TASMUS network management and planning system,
“SYSCON” meets military network management and
planning requirements by using both ITU-T M.3000
TMN system control concepts and NATO TACOMS
Post 2000 system control concepts.
There is also a tactical data bank in TASMUS, which pro-
vides digital maps, geographical data, meteorological info,
intelligence reports, and logistics info.
TASMUS forms a rapid, flexible, reliable, survivable and
secure tactical communication network to meet the current
and future’s armed forces mobility needs.
4. TASMUS network architecture
As shown in Fig. 1 TASMUS has a layered architecture.
Highest layer is the Wide Area Subsystem (WAS), which
carries out the backbone switching, constituted of the nodal
points. Interfaces to the strategic systems and PTT are
located on the WAS.
The middle layer is the Local Area Subsystem (LAS),
which is formed by access points (AP) connected to the
nodal points (NP). The APs contain the access switches
through which the users access the system. The APs also
constitute a gateway for the mobile users.
The lowest layer is the Mobile Subsystem (MS). In the Mo-
bile Subsystem mobile subscribers use mobile subscriber
terminals (MST) to access the TASMUS switching back-
bone.
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In addition to those layered subsystems, the system control
SYSCON carries out all the necessary control functions
such as system planning, control and management.
Fig. 1. TASMUS layered architecture.
Detailed architecture, interconnection of the subsystems
and interfaces to the other systems such as CNR, PTT and
strategic system is shown in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2. Detailed architecture of TASMUS.
For different radio applications at WAS, LAS and MS,
TASMUS uses multi-band multi-role iSTAR radios.
iSTAR is a new generation radio family which combines
both single channel radio access (SCRA) and packet radio
concepts.
iSTAR is capable to be used as mobile terminal (both for
voice and data) and mobile terminal access equipment to
switching backbone. Those two types of applications are
given below.
1. iSTAR radio functioning as radio access point (RAP)
for the access of mobile subscriber (AP switch con-
nection to mobile subscriber).
2. iSTAR radio functioning as mobile subscriber termi-
nal (MST) meets all the communication requirements
of the mobile subscribers and forms independent net-
work among the MSTs.
5. User terminals in TASMUS
TASMUS has digital subscriber terminals, ADSL IP ter-
minals, iSTAR mobile subscriber terminals (iSTAR-MST)
and iSTAR personal subscriber terminal (iSTAR-PST) all
of which have build-in encryption.
The digital subscriber terminals have ISDN S0 interface
with the ISDN switch. They have voice and data capability
at the same time. They are capable of performing asyn-
chronous data transfer up to 38.4 kbit/s, synchronous data
transfer up to 64 kbit/s, and near real time X.25 transfer
up to 64 kbit/s. They also have IP packet data transfer
capability. Each digital subscriber terminal can serve IP
addresses and IP capability, via the switch which it is con-
nected, to maximum 5 external host computers. They can
also send SMS messages to the other user terminals among
the TASMUS and to the ordinary GSM phones via a GSM
modem.
ADSL IP terminals have ADSL interface with the ISDN
switch. They are used for IP packet data communication.
They have 3 Ethernet ports and via these 3 ports totally
510 host computers can be connected to TASMUS IP net-
work or any other connected strategic/tactical IP networks.
They act as IP routers.
iSTAR-MST and iSTAR-PST terminals are the devices of
TDMA radio family. They have voice and data capabil-
ity at the same time. They are capable of performing
asynchronous data transfer up to 38.4 kbit/s, synchronous
data transfer up to 64 kbit/s, and near real time X.25 data
transfer. They also have IP packet data transfer capabil-
ity. iSTAR-MST’s can serve IP addresses and IP capability
to maximum 5 external host computers. iSTAR-MST’s and
iSTAR-PST’s can also send SMS messages to the other user
terminals among the TASMUS and to the ordinary GSM
phones via a GSM modem.
6. User services in TASMUS
TASMUS provides several services to the tactical area
users such as secure voice, file transfer (using near-real
time X.25, IP packet data service, synchronous and asyn-
chronous protocols), web access, e-mail, short message ser-
vice, video conferencing, digital fax, and wireless LAN
applications.
Secure voice service. TASMUS provides encrypted and
non-encrypted voice services using the end-terminals such
as iSTAR-MSTs, iSTAR-PSTs, digital subscriber terminals
and analog subscriber terminals. TASMUS secure voice
service is 4.8 kbit/s CELP encoded. These terminals are lo-
cated in every point of TASMUS, such as the nodal points,
access points or the system control point.
File transfer service. TASMUS has capability to transfer
files between hosts connected to the end-point terminals.
Asynchronous, X.25 and IP packet data services can be
used for file transfer. File transfer protocol (FTP) is used
for file transfer using IP.
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For FTP applications, an FTP server is located in the system
control point in TASMUS as shown in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3. TASMUS FTP service.
The file transfer can also be performed using the near-real
time X.25 service in TASMUS via the user terminals digital
subscriber terminals, iSTAR-MST and iSTAR-PST.
Web service. With the use of an HTTP server TASMUS
has capability to support web services in the tactical area.
Via the end-terminals digital subscriber terminal, ADSL
IP terminal, iSTAR-MST and iSTAR-PST; the hosts can
be connected to the TASMUS IP network and can access
the web applications through the HTTP server, which is
located in the system control point of TASMUS. A similar
web access application is shown in Fig. 4.
Fig. 4. TASMUS HTTP service.
E-mail service. TASMUS can serve e-mail service to its
hosts that are connected to the TASMUS IP network. The
end-points, digital subscriber terminal, ADSL IP terminal,
iSTAR-MST and iSTAR-PST can be used to be connected
to the TASMUS IP network.
For an e-mail application, the SMTP is used between the
hosts and the mail server. The mail server (SMTP server)
is again located in the system control point and the hosts
can create accounts and send e-mails to each other via
this server. A typical application of this service is shown
in Fig. 5.
In this service the mail that host computer-1 creates, is
first sent to the e-mail server by the network. The server
then processes the mail and sends it back to its original
destination host computer-2.
Fig. 5. TASMUS e-mail service.
SMS service. TASMUS end-terminals digital subscriber
terminals, iSTAR-MST’s and iSTAR-PST’s have capabil-
ity to send and receive SMS messages like commercial
GSM phones but all are encrypted. This facility is handled
with the use of an SMS server, again located in the sys-
tem control point of TASMUS. The created SMS messages
are first sent to the SMS server. They are logged in the
server and forwarded to the original destination terminal
afterwards. A typical application is shown in Fig. 6.
Fig. 6. TASMUS SMS service.
Video conferencing service. The video conference
units (VCU) of TASMUS can be connected to the access
point shelters through the switch’s ISDN-BRI interfaces.
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The video coding standard H.263 is used and the rate of
the video session depends on the number of BRI lines used.
The supported rates are 128, 256 and 384 kbit/s, corre-
sponding to 1, 2 and 3 BRI lines. Two VCU units can es-
tablish point-to-point video sessions. A video server, which
is located in the nodal point, is used to arrange the confer-
ence between more than two VCU. The video server does
not join the conference; instead it decides the rate of the
conference. It has a 2 Mbit/s. ISDN PRI interface with
the nodal point switch. A video server can serve a video
session with maximum 6 VCU. A typical application is
shown in Fig. 7.
Fig. 7. TASMUS video conference service.
Fax service. Using the end-terminals digital subscriber ter-
minals, iSTAR-MST’s and iSTAR-PST’s; up to 9600 bit/s.
Digital fax applications can be performed in TASMUS.
A typical application is shown in Fig. 8.
Fig. 8. TASMUS fax service.
Wireless LAN service. With the secure access point units
placed in the access point shelters, TASMUS supports
WLAN service to its tactical area users. The secure ac-
cess point units are connected to the high capacity ADSL
IP terminals, or the digital subscriber terminals in the ac-
cess point. The standard IEEE 802.11b is implemented
and the 2.412–2.472 GHz frequency band (the ISM band)
is used. With this service, the tactical area users who are
located in the 500 meter range of the access point have
the TASMUS IP service. The configuration of TASMUS
wireless LAN service is shown in Fig. 9.
Fig. 9. TASMUS WLAN service.
Fig. 10. Near-real time X.25 service.
Near-real time X.25 service. Near real time data com-
munications is supported in TASMUS for the interoper-
ability with the tactical sensor and weapon systems. The
sensor and weapon systems involves exchanging target
data and is their communication is intolerable to delays.
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The end-terminals digital subscriber terminal, iSTAR-
MST’s and iSTAR-PST’s are used for near-real time
X.25 data communication. A typical TASMUS-sensor and
weapon system integration using iSTAR radio is shown
in Fig. 10.
7. Conclusion
TASMUS aims to form mobile, survivable, flexible and
secure network to support all the present and future com-
munication requirements of the tactical commanders. TAS-
MUS also conveys the real time picture of the battlefield
to the commanders. TASMUS system provides the crucial
near real time data communications needed by the tactical
sensor and weapon systems.
TASMUS brings together the state of the art in military
communication technologies. It incorporates ATM and
ISDN switching technologies used with digital ISDN ter-
minals with built-in crypto module, simultaneous voice
and data capability with synchronous, asynchronous, X.25,
IP data and video interfaces. Video conferencing and digi-
tal fax are also supported over the TASMUS network. TAS-
MUS supports all of the teleservices, bearer services and
supplementary services that the TASMUS subscribers need.
The communication subsystem is the base of all activities
in the battlefield. No sophisticated device or system would
be useful if the communication requirements are not sat-
isfied. TASMUS, which is a mature and fielded system,
will satisfy future communication needs of the 21st cen-
tury C4I systems.
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Paper Sharing tactical data
in a network-enabled coalition
James Busch and Rita Russo
Abstract—The NATO Command, Control and Consultation
Agency (NC3A) is a participant in a coalition project called
the Shared Tactical Pictures (STP). The aim of STP is to de-
velop methods and techniques to enable the sharing of a wide
variety of information – e.g., ground surveillance sensors,
airborne sensor platforms, recognized pictures, and much
more – across a widely distributed network. As NATO changes
its war-fighting paradigm from a well-known and stable al-
liance configuration to more flexible, coalition-based opera-
tions, solving the problem of information-sharing has never
been more important. This paper discusses the technical and
operational developments being explored in STP.
Keywords— service oriented architecture, Web services, coali-
tion, concept of operations, shared picture.
1. Introduction
As NATO changes its war-fighting paradigm from a well-
known and stable alliance configuration to more flexi-
ble, coalition-based operations, solving the problem of
information-sharing has never been more important.
There is a need to take an overall architectural view in order
to produce an operational doctrine for coalition operations.
This will facilitate developing some common rules in the
deployment of command and control (C2) systems. This
doctrine will be critical in guiding the IT part of coalition
deployments in the future.
At the technical level, there is a need to ensure that au-
thorized (but not unauthorized) users are able get the data
they need – where they need it, when they need it. This in-
formation must be available regardless of where it actually
resides and regardless of who “owns” it.
At the tactical level, the problem becomes even more acute,
as one must carefully consider the network situation: the
possibility of disadvantaged (slow, low bandwidth) links,
communication failures and other problems that may affect
the availability and reliability of this information.
Attempting to address these issues, the NATO Command,
Control and Consultation Agency (NC3A) is a partici-
pant in a coalition project called the Shared Tactical Pic-
tures (STP). The aim of STP is to develop methods and
techniques to enable the sharing of a wide variety of infor-
mation – e.g., ground surveillance sensors, airborne sensor
platforms, recognized pictures, and much more – across
a widely distributed network. And because it is being de-
veloped for a variable-profile coalition environment, the
composition of the user group (data consumers) and the
set of available information sources (data providers) are
not necessarily known in advance and may change quickly
over time. Thus it is critical that the environment be de-
signed to be flexible enough to allow dynamic registration
of data providers and the dynamic search for assets by data
consumers. There is also a need to provide a smart data-
fusion capability to merge information in a reasonable way
and help the users make sense of all the information that
is available.
2. Operational doctrine
With the advent and the formalization of new types of al-
liance missions and the complexity involved in the conduct
of modern military operations, new challenges are outlined
for NATO. Just to mention some of the central issues: con-
sidering the wide range of possible coalition scenarios1, the
“doctrine” adopted within the specific type of coalition is
essential in the definition of the nature of command rela-
tionships, both between the assigned national/multinational
forces and HQs and also between HQs. The policy and
rules have to be defined on a case by case basis, since
forces from partner and other non-NATO nations may be
invited to participate and each of them have their own in-
ternal doctrines.
The implications of these rules closely affect the opera-
tional concepts and processes involved, not only as far as
the deployment of C2 systems is concerned, but also the up-
stream process of collection and prioritization of comman-
der’s requirements, the subsequent assignment and control
of (national) assets and the nature of orders to subordinates
finally generated.
As a consequence, within NATO, a process of transforma-
tion and adaptation to the new emerging scenarios has been
undertaken and significant effort is being put in the direc-
tion of systems interoperability achievement. To this pur-
pose, an architectural approach to system design, through
the implementation of agreed standards and products, is fol-
lowed during the development of new C3 systems, which
will then undergo a rigorous interoperability testing pro-
gramme. This new approach is part of the so-called NATO
C3 System Interoperability Process [1].
In line with the above, an overarching NATO Interoper-
ability Policy [2] is under development. This policy must
formalize processes in support of present and future ex-
ecution of a full range of NATO missions and tasks and
provide guidance for the harmonization of interoperability
requirements. Among these is the need for single and joint
1Possible types can be: joint, allied multinational, lead nation coalition,
and ad hoc coalition.
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service capabilities – supplied by all participants – to coop-
erate and, in some cases, be coordinated to provide support
for the achievement of a single goal.
Considering the huge amount of different facilities, in terms
of network infrastructures, communication and information
systems, in use by different nations, it can be reasonably
assumed that this is a very challenging task, which requires
a lot of work to set the premises and the environment in
which the operational actions and missions will be con-
ducted.
The Shared Tactical Pictures (STP) initiative – of which
the first phase has been the shared tactical ground pic-
ture (STGP) – is attempting to solve the problem of in-
formation sharing in a coalition environment. In the words
of the STP vision statement:
“In future coalition operations, all available information
that may be relevant to the production of a decision-quality
tactical ground picture, irrespective of source and type, is
made available to all eligible participants to provide them
with actionable information consistent with their military
requirement and level of command.”
STP is not the development of a new system, nor does
it attempt to supplant existing national systems. Rather,
STP is a process that defines short-term and low-cost tasks
(“quick wins”) in order to develop concepts, methods and
standards that will extend utilization of existing informa-
tion; share data in an interoperable environment; leverage
national operational picture capabilities; and enable pro-
gressive development of interoperability of data, databases,
applications, systems and networks.
In the context of the STP project, an activity of architecture
modelling is under way, which at first stage is being char-
acterized by the collection of information on the systems in
use or under development by the nations, in terms of policy,
process and product. This does not simply mean an inven-
tory activity, but also the examination of the state of the
art as far as national facilities/capabilities are concerned,
which are supposed to be used in future in an interoperable
environment.
As a matter of fact, there are some reasonable issues that
concur to slow down the course of this activity. One is
the releasability of sensitive information by nations, in
a context in which other participating nations, possibly not
known in advance, can access that information. As far as
policy is concerned, this has a very high implication in
assembling the concepts of the adopted national doctrines.
On the other hand, the STP community has agreed that cur-
rently existing rules and policies should constitute the basis
for establishing more general high-level rules, applicable in
a dynamic coalition environment.
The reluctance by nations to release information also affects
the clear understanding of “what” can be shared within
the coalition, i.e., national owned assets and systems along
with their capabilities and products. Addressing this issue
is a key goal of the STP initiative.
Under the term process, all the envisaged CONOPS2
and TTP3 are to be considered. Focus points that need to be
described in detail are relationships between different level
of commands, information cycles/flows between different
operational nodes and the coordination of the operational
staff itself. All these are key points for the effective and
prompt tasking of available systems and for the provision
of as much appropriate and timely support as possible to
satisfy the original requirements during a mission.
An overall knowledge of the associated components, prod-
ucts and services of the existing systems taken into ac-
count are also of great importance to see how much is
covered so far. Some emphasis has been placed on four
different types of system products: BA4, C2-BFT5, ISR6
and NC7. An appropriate analysis should also lead to the
detection of possible gaps in the wide range of system ca-
pabilities required by the users at all LOCs8.
Even if a number of the mentioned issues are still at the in-
vestigatory phase and will probably get no satisfactory anal-
ysis results, the ongoing activity is intended to serve as ve-
hicle for reaching a common understanding on what a gen-
eral coalition doctrine might be in order to lay the basis
for building up a real concept of interoperability amongst
heterogeneous environments and finally enable the achieve-
ment of a common operating picture, in order to speed-up
the decision process and the course of actions.
3. Service oriented architecture
Service oriented architecture (SOA) is an architectural style
whose goal is to achieve loose coupling among interacting
software agents. A service is a unit of work done by a ser-
vice provider to achieve desired end results for a service
consumer.
Consuming a service is usually “cheaper” and more effec-
tive than doing the work ourselves. This is called “sep-
aration of concerns”, and it is regarded as a principle of
software engineering.
SOA achieves loose coupling among interacting software
agents – which can be systems, users or devices – by em-
ploying two architectural constraints:
• A small set of simple and ubiquitous interfaces to
all participating software agents. Only generic se-
mantics are encoded at the interfaces. The interfaces
should be universally available for all providers and
consumers.
2Concept of operations, they provide the vision for users on how sys-
tems/capabilities are operated and utilized.
3Tactics, techniques and procedures for the operation and exploitation
of assets. They are usually aimed at for commanders, staff and operators
directly involved in the planning and tasking of interoperating assets, at
both the operational and tactical level.
4Battlespace awareness.
5Blue force tracking.
6Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.
7Net-centricity – the idea behind it is the flexible integration of com-
mand posts and decision centres, sensors and sensor systems, warfighters
and commanders in a netwsork, to enable an operation.
8Level of commands.
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Fig. 1. Service oriented architecture (diagram courtesy of Booz Allen Hamilton [6]).
• Descriptive messages constrained by an extensible
schema delivered through the interfaces. No, or only
minimal, system behaviour is prescribed by mes-
sages. A schema limits the vocabulary and structure
of messages. An extensible schema allows new ver-
sions of services to be introduced without breaking
existing services. This schema is based on XML9,
the de facto standard language of inter-system com-
munication.
3.1. SOA roles and operations
Any SOA contains three roles: service consumers, service
providers, and a service registry (Fig. 1).
• A service provider is responsible for creating a ser-
vice description, publishing that service description
to one or more service registries, and receiving in-
vocation messages from one or more service con-
sumers.
• A service consumer is responsible for finding a ser-
vice description published to one or more service
9XML is the extensible markup language. An XML document is simply
ASCII text that follows certain standard structural principles. XML is
a “metamarkup” language. Unlike its cousin HTML – the language of
Internet web pages – XML does not have a pre-defined set of tags and
elements. Rather, an XML document is self-describing, allowing virtually
unlimited types of content.
registries and is responsible for using service descrip-
tions to bind to or invoke service providers.
• A service registry is responsible for advertising ser-
vice descriptions published to it by service providers
and for allowing service consumers to search the col-
lection of service descriptions contained within the
service registry.
Each of these roles can be played by any program, soft-
ware agent or network node. In some circumstances, a sin-
gle software agent might fulfil multiple roles; for example,
a program can be a service provider, providing a service to
downstream consumers as well as a service consumer itself
consuming services provided by others.
An SOA also includes three operations: publish, find, and
bind (or invoke). These operations define the contracts
between the SOA roles:
• The publish operation is an act of service registration
or service advertisement. When a service provider
publishes its service description to a service registry,
it is advertising the details of service to a community
of service consumers.
• The find operation is the logical dual of the pub-
lish operation. With the find operation, the service
consumer states a search criterion, such as type of
service, various other aspects of the service such as
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quality of service guarantees, and so on. The service
registry matches the find criteria against its collec-
tion of published service descriptions. The result of
the find operation is a list of service descriptions that
match the find criteria.
• The bind operation embodies the relationship be-
tween the service consumer and the service provider.
When the consumer attempts to invoke the pub-
lisher’s service, a bind operation takes place.
The key to SOA is the service description. It is the ser-
vice description that is published by the service provider
to the service registry. It is the service description that is
retrieved by the service consumer as a result of the find
operation. It is a service description that tells the service
consumer everything it needs to know in order to bind to or
invoke the service provided by the service provider. (A pop-
ular analogy is the telephone book. A human customer uses
the telephone book to learn how to access a business ser-
vice, e.g., phone number, address; a service consumer uses
a service registry to learn how to access an SOA service,
e.g., location, invocation method). The service descrip-
tion also indicates what information (if any) is returned
to the service consumer as a result of the service invoca-
tion [3, 5, 6].
4. The Shared Tactical Pictures
4.1. The STP concept
STP is all about sharing information in a coalition, with-
out the need to develop expensive, time-consuming new
systems.
A key element of STP is that it is a true multi-national
project. Teams from the US, UK, Norway and NC3A have
Fig. 2. The Shared Tactical Pictures.
already been involved in the development process; other
nations including Sweden and Italy are expected to begin
contributing in 2005.
The ultimate goal of STP is to create convergence amongst
coalition interoperability initiatives. To do this, STP is de-
veloping an open, scalable architecture that will enable each
nation to implement its unique solution while maintaining
effective interoperability. This is illustrated in Fig. 2 with
some representative data sources that will be described later
in this paper.
This is where the service oriented architecture concept de-
scribed above comes in. An SOA implementation, as de-
scribed above, is perfectly suited for a highly heteroge-
neous, highly dynamic environment such as a variable-
profile coalition. As a result, this is the design that has
been chosen for the STP initiative.
The various data sources that have been integrated into
the first phase, STGP (listed below), have exposed their
core functionality as services. To do this, a set of Web
service “wrappers” have been written as interfaces into the
underlying systems. These services can then be accessed
by any service-enabled client by issuing a standard SOAP10
request, which results in data being returned in standard
XML format. The existing systems have not themselves
changed at all; rather, their functionality has been made
available to the STP environment by means of these service
interfaces.
The initial results have been promising. Data providers
representing a wide variety of information have been inte-
grated. These information sources share one common goal:
each attempts to provide some kind of “picture” of ground
activity in a certain area. The systems being used for STP
include:
– unattended ground sensors (UGS);
– airborne surveillance and reconnaissance (SAR) sys-
tems that produce ground tracks (e.g., JSTARS,
ASTOR, U-2);
– SAR systems that produce high-resolution images;
– existing systems developed to the multinational inter-
operability programme (MIP) standard.
These systems contain complementary data that are stored
very differently; under normal circumstances would be
quite difficult or even impossible for them to interoperate.
To take one simple example, the airborne (SAR) sensors
produce either ground moving track indicator (GMTI) or
link-16 formatted data, while the SAR cameras generate
images in binary format. Clearly, sharing this information
in its native form presents a huge challenge.
10SOAP is the simple object access protocol. It is basically an “enve-
lope” for an XML message in a SOA environment, containing routing and
other header information for the message.
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Fig. 3. The set of services developed for STP domain.
However, by developing a Web services11 interface for each
of these data sources – a “window” into their functionality –
and by packaging the data as common XML, it becomes
possible to share data among the disparate systems using
an agreed-upon format, and it becomes possible for a user
to make use of the different types of information offered by
each of these platforms.
4.2. The STP Web services implementation
4.2.1. Producers and consumers
The set of services that have been developed for the STP
domain is represented in Fig. 3. At the heart of the STP
implementation are the so-called “Core services”: services
that represent some foundational functionality and which
are available to all producers and consumers. The two
main core services are the registry (based on UDDI) and
security. (The registry, as described in the previous sec-
tion, maintains knowledge of the location and access pro-
cedures for each service on the network. The security ser-
vice, through the use of a public key infrastructure (PKI)
issues and validates certificates to ensure secure transac-
tions between consumer and provider.) In addition, there
are a set of translation services and a monitoring service,
which will be discussed later.
There is also a set of data asset services: providers of in-
formation to the coalition. In this case there are three pri-
11The term “Web services” refers to a specific instantiation of an SOA,
one that is based on XML messages being transported via HTTP over
TCP/IP networks. This is in fact the technology being employed by STP;
therefore the terms “SOA” and “Web services” are often used interchange-
ably throughout this document.
mary service providers: the coalition aerial surveillance and
reconnaissance (CAESAR) shared database (CSD), which
aggregates ground track and imagery information coming
from the various SAR platforms described above; the pas-
sive observation sensor (POS), which is the unattended
ground sensor generating GMTI data; and spot reports,
which give a human observer in the field the ability to
enter text reports about what is being observed.
Finally, the broker service allows users to subscribe to data
from certain sources. This will be described further later
in this document.
The consumer for all this information can be almost any-
thing, from a user with a web browser to a network-
capable PDA to another system. For the purposes of
the STP exercises, a visualization application called deci-
sion desktop (DD) has been developed, which has the abil-
ity to render all the different types of data (ground tracks,
images, textual observations, etc.) being produced.
4.2.2. Dynamic data providers
When a service become available on the network – for ex-
ample, when one of the airborne SAR platforms begins
generating data – it communicates with the registry, pro-
viding the registry with three key items: where it is located
on the network, what services it provides, and how to ac-
cess these services. This is the publish operation described
earlier, and it enables the other, data consuming services
(such as the end user’s system) to discover and make use of
the service (the find operation described earlier). Finally,
the consumer invokes the service (the bind operation) and
receives the data.
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4.2.3. Helper services
The SOA paradigm is largely a pull mechanism: the con-
sumer (user) requests information from the producer and
receives a response. The flaw in this approach is that it
puts a burden on the consumer to keep up with the status
of the producer; in other words, the only way the user will
receive the latest information from a data source is if he
continuously asks for it, and the only way the user will
know if a new data source becomes available is if he looks
for it.
This is where the broker service mentioned in the previous
section comes into action. The broker acts on behalf of
the user to check each data source for updated information;
it also continually scans for new data sources of relevance
to the user. For example, assume that a particular user is
interested in all SAR imagery that is produced in a certain
geographic area, regardless of the source, and wants it as
soon as it is available. The user can set up a “subscription”
with the broker service to continually poll the various data
asset services and return up-to-date information as soon as
it becomes available. The user thus no longer has to be con-
cerned when services are dynamically added or removed, or
when the data being offered by a producer changes, because
the broker takes care of the interactions and automatically
forwards relevant images to him.
A similarly valuable service is the monitor. In an SOA,
the only way to know for sure if a registered service is
indeed available is to issue a query to it; if the query fails
then the service is unavailable. Clearly this is inefficient,
especially if there are many users (or brokers on behalf of
users) constantly doing this. Therefore, STP has developed
a monitoring service that constantly evaluates the state of
all services on the network. When a user (or broker on
behalf of a user) wants to see which services are currently
available, it merely issues a request to the monitor for the
latest status.
Finally, the translation services give the capability to trans-
late data from the format offered by the data provider into
one preferred by the data consumer. For example, as dis-
cussed earlier the airborne SAR platforms (e.g., JSTARS)
produce ground tracks in a tactical data link format called
link-16. The web service that acts as the interface to these
systems presents the data as an XML representation of
link-16. However, the default data consumer in the STP
environment (decision desktop) requires its information to
be delivered in a common data specification known as re-
source description framework (RDF). Therefore, STP pro-
vides a link-16-to-RDF translator service, which is auto-
matically invoked when the decision desktop consumer ac-
cesses the JSTARS provider. By the time the data reaches
the consumer, it has been translated from an XML rep-
resentation of link-16 to an XML representation of RDF.
This same process is available for all of the other types of
data, including GMTI-to-RDF, POS-to-RDF, spot report-
to-RDF, and NSIF-to-JPEG12 .
12NSIF is a NATO-standard format for images. As it is not widely
4.2.4. Information flow
So how does it all work together?
The following very simple example will help to illustrate
the process. Assume that a command officer in the field
wants to see all relevant ground tracks for a particular area
of interest (AOI). He wants to find any providers of this
information on his network, query them for all relevant
detections in his AOI, and get the data back in a form he
can use. The following steps will be taken in the STP
environment (Fig. 4).
1. The data provider(s) and translation services come
online, and register with the registry service by each
sending a SOAP message (formatted as XML) to
identify what it can provide and where it is located.
2. The user starts the decision desktop visualization
tool.
3. The user logs into the system, thereby providing cre-
dentials which will be validated against the various
data sources. He also enters into DD the specific
type of information and geographic area in which he
is interested.
4. By taking the previous steps, the user creates
a “subscription” with the broker service. The user
also can indicate the frequency at which he wants
updates.
5. The broker sends a SOAP message (XML) to the
registry to find all data providers that offer the chosen
type of information (ground tracks).
6. The broker sends a SOAP message (XML) to the
security service verifying that this user has the rights
to the data provider(s). If so, then . . .
7. The broker issues SOAP (XML) requests to each
of the data providers. In each case, if there is
new information available, the broker receives ground
tracks(s) in an XML message formatted as, for ex-
ample, link-16.
8. Knowing that the user on whose behalf it is work-
ing needs data in RDF format, the broker sends
a SOAP message (XML) to the registry inquiring
about a translation service on the network that pro-
vides link-16-to-RDF translation.
9. Once the service is located, the broker sends a SOAP
message (XML) to the translator requesting transla-
tion on the enclosed link-16 data.
10. The returned message containing ground track(s),
now in XML formatted as RDF, is returned to the
user’s system which issued the initial query.
supported by, for example, web browsers, the STP environment offers
translations from NSIF to more common image formats such as JPEG.
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11. The user’s system makes use of the returned message
in whatever way it requires; in this case, decision
desktop plots the returned ground track(s) on a map.
12. Steps 5–11 continue until the user cancels the sub-
scription. At any time, Step 1 can be repeated (a new
service provider comes onto the network); when this
happens the broker “learns” about it as soon as it
re-queries the registry in Step 5.
Fig. 4. The Shared Tactical Pictures environment.
These steps are illustrated in the adjacent diagram (Fig. 4).
The arrows point from the initiators to the recipients of
the messages.
Although this sequence of steps seems fairly simple, what’s
being accomplished is very powerful.
By developing a Web service interface, each of the data
providers described earlier has made its information avail-
able in a common format. The flexibility of the service ori-
ented architecture allows data sources to become available
and be dynamically “discovered” by customers of that type
of information. By standardizing on XML, information ex-
change is facilitated amongst disparate entities. Making
use of the broker and translation services, the user can
have information sources found and queried on his be-
half, and the resultant data delivered in a format that he
can use.
4.2.5. Future goals
There are some exciting additions to the STP environment
in the coming months. This will include integration with
some of the command and control (C2) systems taking
part in the multinational interoperability programme (MIP)
as they add Web services interfaces to their systems.
The special requirements of deploying services to tacti-
cal users – users with low bandwidth and possibly limited
viewing facilities – are being explored.
In addition, an important step will be the development of
intelligent data fusion capability. It is currently possible to
correlate information from a single data source. However,
it would be very powerful to be able to correlate the in-
formation coming from multiple data sources, e.g., inform
the user that the individual ground track being reported
by sensor X is in fact the same as the ground track be-
ing reported by sensor Y. This will also be valuable in
the area of blue force tracking, as different systems work-
ing together can help to identify to whom various entities
belong.
Finally, there will be efforts in the future to offer a full “pic-
ture” in addition to just the ground situational awareness
developed so far. This may include recognized air, mar-
itime and environmental pictures; all Web service-enabled
to take advantage of the power and flexibility of the service
oriented architecture.
5. Conclusions
The shared Tactical Pictures (STP) is an important and ex-
citing initiative in two ways.
First, it is attempting to define the policies and doctrines
involved in making information available across a coalition,
regardless of the source of the data.
Second, it is at the forefront of investigating the technolo-
gies of the future – service oriented architectures, XML
and Web services – which will help make heterogeneous
system interoperability a reality. The prototype work that
has been done has already shown that ground status infor-
mation can be dynamically shared from multiple, disparate
systems.
The on-going work on the STP project is expected to con-
tribute to coalition efforts for many years to come.
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Paper Introduction
of the Network Centric Warfare concept
to Czech Armed Forces
Pavel Eichelmann and Ludeˇk Lukáš
Abstract—One of the features determining the strength of
troops is command and control. The quality of command
and control is determined by the quality of the command and
control systems (C2S). The Czech Armed Forces are devel-
oping tactical command and control systems (TC2S) for the
Ground and Air Forces. The TC2S were a little bit separately
developed. Now, we want to use the benefit of shared situa-
tion awareness. The concept of Network Centric Warfare is
a solution of this problem. The integration of both TC2S’s is
its main objective. To apply this concept, separate C2S’s of
different units are integrated into one logical system, into one
joint C2S. Thus it is possible to create the common operation
picture for all units of the task force.
Keywords— Network Centric Warfare, command and control,
tactical command and control system, situation awareness.
1. Theoretical background
of Network Centric Warfare
The Czech Armed Forces are under the process of reform;
they reduce their structure to become smaller, modern and
mobile. The modern armed forces have developed inten-
sively. They change their mission, capabilities and structure
according to assigned political tasks. There is a growth of
their dynamic abilities, swing operation, range and number
of fulfilled activities. The above-mentioned complicated
problems need new manners to solve. One of the possible
manners is to improve the command and control process. It
is directed into improvement of situation evaluation, com-
mander’s intent formulation and task assignment to sub-
ordinated units. It is important for each element of battle
formation to know its task and its contribution to fulfilment
of the whole mission.
To solve this problem, the command and control sys-
tem (C2S) is improved according to Network Centric War-
fare (NCW) concept. The Network Centric Warfare is
a concept that is based on integration of separate C2S’s
of different units into one logical system, into one com-
mon C2S. Thus, it is possible to create the common oper-
ation picture for all units of the task force.
NCW focuses on combat power that can be generated
from effective linking or networking the engaged military
troops. It is characterized by the ability of the geograph-
ically dispersed forces to create high-level shared battle
space awareness that can be exploited via self-synchroniza-
tion and other network centric operations to achieve com-
mander’s intent.
NCW concerns about networking rather than networks. It
concerns increased combat power that can be generated
by a network centric force. The power of NCW is de-
rived from effective linking or networking knowledgeable
entities that are geographically or hierarchically dispersed.
NCW recognizes the centrality of information and is po-
tentially a source of power. Networking of entities enables
them to share information and to collaborate to develop
shared awareness, and also to collaborate with one another
to achieve certain degree of self-synchronization. The net
result is the increased combat power.
NCW provides opportunities to improve both command
and control (C2) and execution at each echelon. NCW of-
fers the opportunity to not only be able to develop and
execute highly synchronized operations, but also to ex-
plore C2 approaches based upon horizontal coordination
or self-synchronization of battle entities.
NCW is based on using new abilities of the information and
communication technologies (ICT). There is a new view on
strength of information. By sharing information we can im-
prove our situation awareness and understanding. New ICT
has the potential to improve this process.
Information is compared to glue that bonds organization
into one unit stuck together to accomplish the object func-
tion. Higher dynamic and swing of operation needs new
quality of the glue. Correct information flows provide activ-
ity synchronization, information sharing, situation aware-
ness and understanding.
The commander and staff who understand to battle situation
can better formulate the battle objective and direction of
main effort. Like view of the chess-board is important for
a chess-player, knowledge of friendly troops and enemy
situation, terrain and weather conditions is important for
a commander. The data collection was limited in the past.
This status of uncertainty was named “fog of war”.
Nowadays we have new better communication and infor-
mation systems (CIS) and this restriction was reduced. We
can collect position and status data in real time. The infor-
mation system reduces “fog of war”. It provides situation
awareness that is same like real battle situation. The com-
mon shared knowledge of situation is important for suc-
cess of task force. The Air Force and Ground Forces need
common operation picture that is created as an intersection
of their separate operation pictures. Common operation
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picture improves objective formulation, task assignment,
activity synchronization of the task force.
NCW is based on robust network environment. The sep-
arate C2S’s are integrated into one logical system. The
sensors, decision makers and action elements are intercon-
nected together. Technological borders and bottlenecks of
information exchange are reduced. Each force element has
access to all needed information. Provided information cre-
ates a real situation picture. There is a common database
that maintains data for all command levels. All command
levels have the same situation picture.
2. NCW importance for Czech
Armed Forces
The Czech Armed Forces battle capability has been im-
proved by introduction and usage of new C2S and CIS.
The Ground Forces’ Tactical Command and Control Sys-
tem (GF-TCCS) has been developed and used by the
Ground Forces. It is predetermined for the division or
lower levels. The Air Forces’ Tactical Command and Con-
trol System (AF-TCCS) has been developed and used by
Air Forces, too. Developing these C2S’s have followed
the battlefield digitisation concept. However, in the devel-
opment phase these TC2S were a little bit separated. To
apply NCW concept, we would like to integrate GF-TCCS
and AF-TCCS into one logical system (Fig. 1). Thus, our
Joint Forces will have a C2S of new quality. We will cre-
ate better potential for joint actions of the Ground and
Air Forces.
Fig. 1. Common operation picture based on integration
of GF-TCCS and AF-TCCS.
It is important to improve our joint doctrine and procedures
based on NCW. We have to realize new possibilities and
to design new tactics and procedures. These tactics and
procedures will be tested and improved to be a part of the
new doctrine. We improve abilities of formulating battle
objective, of synchronising activities and fulfilling tasks.
Thus NCW will have influence on mission capability pack-
age of the Czech Armed Forces.
3. NCW program description
It should be noted that the Czech Armed Forces now have
no real concept detailing the NCW program. Several par-
tial studies have been made on this subject with analyses
of those topics. The Military Technical Institute of Elec-
tronics and Military Technical Institute of Air Forces, both
from Prague, have been the leaders in solution of this
problematic area.
There is no doubt that each military organization improving
its own performance must, sooner or later, implement the
NCW principles. The notions like information superiority,
knowledge superiority, decision superiority, sharing infor-
mation, common operation picture, etc., aren’t only phrases
but they must be implemented in C2S to improve C2.
Last military conflicts have reflected that achieve-
ment of these funds makes the operations much more
effective.
We know that NCW implementation will have expressive
impact to the Czech Armed Forces. This concept causes to
force a broad organizational measures and C2S system ar-
chitecture changes. Each of these changes is important and
crucial, however C2S system architecture and suitable ICT
implementation is important for the first phase of the NCW
concept.
We will study and analyse good foreign experience in this
area. There is a good example of Sweden, Norway and
Finland cooperation. Together they have provided an anal-
ysis of their current C2S’s and their networking. They
received what they have and what not. Important result
was what they would have to complete to obtain the ro-
bust NCW C2S.
At the beginning, the Czech Armed Forces will necessitate
carrying out a thorough analysis of NCW abilities. Thus
we will locate the positive part of next effort. It isn’t possi-
ble to invest an astronomical sum and purchase technology
of all sorts, but rather to choose the fundamental pillar
of future architecture. Thus, the system can be realized
through gradual evolutional steps. This progress has two
benefits. Financial area is the first. We can accomplish cor-
rect technology acquisitions. Personnel area is the second.
The NCW C2S will have new capabilities. Its using will
need a change of users thinking to take advantage of NCW
capabilities. Our commanders and operational personnel
have to realize step by step these capabilities for C2 im-
provement.
Our military experts will contribute to the NATO NCW
program to receive state-of-art knowledge and experi-
ence. Other cooperation will be done on commercial ICT
firm level. Therefore, we prepare and constitute our so-
lution teams that will be capable to design and develop
the NCW C2S.
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Fig. 2. The time line of the Czech Armed Forces NCW program.
To successfully solve the NCW problems, it will be neces-
sary to make up conceptual study that would cover all the
important issues of above NCW. The analyses of GF-TCCS
and AF-TCCS will create one of the main parts of this
conceptual study. We have to analyse all the important IT
problems and find the solution for integration of AF-TCCS
and GF-TCCS. The integration of TCCS and Stationary
Information System will be next step. It will be done by
integration of the MoD Overarching Information System
and TCCS. Thus we will have military information envi-
ronment for seamless information sharing and exchange.
Figure 2 depicts a time line of Czech Armed Forces
NCW program.
The key is in using NATO standards, MIP for example.
IT standards used for development of other Czech Armed
Forces Information Systems (Staff Information System for
example) should also be concerned so that necessary level
of information sharing is provided.
At first, GF-TCCS and AF-TCCS integration will be done
on brigade level. We assume information sharing and cre-
ation of common operation picture. The fundamental set
of formalized messages will be defined that will mediate
information between GF-TCCS and AF-TCCS. The chosen
technology will be demonstrated and verified. Thus we
can pick suitable HW and SW platforms and technologies.
We hope that we can exchange the basic set of formalized
messages at first. This is important for information shar-
ing. Creation of a simplified version of common operation
picture will be the next step. Thus we can provide for com-
mon sharing of situation information through all command
levels and authorized users.
We assume that the main integration problem will be in
the area of information security. Each of the information
systems has its own security rules. The National Secu-
rity Agency plays an important role here because it is the
certification authority in this area. We will respect NATO
security standard too. Information security is concerned as
a very sensitive area and it is necessary to look for global
solution suitable for all NCW C2S.
It is important to determine several crucial issues that will
have the key role in our process of C2S integration. The
following are some of these problems:
– NCW capability analyses and suitable selection of
proper function;
– methodology assessment to provide for an informa-
tion system integration;
– C2S system architecture change;
– suitable SW and HW technology selection to provide
for function and data integration;
– technology implementation providing information ex-
change;
– common operation picture creation;
– security proposal and realization of integrated sys-
tems;
– migration of the already established and operated in-
formation systems into the final NCW shape;
– modernization of the action elements, namely to ac-
complish the NCW requirements;
– to design a model solution of internetworking sep-
arate C2S to optimise effectiveness of the whole
NCW C2S.
The set of above mentioned problems reveals that this
project won’t be short-term, but it will be strategic. We
can say that it is the gradual reconstruction of the modern
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armiesthat shall enable variety of missions. We hope that
the Czech Armed Forces will be among these armies.
4. NCW technological groundwork
The Czech Armed Forces have already modernized several
years. Our forces are equipped with the weapon systems
and CIS coming from 1970s. We have problems with our
off road vehicles, light trucks, armoured vehicles, aviation
and tactical CIS.
The situation seems unsatisfactory for NCW implementa-
tion. However contrary is the true. We can prepare all pro-
cess of NCW implementation utilising our coalition part-
ner experience. We can prepare the research background of
NCW, choose the suitable tactic of NCW implementation,
prepare appropriate projects. We have time for thinking
about NCW in the Czech Armed Forces. But there is short
time for thinking.
There is a good position for NCW in the area of stationary
communication system. Our microwave radio relay network
provides the data transmission circuits for information sys-
tems and computer networks. The data networks are made
of CISCO products. It is possible to say that we have homo-
geneous environment for stationary data transmission. The
situation was convenient in the area of mobile tactical com-
munication too. For tactical needs we have developed and
fielded new tactical communication system TAKOM, which
was presented on this conference last year. It is a digital
ISDN communication system that uses 2 Mbit/s channels.
CISCO products like in the stationary systems provide data
transmission.
But we have faced a problem to provide data transmission
for mobile users by Tactical Radio System. It is composed
of VHF and HF radios. This system can provide data trans-
mission or voice traffic but not simultaneous data and voice
transmission. The essential disadvantage of this solution is
in preemption of data transmission by voice traffic. Sit-
uation awareness message delay may be tens of seconds
or minutes.
The above-mentioned solution is based on using Czech
VHF radios RF-13. However there are some considerations
about using software-defined radios for Tactical Radio Sys-
tem. Our Military Technical Institute of Electronic, Prague
tested Rohde & Schwarz M3TR and Harris Falcon. The
question of TRS implementation is open. Thus we have
to solve problem to provide simultaneous voice and data
traffic. It is an imperative request for NCW.
To determine fitness for NCW we will have to test com-
munication and information technology features. There are
many possibilities but we have to choose perspective tech-
nologies able of providing for interoperability and simplic-
ity of our solutions.
Computer networksfielded in the Czech Armed Forces
are largely based on INTEL (WINDOWS OS) or SPARC
(SOLARIS OS) technologies. There is continual exchange
of HW and SW platforms to satisfy information system
requirements.
The Air Force use several computer based information sys-
tems namely BOIS and SEKTOR-VS. The basic objec-
tive of these systems is command and control support.
These systems are produced by Czech firms. Similar
situation is in the Ground Forces. They use Battle Ve-
hicle Information System and Movement Control System
to provide situation awareness and message transmission.
The process of broad usage of informatics within military
structure started seven years ago.
Evidently better is the situation in aviation because the
Czech government has approved leasing of JAS 39 GRIPEN
supersonic aircraft. It is equipped with state-of-art CIS
technology.
For object identification we use sensors of multiple types.
In the area of active radars we use old Soviet and
Czechoslovak products of various age. Mainly the So-
viet radars need upgrading especially for digital processing
of radar information and largely implementation of IFF.
The passive surveillance systems are represented by the
older type (TAMARA) and the new type (VERA). For
both of them it is necessary to solve the problem of data
fusion to get common air picture.
5. Czech Armed Forces NCW status
Brigadier general Jiri Baloun, chief of J-6/General Staff, has
presented his vision of the Czech Armed Force NCW [6].
He considered NCW was along with technology also
doctrine, information superiority, new style of command
and control and military thinking. The Czech Armed
Forces have elaborated several fundamental studies that will
present the solution of our NCW problems. We will co-
operate in the appropriate NATO working group to solve
these problems. The elementary problem is providing for
CIS interoperability and data sharing to ensure the situation
awareness. The problem is simple to define but difficult to
solve. For solution we need a good vision, coalition tech-
nology experience and standards, plan and time to ensure
evolution and integration of systems into one, into infor-
mation age environment.
The NCW C2S is potential for better C2. We can benefit
only from employing that potential. The solution is be-
yond signal corps responsibility taking all the Czech Armed
Forces. It is an issue of new style of command and control.
The change of thinking is extremely long route with many
obstacles. But we have to finish this journey to have better
Armed Forces.
6. Conclusion
The Czech Armed Forces are under the process of reform,
reduction of structure to be smaller, modern and mobile.
The key point is the growth of their dynamic abilities,
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swing operation, range and number of fulfilled activities.
One of possible manners to fulfil the above-mentioned re-
quests is improvement of the command and control pro-
cess. We can solve this problem to improve the command
and control system according to Network Centric Warfare
concept. The network centric warfare is a concept that is
based on integration of separate digital C2S’s of different
units into one logical system, into one common C2S, ex-
ploiting the ICT benefit. NCW offers the opportunity to
not only be able to develop and execute highly synchro-
nized operations, but also to explore C2 approaches based
upon horizontal coordination or self-synchronization of
battle entities.
We know that NCW implementation will have an immense
impact on the Czech Armed Forces. Our military ex-
perts will cooperate on NATO NCW program to receive
state-of-art knowledge and experience. One of the ma-
jor integration problems will be in the area of information
security.
The NCW C2S is potential for better C2. We can ben-
efit only from employing that potential. It is an issue
of new style of command and control. The change of
thinking is extremely long route with many obstacles.
But we have to finish this journey to have better Armed
Forces.
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Paper Cryptology Laboratory –
its quality system and technical competence
according to the ISO/IEC 17025 standard
Robert Wicik
Abstract—A laboratory is an organization which operates
a quality system, has technical competence, generates valid
results and its quality system and technical competence are
conformed and recognized. A cryptology laboratory operates
in information technology security area, where cryptographic
methods of information protection play main role. Appropri-
ate confidence, correctness and effectiveness of security ser-
vices is needed and may be achieved trough development, eval-
uation, accreditation and certification processes performed by
competent and commonly recognized organizations like: lab-
oratories, certification and accreditation bodies. We describe
in the paper the accreditation and certification structure and
the IT security framework and also the role of the cryptology
laboratory in this structure and framework.
Keywords— cryptology laboratory, certification, accreditation,
quality system, ISO/IEC 17025 standard.
1. Introduction
A laboratory is an organization [1] which:
– operates a quality system – according to the ISO/IEC
170251 international standard;
– is technically competent – has competent personnel,
sufficient equipment and appropriate test methods
and procedures;
– is able to generate technically valid results;
– has conformed and recognized competence (for ex-
ample) by government bodies.
A cryptology laboratory is a specific kind of laboratory
which operates in information technology (IT) security
area, where cryptographic methods of information protec-
tion play main role. Each IT system or a product has its
own requirements [3] for maintenance of confidentiality,
integrity and availability and implement a number of tech-
nical security enforcing functions to meet these require-
ments. Appropriate confidence, correctness and effective-
ness of these functions are needed and may be achieved
through development, evaluation, accreditation and certifi-
cation processes performed by competent and commonly
recognized organizations: laboratories, certifications bod-
ies and accreditation bodies.
1“Ogólne wymagania dotyczące kompetencji laboratoriów badawczych
i wzorcujących”, PN-EN ISO/IEC 17025, 2001 (in Polish).
The main area of activity of the Cryptology Laboratory is
testing, analyzing and evaluating of cryptographic:
– systems and devices;
– transformations (ciphers, integrity functions, genera-
tors, etc.);
– protocols;
– other crypto mechanisms.
Results of these tests, analysis and evaluations are used in
design and certification processes of:
– secure IT products;
– products that bring security features to general sys-
tems
– or in design and accreditation of secure IT systems.
In this paper, we explain evaluation processes and eval-
uation criteria of secure IT products and systems during
the certification of type and the certification of conformity.
We show the role in certification processes of the Cryptol-
ogy Laboratory and we emphasize importance of its quality
system and the set of technical procedures.
2. Product certification and system
accreditation
Information technology security [4] means:
– confidentiality – prevention of the unauthorized dis-
closure of information;
– integrity – prevention of the unauthorized modifica-
tion of information;
– availability – prevention of the unauthorized with-
holding of information or resources.
An IT system or product has its own requirements for
maintenance security services and it implements a number
of technical security enforcing functions to meet these re-
quirements. Appropriate confidence, correctness and effec-
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tiveness of these functions is needed and may be achieved
through development, evaluation, accreditation and certifi-
cation processes performed by competent and commonly
recognized organizations like: laboratories, certification
and accreditation bodies (see Fig. 1).
Fig. 1. Accreditation and certification structure.
Accreditation bodies recognize and verify competence of
laboratories and certification bodies. It is a national orga-
nization responsible for accrediting laboratories and certifi-
cation bodies according to the standards, for example to the
ISO/IEC 17025 standard or another requirements. Accredi-
tation is a procedure by which an authoritative accreditation
body gives formal recognition that the laboratory or certi-
fication body is competent to carry out specific conformity
assessment tasks.
Certification bodies perform a product and system certifi-
cation, a system accreditation and a personnel certification.
A certification body is a national organization, often the
National Security Authority, responsible for administering
evaluations of products and systems within that country.
The certification body issue certificates (certification re-
ports) – public documents, which are formal statements
confirming the results of the evaluation and that the eval-
uation criteria, methods and procedures were correctly ap-
plied.
Laboratories perform testing also analyzing and evaluat-
ing of devices and systems. Accredited laboratories issue
evaluation technical reports which are submitted to the cer-
tification body detailing the findings of an evaluation and
forming the basis of the certification.
Fig. 2. IT security framework.
IT security framework covers [2]: development, evaluation,
certification, accreditation and operation of a security de-
vice or system (as in Fig. 2).
In the development process an IT system or product is built.
In the evaluation process it is assessed against defined se-
curity evaluation criteria.
In the certification process it is confirmed that the results
of an evaluation are valid and the evaluation criteria have
been applied correctly.
In the system accreditation process it will be confirmed that
the use of an IT system is acceptable within a particular
environment and for a particular purpose.
In the secure operation process an accredited system is op-
erated according to approved procedures.
3. General requirements for testing
laboratories
A testing laboratory should meet requirements according to
the ISO/IEC 17025 standard issued in 1999, which covers:
“General requirements for the competence of testing and
calibration laboratories”. The standard [1] includes:
– management requirements concerning quality system
and documentation;
– technical requirements concerning personnel, test
methods and equipment.
This standard is applicable to all organizations performing
test also laboratories where testing forms part of product
certification. It is for use in developing quality, administra-
tive and technical systems. Laboratory clients, regulatory
authorities and accreditation bodies may also use it in con-
firming or recognizing the competence of laboratories.
Management requirements [1] for a laboratory include:
1. Organization – the description of the laboratory or-
ganization and the identification of potential conflicts
of interest, when a laboratory is a part of larger or-
ganization.
2. Quality system – introduces some specific directions
what must be in a quality policy statement to comply
with ISO/IEC 17025 standard.
3. Document control – demonstrates how laboratory’s
documents are issued, identified, changed and ap-
proved.
4. Review of requests, tenders and contracts – it is to
resolve any differences between the request or tender
and the contract before any work commences. Each
contract shall be acceptable both to the laboratory
and the client.
5. Subcontracting of tests and calibrations – when the
laboratory subcontracts work, this work shall be
placed with a competent subcontractor (complies
with ISO/IEC 17025 standard).
59
Robert Wicik
6. Purchasing services and supplies – the laboratory
should have procedures for the selection purchasing
of services and supplies that affect the quality of the
tests.
7. Service to the client – describes laboratory’s coop-
eration with the client and principles of a client’s
access to relevant areas of the laboratory’s work.
8. Complaints – the laboratory should have procedures
for the resolution of complaints received from clients.
9. Control of nonconforming testing work – there are
specific requirements for dealing with nonconforming
testing results and reference to corrective action in
such cases.
10. Corrective action – there are specific procedures de-
fined for cause analysis, selection and implementa-
tion of corrective action, subsequent monitoring and
follow-up audits.
11. Preventive action – it should be undertaken, if
improvements and potential sources of nonconfor-
mances, either technical or concerning the quality
system are identified.
12. Control of records – quality and technical records
from internal audits and management reviews as well
as records of corrective and preventive actions.
13. Internal audits – internal auditors periodically con-
duct internal audits of activities of the laboratory to
verify its quality system and the testing activities.
14. Management reviews – the laboratory’s executive
management periodically conduct a review of the
laboratory’s quality system and testing activities to
ensure their continuing suitability and effectiveness,
and to introduce necessary changes or improvements.
Technical requirements for a laboratory include [1]:
1. General – describes which factors determine the cor-
rectness and reliability of the tests performed by
a laboratory.
2. Personnel – the laboratory should have competent
personnel as well as plans and procedures of educa-
tion and training.
3. Accommodation and environmental condition – labo-
ratory facilities and environmental conditions should
help testing and do not adversely affect the required
quality of tests.
4. Test methods and method validation – the laboratory
uses methods and procedures for testing which should
be validated if they are not standardized.
5. Equipment – the laboratory shall possess sampling,
measurement and test equipment which should be
regularly calibrated or checked.
6. Measurement traceability – it is traceability to the
International System of Units (SI). It is possible and
desirable in some areas and not in others.
7. Sampling – it is a procedure whereby a part of a sub-
stance, material or product is taken to provide for
testing.
8. Handling of test items – the laboratory shall have
procedures for the transportation, receipt, handling,
protection, storage and retention of test items to pro-
tect the interests of the laboratory and the client.
9. Assuring quality of test results – the laboratory shall
have quality control procedures for monitoring the
validity of tests undertaken.
10. Reporting the results – the results of each test car-
ried out by the laboratory shall be reported in the test
report accurately, clearly, unambiguously and objec-
tively and shall include all the information requested
by the client and necessary for the interpretation of
the test results.
Many factors determine the correctness and reliability of
the tests performed by a laboratory. These factors include
contributions from: human factors, accommodation and
environmental conditions, test methods and method vali-
dation, equipment, measurement traceability, sampling and
handling of test items. The laboratory shall take account of
these factors in developing test methods and procedures, in
the training and qualification of personnel and the selection
of the equipment it uses.
4. Documentation of a laboratory
There are quality and technical documentations maintained
in the laboratory. Laboratory’s documentation should:
– be prepared according to the requirements included
in the ISO/IEC 17025 standard;
– strict correspond with the real laboratory’s activities;
– be updated, approved, legible, and accessible for the
laboratory’s personnel.
Documentation of the laboratory should include:
– The Quality Manual,
– The Management Procedures Manual,
– The Technical Procedures Manual,
– Test Instructions,
– other documents and records describing every impor-
tant properties and activities of the laboratory.
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Basic laboratory’s document is “The Quality Manual”. In
the quality manual there are defined the laboratory’s qual-
ity system policies and objectives. The quality manual out-
lines the structure of the documentation used in the quality
system of the laboratory. The quality manual includes or
makes references to the supporting management procedures
and technical procedures. The roles and responsibilities of
quality and technical management as well as the rest of the
personnel are defined in the quality manual.
“The Management Procedures Manual” is created if such
procedures are not included in the quality manual. This
manual covers supporting procedures of managing qual-
ity system and not covers technical (sampling and testing)
procedures. Some aspects and data of laboratory’s quality
system can be covered by other documents, for example:
rights and responsibilities of the laboratory’s personnel and
the organization and management structure.
“The Technical Procedures Manual” consists of laboratory-
developed procedures which describe non-standard meth-
ods, laboratory-designed/developed methods, amplifica-
tions and modifications of standard methods. Developed
methods and procedures should have been validated before
use. Validation is the confirmation by examination and
the provision of objective evidence that the particular re-
quirements for a specific intended use are fulfilled. Each
developed procedure should include records with results
obtained form validation process.
“The Test Instructions” are supplements to the technical
procedures. Test instructions are issued, if technical pro-
cedures insufficiently describe testing methods. A test in-
struction describes in details each steps to perform a techni-
cal procedure, such as: preparing samples, checking equip-
ment, preparing workspace, performing tests, recording ob-
servations and results, other details needed to perform test-
ing procedure.
Other documents and records maintained in the laboratory:
– definitions and terminology;
– a organization scheme of the laboratory;
– personal cards (function descriptions, duties, respon-
sibilities);
– training (annual plans and programs of trainings);
– client complaints (register of complains, laboratory’s
judgments);
– approved suppliers (cards, problems, reviews);
– measuring equipment (register of equipment and their
service, repairs, checks and calibrations);
– audits (schedule, programmes and reports);
– internal problems and correction actions;
– projects (proposals, realizations, approvals and intro-
ductions of documents of quality and testing system).
5. Test methods and procedures of the
Cryptology Laboratory
The main area of activity of the Cryptology Laboratory is
testing, analyzing and evaluating of cryptographic:
– systems and devices;
– transformations (ciphers, integrity functions, genera-
tors, etc.);
– protocols and other crypto mechanisms.
Results of these tests, analysis and evaluations are used in
design and certification processes of:
– secure information technology products,
– products that bring security features to general sys-
tems;
or in design and accreditation of:
– secure information technology systems.
In the cryptology area, there are dominating non standard
methods, which base on the common recognized evalua-
tion criteria of ciphers, devices and systems. There are
well known (or not) methods for determining crypto secu-
rity parameters and features, which can by applicable as
laboratory developed methods and procedures.
The cryptology laboratory can perform methods and pro-
cedures for:
– type certification;
– certification of conformity for objects or systems;
– evaluation of parameters for ciphers and other crypto
transformations, binary sequences, etc.
Type certification bases on the national law and regu-
lations and on the established criteria, for example on
the Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria –
ITSEC [2] or Common Criteria for Information Technology
Security Evaluation – CC [3]. Methods and procedures for
type certification describes major actions taken during this
process. Such methods and procedures can cover evalua-
tions of crypto transformations and mechanisms used in an
assessed object.
Technical procedures for type certification can cover pro-
cedures such as:
• Inspection of the documentation – includes methods
for determining whether the documentation of eval-
uated object is complete, precisely and exhaustively
describes all aspects, which are essential for certifi-
cation and for the goals, which was put in.
• Checking correctness of implementation – includes
methods for determining whether the security en-
forcing functions are correctly implemented in the
evaluated object.
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• Effectiveness analyzing – includes methods for deter-
mining whether the security measures implemented
in the evaluated object are effective against the iden-
tified threats.
• Vulnerabilities analyzing – includes methods for de-
termining how recommended countermeasures pre-
vent evaluated object from successfully attacking us-
ing construction, operational and exploitable vulner-
abilities detected in the object.
• Other technical procedures written according to the
established criteria (ITSEC, CC, etc.).
Certification of conformity authenticate that evaluation ob-
ject is consistent with type of object, which obtained type
certificate. Certification of conformity process can cover
all of objects or samples taken from production line. Tech-
nical procedures for certification of conformity make use of
documentation and prototype objects, which were basis of
the type certification. Each assessed object can require new
procedures developed on the start of certification process.
Technical procedures for certification of conformity can
cover procedures such as:
• Examination of conformity for the software – in-
cludes methods for determining whether the tested
software is compatible with prototype of this soft-
ware.
• Examination of conformity for the device – includes
methods for determining whether the tested object is
compatible with prototype of the object, for which
certificate of type was issued.
Technical procedures for evaluation of crypto-transforma-
tion can cover procedures such as:
• Randomness testing of binary sequences produced by
stream ciphers, block ciphers, hash functions, etc.
• Independence testing of pairs of binary sequences
produced by stream ciphers, block ciphers, hash func-
tions, etc.
• Avalanche testing of block ciphers and other crypto
transformations, for example S-boxes.
• Nonlinearity testing of crypto transformations, for ex-
ample S-boxes.
5.1. Randomness testing
Binary sequences produced by ciphers should be statisti-
cally random in order to achieve high security level of cryp-
tographic system. We examine randomness of sequences
using statistical tests [8, 10]. These tests use statistics of
binary samples and also chi-square and normal distribu-
tions. We use following statistical tests: frequency test,
serial test, poker tests, runs test and autocorrelation test.
During statistical testing of binary sequence we count ap-
propriate statistics for each test. Obtained statistics we split
into classes, which identify them from the best to the worst.
In the Cryptology Laboratory we have a technical proce-
dure, which describes in details how to get samples of bi-
nary sequence, how to perform statistical testing of samples
and how to interpret results of testing. This procedure uses
laboratory-developed software, which implement statistical
tests used in the method. The procedure and software are
validated in the laboratory that gives expected results of
testing. We use this procedure for testing binary sequences
taken from:
– random and pseudorandom generators;
– stream and block ciphers;
– password and key generators;
– other cryptographic functions, where randomness is
crucial.
5.2. Independence testing
Independence testing is similar to randomness testing but
concern pairs of binary sequences. Binary sequences pro-
duced by ciphers should be statistically independent and
we examine independence of pairs of them using statistical
tests [9, 10]. These tests use statistics of pairs of binary
samples and also chi-square and normal distributions. We
examine independence of a pair of binary sequences using
three statistical tests for appropriate bit-length pairs. For
each test we count suitable statistics. Obtained statistics
we split into classes, which identify statistics from the best
to the worst.
In the Cryptology Laboratory we have a technical proce-
dure, which describes in details how to get samples of pairs
of binary sequence, how to perform statistical testing of
samples and how to interpret results of testing. This proce-
dure uses laboratory-developed software, which implement
statistical tests used in the method. The procedure and
software are validated in the laboratory that gives expected
results of testing.
5.3. Avalanche testing
There are a few criteria of avalanche testing. The basic
are: avalanche effect and strict avalanche criterion (SAC).
Full avalanche effect and full SAC should appear after
a few rounds in a properly constructed block cipher. Full
avalanche effect will occur in the cipher, if the average
number of changed bits in cryptograms is equal to the half-
length of ciphered block, as a result of any bit of plain text
or key changes. The cipher will fulfil the strict avalanche
criterion, if the average probability of bit changing in cryp-
tograms is equal to 0.5, as a result of any bit of plain text
or key changes.
In the Cryptology Laboratory we implemented software
calculating avalanche effect and strict avalanche effect
which occur in the evaluated block cipher. This software is
used by procedures which describes in details how to pre-
pare cipher for testing, how to perform testing of avalanche
effects in the cipher and how to interpret results of testing.
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The procedure and software are validated in the laboratory
that gives expected results of testing. We use this procedure
for testing block ciphers and other cryptographic functions,
where avalanche effects are crucial.
5.4. Nonlinearity testing
Nonlinearity is a basic criterion in achieving resistance
of ciphers to cryptanalysis. We can calculate nonlinear-
ity for Boolean functions and for complex functions com-
posed of Boolean functions. Nonlinearity of a function is
the Hamming distance to the nearest affine function (it is
called classical nonlinearity) or to the nearest function,
which have linear structure (it is called strict avalanche
criterion). Cryptographically strong functions should have
high nonlinearity – it means – large distance to crypto-
graphically weak affine functions and function with linear
structure.
In the Cryptology Laboratory we implemented software and
a procedure for nonlinearity testing. We use this proce-
dure for testing: elements of block ciphers (for example
S-boxes), Boolean functions (used in S-boxes and stream
ciphers) and other cryptographic functions, where nonlin-
earity is crucial.
5.5. Examination of conformity
In the Cryptology Laboratory we have testing procedures
used in certification of conformity processes of crypto-
graphic devices and software. We examine evaluated ob-
ject, whether it is consistent with type of the object, which
obtained type certificate. We process all of the objects or
samples taken from production line. Results of our testing
are basis for issuing certificate of conformity for examined
objects by certification authority. Security devices and soft-
ware with such certificates (and with certificate of type) can
be used in IT security systems which process sensitive in-
formation (if obtain accreditation certificate).
Each assessed types of objects can require new procedures
developed on the start of certification process.
6. Summary
Products and systems used for processing sensitive and
classified information should be evaluated, certificated and
accredited by competent and common recognized organi-
zations like laboratories and certifications bodies. Certifi-
cation bodies conduct certification processes, commission
laboratory’s testing, evaluations and analysis, and on this
basis issue certificates for products and systems. Labora-
tories and certification bodies should operate according to
the standards and be recognized by accreditation bodies.
The Cryptology Department has been operating in the
Military Communication Institute for many years. The
Cryptology Laboratory operates within the whole Cryp-
tology Department using the quality system according to
the ISO/IEC 17025 standard. The Cryptology Laboratory
bases on the resources of the Cryptology Department, its
personnel, knowledge and experience. The quality system
according to the ISO/IEC 17025 standard was introduced
in the Cryptology Laboratory in 2002. The Cryptology
Laboratory is now recognized by the Products Certification
Unit of the Military Security Authority.
Main object of interest of the Cryptology Laboratory is
testing, analyzing and evaluating military crypto devices
and systems. The Cryptology Laboratory performs works
commissioned and financed by producers and vendors of
cryptographic devices and systems. Results of the Cryp-
tology Laboratory works are used in the certification and
accreditation processes performed by the Products Certifi-
cation Unit.
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Paper IP-KRYPTO cipher machine
for military use
Mariusz Borowski and Grzegorz Łabuzek
Abstract—Polish military IP networks can be effectively and
cheaply secured by IP-KRYPTO cipher machines which are
developed in the Military Communication Institute. The co-
operation with Polish manufacturers – Optimus and ABA
Kraków and the usage of COTS elements and ideas speed
up the research and development works. The IP-KRYPTO
cipher machine will be used for securing the “SECRET” data
so it must be certified to fulfill E3 ITSEC evaluation crite-
ria. This requirement generates additional challenges in the
development process when the COTS elements are to be im-
plemented.
Keywords— IPsec standards, ITSEC evaluation criteria.
1. Introduction
Military computer networks, among other things, need the
security cryptographic services which can be implemented
at several layers in a network infrastructure. Military in-
stitutions have used link-level encryption for years. In the
method every communications link is protected with a pair
of encrypting devices – one on each end of the link. While
this method provides excellent data confidentiality between
two crypto devices, other cryptographic services are inac-
cessible. Of course, this method does not work at all in the
public networks, where few of the intermediate links are
accessible or trusted to the user.
2. Usage of IPsec standards as a COTS
development idea
The Internet Protocol security (IPsec) is a framework of
open standards for ensuring secure private communications
over IP networks. Based on standards developed by the In-
ternet Engineering Task Force (IETF), IPsec ensures con-
fidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of data communica-
tions across the public IP network.
The concept of a “Security Association” (SA) is fundamen-
tal to IPsec [2]. SA is a simple “connection” that affords
security services to the traffic carried by it. Two types of SA
are defined: transport mode and tunnel mode.
The transport mode SA is a security association between
two hosts. In IPv4, a transport mode security protocol
header appears immediately after the IP header and any
options, and before any higher layer protocols (e.g., TCP
or UDP).
The tunnel mode SA is essentially an SA applied to an
IP tunnel. Whenever either end of a security association is
a security gateway, the SA must be the tunnel mode. For the
tunnel mode SA, there is an “outer” IP header that specifies
the IPsec processing destination, plus an “inner” IP header
that specifies (apparently) the ultimate destination for the
packet.
The Internet Protocol security is based on the following
two protocols:
– Authentication Header protocol (AH) [3],
– Encapsulation Security Payload protocol (ESP) [4].
The AH protocol provides integrity and authentication ser-
vices, while the ESP protocol delivers mainly confidential-
ity. These protocols may be applied alone or in combination
with each other to provide desirable set of security services.
Each protocol can be used in the transport mode and the
tunnel mode.
The encrypted packets look like ordinary IP packets
(Fig. 1), they can easily be routed through any IP network,
such as the Internet, without any changes to the intermedi-
ate networking equipment.
Fig. 1. Appling ESP to a packet in tunnel mode.
The only devices that know about the encryption are the
end points. This feature greatly reduces both the imple-
mentation and management costs.
3. The TCE 621 IP Crypto Device –
the prototype
According to the COTS strategy the IPsec standards were
implemented in military IP crypto devices by many manu-
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facturers. One of such approach is the TCE 621 IP Crypto
Device (Fig. 2) developed by THALES Communications
company which was approved for securing NATO IP net-
works.
Fig. 2. The TCE 621 IP Crypto Device.
The TCE 621 is inserted between a host (end system) or
a company network and the IP network. This is used to
establish virtual private networks (VPN) solutions, or to
provide end-to-end protection of the communications be-
tween single hosts. The TCE 621 protects the communica-
tions between hosts by adding end-to-end security services
to the IP protocol. All security services are provided by
the IPsec ESP protocol [4] as specified by IETF.
The TCE 621 provides:
– NATO approved cryptographic algorithms;
– a 10 megabits per second Ethernet interface;
– security for between 500 and 900 IP datagrams per
second, depending on pocket size;
– up to 1000 security associations;
– work in a net consisted of up to 1000 such devices;
– audit support and centralized management;
– protection against electromagnetic emanation accord-
ing to AMSG 720B;
– ruggerized, temper resistant shelter.
The Polish army is not equipped with the IP crypto ci-
pher machines of such functionality but it needs them. The
Military Communication Institute, which has long tradition
in building the cryptographic devices, starts research and
the development process. For efficiency and the time and
money saving we decided to use some of the COTS com-
ponents and ideas.
4. The Optimus ABA IPSec Gate –
the first Polish approximation
Polish computer companies, Optimus and ABA Kraków,
developed and introduced the Optimus ABA IPSec Gate
crypto devices which are based on IPsec standards.
The Optimus ABA IPSec Gate (Fig. 3) uses exclusively
well-tried standard PC hardware which is cost-effective and
deliverable in the long term. Moreover, the cipher machine
can be integrated into every underlying IP-based IT infras-
tructure.
The Optimus ABA IPSec Gate is based on a specially min-
imized and hardened Linux operating system with imple-
mentation of IPsec standards named FreeS/Wan. All soft-
ware is stored on flash RAM with manipulation protection.
Moreover the software integrity is checked during the sys-
tem start up, and in small regular time periods.
Fig. 3. The Optimus ABA IPSec Gate.
The Optimus ABA IPSec Gate provides the strongest en-
cryption technology available on the commercial market,
using concurrent 3DES (168-bit key) and Rijndael – AES
(256-bit) algorithms as standard offerings. The unit em-
ploys the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1 and SHA-2), as
well as Diffie-Hellman and Internet Key Exchange (IKE)
protocols [6] to perform authentication and automatic ex-
change of a key material.
Supported standards:
• [2], [3], [4] – main IPsec standards;
• [5], [6], [7] – IPsec standards supported session keys
establishing methods;
• RFC 2403, The Use of HMAC-MD5-96 within ESP
and AH;
• RFC 2404, The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within ESP
and AH;
• RFC 2104, HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message
Authentication Code;
• RFC 2451, The ESP CBC Mode Cipher Algo-
rithms;
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• RFC 2408, Internet Security Association and Key
Management Protocol;
• RFC 3173, IP Payload Compression Protocol
(IPComp);
• RFC 2394, IP Payload Compression Using
DEFLATE.
The throughput of data depends on the selected cryp-
tographic algorithm. The data throughput of the Opti-
mus ABA IPSec Gate is scaled with the clock rate of
the underlying processor hardware and achieves up to
90 Mbit/s with AES on a Intel Celeron 1.7 GHz proces-
sor. It supports dial-up functions (PPP) via ISDN terminal
adapters, analogue modems, DSL and GSM/GPRS mobile
phones.
The Optimus ABA IPSec Gate was certified for secur-
ing the “RESTRICTED” data by the national security au-
thority according to the “Protection of Classified Informa-
tion Act”.
5. The IP-KRYPTO cipher machine
research process
The Military Communication Institute in cooperation with
Optimus and ABA Kraków companies is developing an IP-
KRYPTO cipher machine for use by the Polish army. The
cipher machine is designated for securing the “SECRET”
data in the military and government IP networks; therefore
it must be worked out and produced to fulfill the ITSEC
evaluation criteria.
The IP-KRYPTO cipher machine has to fulfill the E3 IT-
SEC evaluation criteria, but the cryptographic algorithms
have to fulfill E6 criteria. For rapid development we de-
cided to use COTS technologies and equipments. The tar-
get of the evaluation (TOE) [8] which satisfies E3 criteria
must be prepared in the development process with:
– security target for the TOE;
– informal description of the architecture of the TOE;
– informal description of the detailed design;
– test documentation;
– library of test programs and tools used for testing the
TOE;
– source code or hardware drawings for all security
enforcing and security relevant components;
– informal description of correspondence between
source code or hardware drawings and the detailed
design.
While the use of IPsec standards as an example of COTS
ideas is consistent with the shown criteria in regard to
the deliberated specification, the implementation of soft-
ware modules without the source code is unacceptable.
The main tasks in the research process:
a) designing fast and secure national cryptographic al-
gorithms with a suitable documentation;
b) implementation of algorithms in the COTS imple-
mentation of IPsec standards named FreeS/WAN;
c) designing a secure and effective key establishing
method;
d) designing a secure and temper resistant keying mod-
ule;
e) designing an IP-KRYPTO motherboard with an ap-
propriate powerful processor and solved thermal
problems;
f) designing a temper resistant and satisfying lack of
electromagnetic emanation (AMSG 720B) shelter;
g) designing a shelter and a motherboard which satisfy
environmental and mechanical demands;
h) preparing a network planning and key generation sta-
tion.
Some of the aforementioned challenges will be discussed
more precisely here.
The IP-KRYPTO cipher machine demands fast and secure
national cryptographic algorithms. The IPsec standards are
open and suitable for the implementation of any national
algorithms instead of those shown for the commercial use.
The new national algorithms were designed in the Mili-
tary Communication Institute. In addition to the security
features also their speed of work was important because
the IP-KRYPTO must support at least a 10 Mbit/s Ethernet
interface.
The IP-KRYPTO cipher machine needs a motherboard
with an appropriate powerful processor and the solved ther-
mal problems. The Optimus ABA IPSec Gate manufac-
tured by our partners uses exclusively the well-tried stan-
dard PC hardware which is cost-effective but this commer-
cial equipment cannot be implemented in the military prod-
ucts. We decided to use a hardened industrial standard
PC motherboard. The motherboard provides 10/100 Mbit/s
Fast Ethernet Ports, a socket 478 processor and DiskOn-
Module like flash memory on the board. It also supports
optional IPsec encryption accelerator which uses commer-
cial algorithms according IPsec standards. We did not de-
cide to design national VLSI IPsec module because of small
scale of production, costs and absence of trusted manu-
factures (national algorithms will have to be implemented
in it). All IPsec operations are software implemented
and executed by a fast processor. Computational power
of the processor is very important but it causes problems
with freezing all modules on the motherboard. Freezing
66
IP-KRYPTO cipher machine for military use
demands are additionally complicated by the needed lack
of electromagnetic emanation of the cipher machine. Me-
chanical and environmental exposures also must be taken
into consideration.
The source code or hardware drawings for all security en-
forcing and the security relevant components have to be
shown in the certification process so the IP-KRYPTO ci-
pher machine operates under control of the Linux oper-
ating system. The Linux OS is the open source operat-
ing system and everyone wise has an access to its code.
The Linux OS used in the IP-KRYPTO crypto machine is
integrated with software implementation of IPsec standards
named FreeS/WAN. All security services are provided by
the IPsec ESP protocol in the tunnel mode. New func-
tions have been added to the standard FreeS/WAN soft-
ware. The functions concern the ability of connecting
with the device located behind a Network Address Trans-
lator (NAT-Traversal) and Dead Peer Detection (DPD).
Additionally the IP-KRYPTO software is integrated with
a software firewall based on iptables with an automatic con-
figuration option. This configuration is created upon con-
figuration parameters for maximizing security and does not
reduce functionality. By default the firewall blocks all pack-
ets except packets moving in the IPsec tunnel. All appli-
cations have been compiled with the use of Gnu Compiler
Collection (GCC) with stack-smashing protector. It is an
extension for protecting applications from stack-smashing
attacks. The protection is realized by buffer overflow de-
tection and the variable reordering feature to avoid the cor-
ruption of pointers.
Key establishing methods for IPsec are shown in [6].
Phase 1 is where two ISAKMP peers establish a secure,
authenticated channel with which to communicate. In the
phase the Diffie-Hellman protocol is used for establishing
a common secret. The common secret is used in Phase 2
for establishing cryptographic keys. The IP-KRYPTO ci-
pher machine will secure the “SECRET” data, so the data
must stay secret by the next fifty years. In that case we
have a well known cryptographic theorem: “If the Diffie-
Hellman protocol is secure than the scheme is secure”.
A well known method of securing the Diffie-Hellman pro-
tocol is using more numerous GF∗(p) or transforming the
protocol to the group of points on elliptic curves. These
examples are shown in [7] and they are suitable for the
commercial use where such a long time for securing the
data is not required. The security of the Diffie-Hellman
protocol is based on the difficulty of solving a discrete
logarithms problem, other well known public key algo-
rithms (for example RSA) are based on the difficulty of
number factoring. The security of the transformations is
based on mathematical problems and computational com-
plexity. But an adversary is able to record all exchanges
between two IP-KRYPTO devices and wait (it has fifty
years) until new mathematical or computational methods
are achieved. Thus a simple copy of the standard [6]
in the developing the IP-KRYPTO cipher machine is not
available.
The IP-KRYPTO cipher machine needs a secure and tem-
per resistant keying module. The Optimus ABA IPSec Gate
used a Flash RAM for hiding the keys and configuration.
All data on the Flash RAM are ciphered. This is an excel-
lent example of using the COTS technology which is fast,
cost effective and suitable for securing the “RESTRICTED”
data. The requirements for securing the “SECRET” data
demand that the key module must have a temper resistant
shelter and support an emergency clearing function execut-
ing without outer power supply.
The last step in the developing the IP-KRYPTO cipher
machine will be creating a network planning and key gen-
eration station. The main goal of the station is prepa-
ration of the configuration data and cryptographic keys
for all IP-KRYPTO machines and filling their keying
modules.
6. Summary
In the paper we showed the IP-KRYPTO research process.
If a crypto device must be used for securing the “SECRET”
data, then special requirements must be fulfilled. Usage
of COTS technologies and equipments is suitable in de-
veloping crypto devices for securing the “RESTRICTED”
data. Such techniques implemented in the devices dedi-
cated for securing higher clause data need an extremely
cautious, well prepared and experienced developing team.
The simplest way is with the use of COTS ideas and
standards but military equipments must fulfill additional
mechanical, environmental and electromagnetic emanation
criteria.
IP-KRYPTO cipher machines demand also a network plan-
ning and key generation station. At the end of the research
process the prototype of the cipher machine with the station
must be certified by the national security authority accord-
ing to the “Protection of Classified Information Act”.
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Paper Primality proving
with Gauss and Jacobi sums
Andrzej Chmielowiec
Abstract— This article presents a primality test known as
APR (Adleman, Pomerance and Rumely) which was invented
in 1980. It was later simplified and improved by Cohen and
Lenstra. It can be used to prove primality of numbers with
thousands of bits in a reasonable amount of time. The running
time of this algorithm for number N is O((lnN)C ln ln lnN) for
some constant C. This is almost polynomial time since for all
practical purposes the function ln ln lnN acts like a constant.
Keywords— prime numbers, primality proving, cyclotomic ring,
Gauss sum, Jacobi sum, APR.
1. Introduction
Probabilistic primality tests are in fact compositness tests.
That kind of test gives us correct answer only if the number
has nontrivial factor. In other words this test gives two
possible answers:
– number is composite,
– number may be prime.
In the former case we are absolutely sure that the number
is composite, but in the latter one we receive only statisti-
cal information. That kind of unsertainty can be accepted
in RSA users keys. Situation is completely different with
certificate authority keys and elliptic curve parameters. In
those cases wrong verification of primality may compro-
mise all keys in cryptosystem.
We can avoid this problem using algorithm which proves
primality and always gives correct answer. There are
two very effective methods of primality proving. One of
them gives primality certificate and is based on elliptic
curves [2]. The second one – Gauss and Jacobi sums pri-
mality test [3] – is the topic of this paper. The test based
on Gauss sums [4, 7] is interesting only from theoretical
point of view and it doesn’t have practical implications. Its
improvement – Jacobi sums test [5, 6] – is much more ef-
ficient and can be used to prove primality of numbers with
thousands of bits in a reasonable amount of time.
In the following sections we will show how the theoretical
results can be interpreted in terms of computer program-
ming. It will allow to understand the basic idea of Jacobi
sums method and will be helpful for those who will try to
implement this test in practice. The article does not contain
any proof, as it can be easily found in references. Proba-
bly the best theoretical description of this algorithm can be
found in Henri Cohen’s book [6].
2. Theoretical background
In the whole article we will use the following notation:
N – number which is tested for primality,
p, q – small prime numbers.
2.1. Cyclotomic fields
We start from definition of algebraic structure in which the
test operations are performed.
Definition 1: If ζn ∈C is such that ζ nn = 1 and for all k < n
we have ζ kn 6= 1, then ζn is a primitive nth root of unity, and
field extension Q(ζn) is the nth cyclotomic field. 
Proposition 1: Let K = Q(ζn) be nth cyclotomic field.
1. The extension K/Q is a Galois extension, with
Abelian Galois group given by
G = Gal(K/Q) ={
σa : (a,n) = 1, where σa(ζn) = ζ an
}
.
In particular, the degree of K/Q is φ(n), where φ is
the Euler function.
2. The ring of integers of K is ZK = Z[ζn]. 
Such a definition is good from a theoretical point of view,
but is also completely impractical. We need to find a way
that would allow us to represent elements of Q(ζn) and
Z[ζn] in a computer. This is possible by the definition of
a cyclotomic polynomial:
Φn(X) = ∏
(a,n)=1, 0<a<n
(X−ζ an ).
It is possible to show that Φn(X) ∈ Z[X ] and the following
lemma is true.
Lemma 1: If ζn is a primitive nth root of unity, and Φn(X)
is the nth cyclotomic polynomial, then
Q(ζn) ' Q[X ]/Φn(X),
Z[ζn] ' Z[X ]/Φn(X).
This isomorphism fixes elements of Q, and sends ζn on
to X . 
In this approach we only need to compute the nth cyclo-
tomic polynomial. The following formula gives us a very
effective way to do this for small values of n
Φn(X) = ∏
d|n
(
1−X
n
d
)µ(d)
, (?)
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where µ(d) is the Mo¨bius function
µ(d) =


1 if d = 1,
(−1)k if d is product of k distinct
primes,
0 in other cases.
Example 1: Using formula (?) for a prime or a power of
prime, we can easily compute cyclotomic polynomials:
Φp(X) =
1−X p
1−X
=
p−1
∑
i=0
X i
= X p−1 + · · ·+X +1,
Φpk(X) =
1−X p
k
1−X pk−1
=
p−1
∑
i=0
X ip
k−1
= X (p−1)p
k−1
+ · · ·+X p
k−1
+1.

The main part of Jacobi sums test will be based on com-
putations in the ring Z[ζpk ]. It is known from Lemma 1
that Z[ζpk ] ' Z[X ]/Φpk(X), and Φpk(X) can be computed
from (?). The next example shows how to do arithmetic
operations in such a ring.
Example 2: Let p = 2, and k = 2. The previous consider-
ations lead us to
Z[ζ4]' Z[X ]/Φ4(X),
where Φ4(X) = X2 + 1. Of course every element of
Z[X ]/Φ4(X) may be represented as polynomial of degree
< deg(Φ4). Suppose that
a(X) = a1X +a0,
b(X) = b1X +b0
are such representations. Addition and subtraction can be
done by coordinates:
a(X)±b(X) = (a1±b1)X +(a0±b0).
Multiplication is a little bit more complicated. To do
this we first have to compute a(X)b(X) in Z[X ], and
then reduce the product modulo Φ4(X). Since (a1X +a0)
(b1X + b0) mod (X2 + 1) = a1b1X2 + (a1b0 + a0b1)X +
a0b0 mod (X2 +1) = (a1b0 +a0b1)X +(a0b0−a1b1), then
we have
a(X)b(X) = (a1b0 +a0b1)X +(a0b0−a1b1).

2.2. Group rings
In the previous section Galois group of extension Q(ζn)/Q
was defined as
G = {σa : (a,n) = 1, where σa(ζn) = ζ an }.
If we interpret Q(ζn) as Q[X ]/Φn(X) then every ele-
ment σa ∈ G can be written as σa(X) = Xa mod Φn(X).
Group G is in fact the group of automorphisms of the
field Q(ζn) which fixes the base field Q [9]. There is a nat-
ural action of G on Q(ζn) and Z[ζn].
Example 3: Consider Q(ζ4) ' Q[X ]/(X2 + 1) a Galois
group of extension Q(ζ4)/Q is defined as
G =
{
σ1,σ3
}
' (Z/4Z)∗.
Let b(X) = b1X +b0 be the representation of element from
Q[X ]/(X2 + 1). Since every σa ∈ G fixes Q elements, we
have
σ1(b(X)) = b1σ1(X)+b0
= b1X +b0,
σ3(b(X)) = b1σ3(X)+b0
= b1X3 +b0 mod (X2 +1)
= −b1X +b0.
The same is true if b(X)∈Z[X ]/(X2 +1). 
Now we will introduce the ring of Z-linear combinations
of elements of G. This structure plays a crucial role in the
extension of Gauss sums test to Jacobi sums test, and it
allows to apply the latter in practice.
Definition 2: Define group ring Z[G] as the set of elements
f = ∑σ∈G fσ σ , where all fσ ∈ Z. Operations in Z[G] are
defined in the following way:
f ±g = ∑
σ∈G
( fσ ±gσ )σ ,
f ·g = ∑
σ ,τ∈G
( fσ gτ)(στ).

Addition and subtraction is in Z[G] defined by coordinates.
Multiplication is a little bit more complicated. The follow-
ing example explains how to do this operation.
Example 4: Consider group ring Z[G] with G defined as in
previous example G = {σ1,σ3} ' (Z/4Z)∗. The following
table presents group law for G
· σ1 σ3
σ1 σ1 σ3
σ3 σ3 σ1
If f = f1σ1 + f3σ3 and g = g1σ1 + g3σ3 are elements
of Z[G], then we have:
f ±g = ( f1±g1)σ1 +( f3±g3)σ3,
f ·g = ( f1g1)(σ1σ1)+( f1g3)(σ1σ3)+
( f3g1)(σ3σ1)+( f3g3)(σ3σ3)
= ( f1g1)σ1 +( f1g3)σ3 +
( f3g1)σ3 +( f3g3)σ1
= ( f1g1 + f3g3)σ1 +( f1g3 + f3g1)σ3.

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Now we are ready to extend group action given by G to
action given by Z[G].
Definition 3: Let G be a Galois group of extension
Q(ζn)/Q, and Z[G] denote its group ring. If f ∈ Z[G]
and x ∈Q(ζn), then we define action of f on x by
x f = ∏
σ∈G
σ(x) fσ
for x 6= 0, and 0 f = 0. 
This definition is quite natural and it has very nice prop-
erties. One can immediately check, that for all x,x1,x2 ∈
Q(ζn) and f , f1, f2 ∈ Z[G] we have:
1. x f1+ f2 = x f1 x f2 ,
2. x f1 f2 =
(
x f1
) f2 = (x f2) f1 ,
3. (x1 + x2) f = x
f
1 + x
f
2 ,
4. (x1x2) f = x
f
1 x
f
2 .
Example 5: Let a(X) = a1X +a0 represent an element of
Q(ζ4)'Q[X ]/(X2 +1), then for f = σ1 +σ2 we can obtain
a(X) f = σ1(a1X +a0)σ3(a1X +a0)
= −a21X
2 +a20 mod (X
2 +1)
= a21 +a
2
0,
and for g = 2σ1 +σ3 we have:
a(X)g = a(X)σ1+ f
= σ1(a1X +a0)(a21 +a
2
0)
= (a31 +a
2
0a1)X +(a0a
2
1 +a
3
0).

The most interesting is the case of n = pk, where p is prime.
The following proposition shows the relation which will be
usful in the next section.
Proposition 2: If n = pk and G = Gal(Q(ζn)/Q), then the
set
p = { f ∈ Z[G] : ζ fp = 1}
is a prime ideal of group ring Z[G]. 
2.3. Dirichlet characters
Dirichlet character χ modulo q is a group homomorphism
from (Z/qZ)∗ to C∗. If q is prime then character χ can
be defined by choosing value χ(g) for some generator g of
(Z/qZ)∗.
Example 6: If q = 5, then g = 2 is a generator of (Z/5Z)∗,
and all Dirichlet characters may be defined by choosing
value for χ(g). But χ must be a homomorphism, so its
image has to be a multiplicative subgroup of order four
in C∗. There are only four such possibilities:
1. χ1(g) = 1 (trivial character),
2. χ2(g) =−1,
3. χ3(g) = i,
4. χ4(g) =−i.

It can be shown, that the set of all characters modulo q
forms a group.
Proposition 3: All characters from (Z/qZ)∗ to C∗ form
a group with neutral element χ0 such that χ0(x) = 1 for all
x ∈ (Z/qZ)∗. 
Since χ is a homomorphism and |(Z/qZ)∗| < ∞ one can
show that the set of character values forms a multiplicative
group which is a subgroup of 〈ζq〉= 〈e 2piiq 〉. Definition of
character may be extended to a multiplicative map from
Z/qZ to C by taking χ(x) = 0 for all x 6∈ (Z/qZ)∗. It can
then be lifted to map from Z to C. More information about
characters can be found in [8].
2.4. Gauss and Jacobi sums
We are now ready to give the definition and some basic
properties of Gauss and Jacobi sums.
Definition 4:
1. Let χ be a character modulo q. The Gauss sum τ(χ)
is defined by
τ(χ) = ∑
x∈(Z/qZ)∗
χ(x)ζ xq ,
where ζq = e 2piiq .
2. Let χ1,χ2 be two characters modulo q. The Jacobi
sum j(χ1,χ2) is defined by
j(χ1,χ2) = ∑
x∈(Z/qZ)∗
χ1(x)χ2(1− x).

There is a nontrivial connection between those two objects.
It allows us to implement our primality proof in a very
effective way.
Proposition 4: Let χ1,χ2 be characters modulo q such that
χ1χ2 6= χ0. Then
j(χ1,χ2) =
τ(χ1)τ(χ2)
τ(χ1χ2)
.

It is clear that if χ is a character modulo prime num-
ber q, then its values belong to some group 〈ζn〉, where
n | q − 1. But it means that τ(χ) ∈ Z[ζn,ζq] and
j(χ1,χ2) ∈ Z[ζn]. The second ring is simpler and has
smaller cost of arithmetic operations. The next section
will show how to use it to effectively implement the
primality test.
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3. Primality test
The previous section presented the theoretical basis of Ja-
cobi sums test concept. Now we will try to sum up the
theory and show how it can be used in the construction of
a primality proving algorithm. It will be done in two steps.
The first step describes an impractical algorithm based on
Gauss sums (that are located in a large ring). The sec-
ond one uses particular properties of Jacobi sums to move
computations into a smaller ring, where Gauss sums are
replaced by Jacobi sums.
We assume that N has already passed the Rabin-Miller test
and it is highly improbable that N is composite. Our aim
is the proof of primality of N. In this section we fix prime
numbers p,q such that pk | q− 1 and pk+1 - q− 1. Let
χ be character modulo q of order n = pk in the group of
characters.
3.1. Basic test
The fundamental concept is to prove a generalization of
Fermat’s little theorem. It allows us to verify many con-
gruences that are satisfied by prime numbers and together
imply primality of the tested number.
Proposition 5: Let β ∈ Z[G]. Then if N is prime, there
exists η(χ) ∈ 〈ζn〉 such that
τ(χ)β (N−σN) ≡ η(χ)−βN mod N, (?β )
where η(χ) = χ(N). 
Note that Z[G] acts not only on Z[ζn] but also on Z[ζn,ζq].
But it doesn’t matter because action on ζq is trivial (identity
action). In the final version of the test, the congruence
(?β ) in Z[ζn,ζq] will be transformed to equivalent condition
in Z[ζn]. So results of this section are important only from
the theoretical point of view and it is unnecessary to give
examples of operations in Z[ζn,ζq].
In order to present the main result of this section, first we
have to define the so called Lp condition.
Definition 5: Condition Lp is satisfied iff for all prime
divisors r of N and all positive integers a we can find
lp(r,a) such that
rp−1 ≡ N(p−1)lp(r,a) mod pa.

Now we are ready to formulate the fundamental theorem
which allows us to give primality proof of number N.
Theorem 1: Let t be an even integer. Define
e(t) = 2 ∏
q prime, (q−1)|t
qvq(t)+1.
Assume that (N, te(t)) = 1 and e(t) >
√
N. For each pair
of primes (p,q) such that (q− 1) | t and pk ‖ (q− 1),
let χp,q be a character modulo q of order pk (if gq is
a generator modulo q, then we can take χp,q(gq) = ζpk ).
If the following conditions are satified:
1. all χp,q satisfy (?β ) for some βp,q 6∈ p,
2. condition Lp is true for all primes p | t,
3. for every 0 ≤ i < t and r = N i mod e(t) if r 6= 1,
then r - N,
then N is prime. 
This theorem is interpreted as follows. If congruence (?β )
is false for some χp,q, then we have that N is not prime
(just like in Fermat test). But if (?β ) is true for all de-
fined characters then we get some extra information about
possible divisors of N. This allows to prove primality
of N or gives its nontrivial factor. So the only problem is
to verify the Lp condition. The following proposition gives
a practical method for checking it.
Proposition 6: Suppose that χ is a character modulo q of
order pk which satisfies (?β ) for some β 6∈ p. If one of the
following conditions is true, then Lp is satisfied:
1. p≥ 3,
2. p = 2, k = 1 and N ≡ 1 mod 4,
3. p = 2, k≥ 2 and q
N−1
2 ≡−1 mod N. 
3.2. Jacobi sums
The test based on Gauss sums is asymptotically fast, how-
ever it is far from being practical. Main reason for this
situation is the computation of τ(χ)β (N−σN). One needs to
work in Z[ζn,ζq] and this is very slow in practice.
Example 7: If we want to test number N < 10100 then we
can take t = 5040. In this case n = pk will be very small,
more precisely pk ≤ 16. Unfortunately q will be much
larger, the largest value being q = 2521. This forces us to
consider polynomials of degree > 1,5 ·104 and coefficients
reduced modulo N. Multiplying such polynomials takes
about 2 ·108≈ 227 multiplications modulo N and makes this
completely unpractical. 
The above example shows that using Gauss sums is compu-
tationally infeasible. One of possible ways to make the test
practical, is to replace the (?β ) congruence by some condi-
tion depending only on Jacobi sum which lies in a smaller
ring Z[ζn]. Fortunately, it is possible and the next three
propositions give complete description of this construction.
First we present a very nice result which gives equivalent
condition for all practically considered odd primes p.
Proposition 7: Let 3≤ p < 6 ·109 and p 6= 1093,3511. If
we denote by E the set of all integers 1≤ x < pk coprime
to p, then condition (?β ) is equivalent to congruence:
j(χ,χ)α ≡ η(χ)−cN mod N,
where
α = ∑
x∈E
⌊
Nx
pk
⌋
σ−1x
and c = 2(2(p−1)pk−1 −1)/pk. 
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Note that the restriction on p in above proposition is com-
pletely irrelevant in practice. Even if we want to test the
primality of numbers having 109 decimal digits, we would
never need primes larger than 1093. This means that the
practical problem of testing (?β ) for p ≥ 3 is solved. The
next two propositions decribe the case p = 2.
Proposition 8: Let χ be a character modulo q of or-
der 2k with k ≥ 3. Denote by E the set of all integers
1≤ x < 2k that are congruent to 1 or 3 modulo 8. Set
δN = 0 for N congruent to 1 or 3 modulo 8, δN = 1 if N is
congruent to 5 or 7 modulo 8. The (?β ) condition can be
replaced by
(
j(χ ,χ) j(χ ,χ2)
)α
j
(
χ2k−3 ,χ3·2k−3
)2δN
≡
(−1)δN η(χ)−cN mod N,
where
α = ∑
x∈E
⌊
Nx
2k
⌋
σ−1x
and c = 3(32
k−2
−1)/2k. 
Proposition 9: For p = 2, k = 1 and β = 1 condition (?β )
is equivalent to the congruence
(−q)
N−1
2 ≡ η(χ) mod N.
For p = 2, k = 2 and β = 1 condition (?β ) is equivalent to
the congruence
j(χ ,χ) N−12 q N−14 ≡ η(χ)−1 mod N
if N ≡ 1 mod 4, and to the congruence
j(χ ,χ) N+12 q N−34 ≡−η(χ) mod N
if N ≡ 3 mod 4. 
4. Implementation and results
4.1. Description of the algorithm
This subsection is based on algorithm given by Henri Co-
hen in his book [6] and gives pseudocode of Jacobi sums
primality test.
Algorithm 1 (Precomputations): Let B be an upper bound
on the numbers we want to test. This algorithm makes
precomputations of values that don’t depend on N.
1. Find such t that e(t)2 > B (see Theorem 1 for defini-
tion).
2. For every prime q dividing e(t) with q ≥ 3 do as
follows.
(a) Find a primitive root gq modulo q, and a table
of the function f (x) defined for 1 ≤ x ≤ q− 2
by 1−gxq = g
f (x)
q and 1≤ f (x)≤ q−2.
(b) For every prime p dividing q−1 let k be such
number that pk | q−1 and pk+1 - q−1. Let χp,q
denote the character defined by χp,q(gxq) = ζ xpk .
(c) If p≥ 3 or p = 2 and k = 2, compute
J(p,q) = j(χp,q,χp,q) = ∑
1≤x≤q−2
ζ x+ f (x)
pk
.
If p = 2 and k ≥ 3, compute J(2,q) as above
and then
J3(q) = j(χ2,q,χ2,q) j(χ2,q,χ22,q) =
J(2,q)
(
∑
1≤x≤q−2
ζ 2x+ f (x)2k
)
,
and
J2(q) = j
(
χ2k−32,q ,χ3·2
k−3
2,q
)2
=
(
∑
1≤x≤q−2
ζ 3x+ f (x)8
)2
.
The above algorithm shows how to compute the set of Ja-
cobi sums for tested numbers that are smaller than some
upper bound B. The key step of this part is to compute
a very large table f (x) of q−1 elements, which allows us
to determine Jacobi sums. Of course this part doesn’t have
to be precomputed as it was suggested before. Experiments
show that it takes about 3−5% of total time of the testing
procedure, so the described step can be done during every
test. The next algorithm combines all previous theoreti-
cal results and it proves primality or compositeness of the
tested number.
Algorithm 2 (Jacobi sums primality test): Suppose that
N ≤ B and precomputation step has been done.
1. If (te(t),N) > 1, then N is composite.
2. For every prime p | t set lp← 1 if p≥ 3 and N p−1 6≡ 1
mod p2, lp← 0 otherwise.
3. For each pair (p,q) of primes such that pk ‖ (q−1) | t
execute 4a if p≥ 3, 4b if p = 2 and k≥ 3, 4c if p = 2
and k = 2, 4d if p = 2 and k = 1. Then go to Step 5.
4a. (Based on Proposition 7): Let E be the set of
all positive integers smaller than pk and coprime
to p. Set Θ← ∑x∈E xσ−1x , r ← N mod pk, α ←
∑x∈E
⌊
rx
pk
⌋
σ−1x , and compute s1← J(p,q)Θ mod N,
s2 ← s
bN/pkc
1 mod N, and S(p,q) ← s2J(p,q)
α
mod N.
If pkth root of unity η such that S(p,q)≡ η mod N
doesn’t exist, then N is composite. If η exists and is
a primitve root, then set lp← 1.
4b. (Based on Proposition 8): Let E be the set of all
positive integers smaller than 2k that are congru-
ent to 1 or 3 modulo 8. Set Θ ← ∑x∈E xσ−1x ,
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r ← N mod 2k, α ← ∑x∈E
⌊
rx
2k
⌋
σ−1x , and compute
s1 ← J3(q)Θ mod N, s2 ← s
bN/2kc
1 mod N, and
S(2,q)← s2J3(q)α J2(q)δN mod N, where δN = 0 if
r ∈ E, δN = 0 otherwise.
If 2kth root of unity η such that S(2,q)≡ η mod N
doesn’t exist, then N is composite. If η is a primitve
root and in addition q(N−1)/2 ≡−1 mod N, then set
l2← 1.
4c. (Based on Proposition 9): Compute s1← J(2,q)2 ·q
mod N, s2 ← s
bN/4c
1 mod N, and S(2,q) ← s2 if
N ≡ 1 mod 4, S(2,q)← s2J(2,q)2 if N ≡ 3 mod 4.
If the fourth root of unity η such that S(2,q) ≡ η
mod N doesn’t exist, then N is composite. If η
is a primitve root and in addition q(N−1)/2 ≡ −1
mod N, then set l2← 1.
4d. (Based on Proposition 9): Compute S(2,q) ←
(−q)(N−1)/2 mod N.
If S(2,q) 6≡ ±1 mod N then N is composite.
If S(2,q) ≡ −1 mod N, and N ≡ 1 mod 4, then
set l2← 1.
5. (Based on Proposition 6): For every p | t such that
lp = 0 do as follows. Take random number q such
that q - e(t), p | (q− 1) and (q,N) = 1. Execute
Step 4a–4d according to the value of pair (p,q).
If after a reasonable number of tries, some lp is still
equal to 0, then send message saying that the test
failed (this is highly improbable).
6. (Based on Theorem 1): For i = 1, . . . , t−1 compute
ri ← Ni mod e(t). If for some i, ri is a nontrivial
factor of N then N is composite. Otherwise N is
prime.
Presented algorithm works well both in theory and in prac-
tice. Pomerance and Odlyzko have shown that the com-
plexity of the Jacobi sums test is
O(lnNC ln ln lnN)
for some constant C. This is almost polynomial time.
4.2. Choosing good t
We see that in Step 6 Algorithm 2 needs to do O(t) divi-
sions. That means that the chosen t shouldn’t be too large.
On the other hand, if t will be small, then e(t)2 may be
smaller than N and this will not allow to use the algorithm.
Steps 4a–4d have small complexity only if factors of t are
small. All the above considerations tell us that t shouldn’t
be too small and too large, and it should have small factors.
Unfortunately there is no good description of this problem.
So we present values of t that are based on intuition and
experiments. Table 1 presents the sample values.
Table 1
Sample values of t for testing numbers
log2 N t
≤ 101 180 = 22 ·32 ·5
≤ 152 720 = 24 ·32 ·5
≤ 204 1260 = 22 ·32 ·5 ·7
≤ 268 2520 = 23 ·32 ·5 ·7
≤ 344 5040 = 24 ·32 ·5 ·7
≤ 525 27720 = 23 ·32 ·5 ·7 ·11
≤ 774 98280 = 23 ·33 ·5 ·7 ·13
≤ 1035 166320 = 24 ·33 ·5 ·7 ·11
≤ 1566 720720 = 24 ·32 ·5 ·7 ·11 ·13
≤ 2082 1663200 = 25 ·33 ·52 ·7 ·11
≤ 3491 8648640 = 26 ·33 ·52 ·7 ·11 ·13
4.3. Running times of the algorithm
We have implemented Algorithm 2 and Rabin-Miller test
using the same standard modular arithmetic. Table 2
presents comparison of running time between Jacobi sums
test and 320 iterations of Rabin-Miller test. Presented times
suggest that the Jacobi sum test can not be used for fast
generation of prime numbers. But it can be used for single
operations such as generation of
– cryptosystem parameters,
– certificate authority key.
The benefit is the certainty that the base of our cryptosystem
satisfies theoretical requirements.
Table 2
Sample runnig times for Jacobi sums test
and 320 iterations of Rabin-Miller test on 430 MHz PC
log2 N Jacobi sums Rabin-Miller
64 0.06 s 0.06 s
128 0.16 s 0.15 s
256 2.09 s 0.75 s
512 37.6 s 5.02 s
1024 907 s 37.1 s
Comparsion of times from Table 2 is also presented in
Fig. 1. The logarithmic scale of time was taken to show
how close is the runnig time of Jacobi sums test to polyno-
mial time. We can see that the complexity is bounded by
C1 ln3 N for Rabin-Miller test and by C2 ln4.5 N for Jacobi
sums primality prooving method. Last remark shows that
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Fig. 1. Comparsion of runnig times for Jacobi sums test and
320 iterations of Rabin-Miller test (based on data from Table 2).
for practical applications Jacobi sums method is faster than
deterministic, polynomial algorithm proposed by Agrawal,
Kayal and Saxena [1].
5. Conclusions
This article presented a primality proving algorithm based
on Jacobi sums. Described algorithm is about 2400 times
slower than a single iteration of Rabin-Miller test for
512-bit numbers. This means that it can’t be used in appli-
cations where time is one of the most critical resourses and
where high speed is necessary. On the other hand there ex-
ist situations where security is much more important than
speed. Then Jacobi sums test can be successfully used to
verify primality of strong pseudoprime numbers.
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Paper Packet switch architecture
with multiple output queueing
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Abstract— In this paper the new packet switch architecture
with multiple output queuing (MOQ) is proposed. In this
architecture the nonblocking switch fabric, which has the ca-
pacity of N×N2 , and output buffers arranged into N separate
queues for each output, are applied. Each of N queues in
one output port stores packets directed to this output only
from one input. Both switch fabric and buffers can operate
at the same speed as input and output ports. This solution
does not need any speedup in the switch fabric as well as
arbitration logic for taking decisions which packets from in-
puts will be transferred to outputs. Two possible switch fab-
ric structures are considered: the centralized structure with
the switch fabric located on one or several separate boards,
and distributed structure with the switch fabric distributed
over line cards. Buffer arrangements as separate queues with
independent write pointers or as a memory bank with one
pointer are also discussed. The mean cell delay and cell loss
probability as performance measures for the proposed switch
architecture are evaluated and compared with performance of
OQ architecture and VOQ architecture. The hardware com-
plexity of OQ, VOQ and presented MOQ are also compared.
We conclude that hardware complexity of proposed switch is
very similar to VOQ switch but its performance is comparable
to OQ switch.
Keywords— high-speed packet switching, output queueing,
buffer, switch fabric, switching node, multicast.
1. Introduction
The transmission capacity of optical fibers has caused
a tremendous increase in data transmission speed. The de-
velopment of broadband access technologies resulted in the
need for next generation routers with high-speed interfaces
and large switching capacity. One of constrains that limits
the switching capacity is the speed of memories used for
buffering packets to resolve contention resolution in packet
switches. Buffers can be placed on inputs, outputs, inputs
and outputs, and/or within the switch fabric. Depending
on the buffer placement respective switches are called in-
put queued (IQ), output queued (OQ), combined input and
output queued (CIOQ) and combined input and crosspoint
queued (CICQ) [1].
In the OQ strategy all incoming cells (i.e., fixed-length
packets) are allowed to arrive at the output port and are
stored in queues located at each outlet of switching ele-
ments. The cells destined for the same output port simulta-
neously do not face a contention problem because they are
queued in the buffer at the outlet. To avoid the cell loss the
system must be able to write N cells in the queue during
one cell time, N is the total number of inlets of the switch.
No arbiter is required because all the cells can be switched
to respective output queue. The cells in the output queue
are served using FIFO discipline to maintain the integrity
of the cell sequence. In OQ switches the best performance
(100% throughput, low mean time delay) is achieved, but
every output port must be able to accept a cell from ev-
ery input port simultaneously or at least within a single
time slot (a time slot is the duration of a cell). If more
cells will request access to a particular output port than
the switch fabric output buffer can support, the excess cells
must be discarded. An output buffered switch can be more
complex than an input buffered switch because the switch
fabric and output buffers must effectively operate at a much
higher speed than that of each port to reduce the probability
of cell loss. The bandwidth required inside the switching
fabric is proportional to both the number of ports N and
the line rate. This speed is necessary when all inputs si-
multaneously transfer a cell to the same output port. Such
case is called “hot spot” and often occurs when a pop-
ular server is connected to a single switch port. The in-
ternal speedup factor is inherent to pure output buffer-
ing, and is the main reason of difficulties in implement-
ing switches with output buffering. It is no longer possi-
ble to find RAMs with sufficiently fast access time taking
into account an increasing line rate. Since the output buffer
needs to store N cells in each time slot, its speed limits the
switch size.
The IQ packet switches have the internal operation speed
equal to (or slightly higher) than the input/output line speed,
but the throughput is limited to 58.6% under uniform traf-
fic and Bernoulli packet arrivals because of head-of-line
(HOL) blocking phenomena [2]. This problem can be
solved by selecting queued cells other than the HOL cell for
transmission, but it is difficult to implement such queueing
discipline in hardware. Another solution is to use speedup,
i.e., the switch’s internal links speed is greater than in-
puts/outputs speed. However, this also requires a buffer
memory speed faster than a link speed. To increase the
throughput of IQ switches space parallelism is also used
in the switch fabric, i.e., more than one input port of the
switch can transmit simultaneously [3].
One of the proposed solution for IQ switches, which is
recently widely considered in papers, is a virtual output
queuing (VOQ) [4, 5]. In this solution an input buffer in
each input port is divided into N parallel queues, each stor-
ing packets directed to different output port. When a new
cell arrives at the input port, it is stored in the destined
queue and waits for transmission through a switch fabric.
In this architecture, the memory speed remains compati-
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ble with the line rate, but a good matching algorithm be-
tween inputs and outputs is needed so that it can achieve
high throughput and low latency. The performance of the
switch can be improved when the internal switch fabric
operates a few times faster than the line rate, but faster
memories are also needed in this case. Different schedul-
ing algorithms for VOQ switches were considered in the
literature [5–9], most of them achieve 100% throughput
under uniform traffic, but the throughput is usually reduced
under non-uniform traffic. The arbitration scheme should
be realized slot by slot, therefore the arbiter’s speed also
limits the capacity of the switch.
In this paper we propose a new switch architecture which
uses multiple output queuing (MOQ). In this architecture
buffers are located at output ports and are divided into
N separate queues. Each of N queues in one output port
stores packets from one input port. We assume, that fixed-
length switching technology is used, i.e., variable-length
packets are segmented into fixed-length packets, called time
slots or cells, at inputs and reassembled at the outputs.
We will use terms cell and packet interchangeably further
on. In the proposed architecture at most one packet is
to be written to the one output queue in one time slot.
Therefore, the memory speed is equal to the line speed,
but the performance of the switch is very similar to those
of OQ switch.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2
the general switch architecture is proposed. The possible
switch fabric structures are described. Centralized and dis-
tributed switch fabrics structures and possible buffer ar-
rangements are considered. In the next section performance
evaluation of the proposed switch architecture using simu-
lation is done. Then some comparison between implemen-
tation complexity of the proposed switch architecture and
a VOQ switch are given, followed by conclusions.
2. The switch architecture
2.1. General architecture
In this paper we propose the new switch architecture which
uses output queueing. To reduce the memory speed an
output buffer at each output port is divided into N separate
queues. Each queue stores packets directed to the output
only form one input. In this way this architecture is similar
to the VOQ switch, but multiple buffers are located at out-
put ports not at input ports. We will call this architecture
the multiple output queueing switch. The general architec-
ture of the switch is shown in Fig. 1. The switch consists of
N input ports, N output ports and the switch fabric. Input
and output ports can be implemented on separated ingress
and egress cards, as it is shown in Fig. 1, or they may be
placed on one line card, as it will be shown latter. Each
ingress card is connected to the switch fabric by one line,
while N outputs from the switch fabric are connected to
one egress card. At the output port buffer memory is di-
vided into N separate queues. Each queue stores packets
directed from one input port. The output queue denoted
by OQ j,i at the output port j stores packets directed to this
output port from input i. At the given time slot each input
port can send at most one packet and each output port can
receive up to N packets, each from different input ports.
Therefore, these packets can be simultaneously written to
N queues.
Fig. 1. The switch architecture with multiple output queueing.
The main advantage of these architecture is that it can op-
erate at the same speed as input and output ports, and
the lack of arbitration logic, which decides which packets
from inputs will be transferred through the switch fabric
to output ports (this arbitration mechanism is needed in
VOQ switches). However, since we have N queues in each
output port, it is necessary to use an output arbiter, which
chooses a packet to be sent to the output line. We propose
to use round-robin scheme, which is widely used because
of its fairness. The buffer management algorithms will be
discussed in more details later on.
2.2. The switching fabric architecture
We will now consider some possible switch fabric im-
plementations. The switch fabric in the proposed switch
should have a capacity of N×N2 and should be nonblock-
ing at the packet level. It should be noted that there is no
need to support full connectivity in the switch fabric. Any
input should only have a possibility to send packets to N
different switch fabric’s outputs, each of these N outputs
should be connected to the different output port. In general,
input i, 0≤ i≤ N−1 should be able to transfer a packet to
the switch fabric output j N + i, 0 ≤ j ≤ N− 1, when this
packet is directed to output port j. The packet will be then
stored in OQ j,i.
The switch fabric can be organized either in the central-
ized mode or the distributed mode. In the first case the
switch fabric constitutes one module produced on one board
(or several boards). This architecture is shown in Fig. 2.
We assume here that one input port and one output port
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Fig. 2. The switch architecture with the centralized switch fabric.
are arrange on one line card. Buffers are placed at out-
put ports. The switch fabric may be realized for instance
using the tree architecture, or may be based on the cross-
bar architecture as it is shown in Figs. 3 and 4, respec-
tively. The stacked-banyan switch fabric proposed in [10]
can also be used. In all these solutions N2 + N lines is
needed for connecting input and output ports to the switch
fabric. Each line card is connected by means of N +1 lines
to the switch fabric. For switches of greater capacity num-
ber of connectors will limit the switch size. The capacity of
the switch may be increased by using fiber connections with
wavelength multiplexing. The other solution is to combine
output buffers within the switch fabric. In this case line
cards will be connected with the switch fabric by two lines,
but the switch fabric will require more boards with buffer
memories.
Fig. 3. The switch fabric using the tree architecture.
In the distributed mode the switch fabric is distributed over
line cards (or ingress/egress cards). In this case each line
card comprises also a segment (or a part) of the switch
fabric. The capacity of such segment is 1×N, and for
each line card there is N outgoing lines to connect outputs
of the 1×N switch fabric to buffers located on the same and
other line cards, and N incoming lines to N output queues
(see Fig. 5). The switch fabric based on the tree architecture
can be decentralized by putting each 1×N segment on one
line card (compare Fig. 3). The crossbar architecture can
be also decentralized in such a way that each row of the
crossbar switch fabric (which corresponds to one input –
see Fig. 4) is placed on one line card.
Fig. 4. The switch fabric based on the crossbar architecture.
The drawback of the decentralized architecture described
above is the number of outputs from line cards. We need
2N lines (N incoming and N outgoing) for each line card.
This number may be reduced by putting the switch fabric
on the output side of the line card, as it is shown in Fig. 6.
Connection lines between cards work as busses and arriving
packets are broadcast from inputs to all outputs. Address
filters AF at each line card determine whether respective
packets are destined to the output. Cells directed to the
given output are passed through the address filters to the
output queues. The advantage of this architecture is the
reduced number of connecting lines between line cards,
which is now equal to N. The number of address filters
is N2, and they should operate with the line speed. The
speed of connecting lines between line cards is also equal
to the line speed.
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Fig. 5. The switch architecture with the decentralized switch fabric – version 1.
Fig. 6. The switch architecture with the decentralized switch
fabric – version 2.
2.3. Buffer arrangements
Buffers in output ports are arranged into N separate queues.
When N packets from N input ports are directed to one
output port in the same time slot, each packet is written to
the different queues. Therefore, the memory speed is the
same as the line speed. Buffers may be arranged as sepa-
rate queues with independent write pointers or as a mem-
ory bank with one pointer which points the same memory
cells in each queue. Packets from N queues in each out-
put port are read out using the round-robin (RR) algorithm.
When independent write pointers are used, the round-robin
pointer, denoted by RR, is moved to the queue next to those
read out in the previous time slot. When packets are writ-
ten to the same position of the buffers (one write pointer
is used), the operation of RR is modified in such a way,
that when all packets from the same position (i.e., which
were simultaneously written to the buffers) are already read
out, the RR is set back to 0. The operation of these two
arrangements will be described by means of the following
example.
In the first case the separate pointer is assign to each
queue. This pointer, denoted by MPj,i, points the end of
queue OQ j,i, where the next incoming packet to output j
from input i will be written to. The example for output
x is shown in Fig. 7. It is assumed that all queues are
empty at the beginning of the first time slot. Pointers are
shown by arrows which shows the state of the pointers at
the end of respective time slots. In the first time slot two
packets (numbered 1 and 2) from inputs 0 and 1 arrive
to the considered output x. The round-robin pointer is set
to 0 (the HOL packet from OQx,0 has the highest prior-
ity). Since buffer OQx,0 is empty, the packet from input 0
is immediately directed to the output, the RR pointer is
set to 1, and packet 2 is stored in OQx,1. The state of RR
at the end of the time slot is shown in Fig. 7. The pointer
of OQx,1 is moved to the next memory cell. In the next time
slot packets from inputs 0, 1 and 3 arrive (numbered 3, 4,
and 5, respectively). They are stored in respective queues,
while packet 2 from OQx,1 is sent out. During the third
time slot packets 6, 7 and 8 arrive from inputs 1, 2, and 3,
respectively. Since RR is now set to 2 and buffer OQx,2
is empty, packet 7 is sent directly to the output, while
packets 6 and 8 are stored in OQx,1 and OQx,3. In the
next time slot packet 5 will be sent out from OQx,3. In
this example packet 7 is sent before packet 5, but these
packets arrive to the considered output from different in-
puts. The sequence of packets from the same input port
is preserve.
In the second case there is one pointer for all queues. This
pointer, denoted by MPj, points to the memory cells in all
queues of output j, where the next incoming packets will
be written to. The example is shown in Fig. 8. In the first
time slot two packets (numbered 1 and 2) from inputs 0
and 1 arrive to the considered output x. The round-robin
pointer is set to 0 (the HOL packet from OQx,0 has the
highest priority). Since buffer OQx,0 is empty, the packet
from input 0 is immediately directed to the output, packet 2
is stored in OQx,1, the MPx is moved to the next mem-
ory cells in all queues (shown by arrows in Fig. 8), and
the RR pointer is set to 1 (here also the state of RR is
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Fig. 7. The example of buffer operation with separate pointers.
Fig. 8. The example of buffer operation with one pointer.
shown at the end of the time slot). In the next time slot
packets from inputs 0, 1 and 3 arrive (numbered 3, 4,
and 5, respectively). They are stored in the second mem-
ory cell of respective queues, while packet 2 from OQx,1
is sent out. After this packet is read out, there is no any
packet in the first memory cell in all queues. Therefore,
the next cells in the queues are moved to the HOL po-
sition, and the RR is set to 0. During the third time
slot packets 6, 7 and 8 arrive from inputs 1, 2, and 3,
respectively. Since RR is now set to 0, packet 3 from
OQx,0 is sent to the output, while new packets are writ-
ten to the buffer. In the next three time slots packets 4, 5,
and 6 will be sent out from OQx,1, OQx,3, and OQx,1,
respectively.
In this second approach all packets which arrive to the given
output are written in the same position of each buffer. So
we can use only such positions where all memory cells are
empty. When in the given time slot less than N packets
arrive to the output, some memory cells will be empty and
they could not be used to store packets until all packet in
the same position of all buffers are read out. Therefore, the
memory is not used as efficiently as in the first approach. In
the next section only the performance of this first approach
will be evaluated.
3. Performance evaluation
In order to evaluate performance measures for the proposed
MOQ switch architecture, the corresponding simulation re-
searches have been conducted. The researches have been
carried out for the switch with a size of N ×N (N = 8)
for the following values of traffic load for an input port:
p = 0.6; 0.7; 0.8; 0.9. We have assumed that offered traffic
is uniformly distributed for N outputs (uniform traffic). We
have further assumed that the service time of each cell is
deterministic and equal to one.
The results of the simulations are shown in the charts
(Figs. 9 and 10) in the form of marks with 95% confi-
dence intervals that have been calculated after the t–student
distribution for the five series with 10,000,000 time slots.
For each of the points of simulation the value of the con-
fidence interval is at least one order lower than the mean
value of the results of the simulation. In many cases the
value of the confidence interval is lower than the height
of the sign used to indicate the value of the simulation
experiment.
We have evaluated two performance measures for switch
architectures, i.e., mean waiting time (mean cell delay)
and cell loss probability (CLP). The obtained performance
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measures of MOQ architecture have been compared with
performance of OQ architecture [6] and VOQ architecture
(algorithm iSLIP with one and four iterations) [7].
Fig. 9. Mean waiting time (in time slots), N = 8.
Fig. 10. Cell loss probability, N = 8.
Figure 9 plots the mean waiting time (in time slots) of
the MOQ switch as a function of input load p. The pre-
sented results have been obtained for the switch in which
the size of each of N = 8 output buffers (of the tagged out-
put port) was limited to b = 10. The adopted buffer size
assures – for each value of traffic load – stable values of
mean waiting times (the application of larger buffers do not
lead to increase in values of waiting time). The simulation
results enabled us to compare the MWT values in the pro-
posed MOQ switch architecture with the results obtained
for OQ architecture. For OQ switch we have assumed that
the buffer size is large enough to get stable values of MWT
parameter. We can notice that both architectures are com-
parable. This phenomenon results from similar character-
istics of both FIFO discipline for single queue and round
robin discipline for cyclic-service set of queues. Addition-
ally, Fig. 9 shows the performance of iSLIP algorithm in
virtual output queuing architecture. It is evident from the
presented results that – regardless of the number of itera-
tions in iSLIP algorithm – the VOQ switch architecture is
charcterised by higher values of MWT than the proposed
MOQ switch architecture.
Another important performance measure for packet
switches is the cell loss probability. Figure 10 compares the
results of CLP obtained for MOQ switch with the results
calculated for the switch with output queuing. It is intu-
itively clear, that the proposed switch architecture requires
greater total number of memory cells (N buffers for each
output port) in order to keep the same value of CLP pa-
rameter as in the case of switches with single output queue
for each output port.
4. Comparison
In the previous section MWT and CLP in MOQ, OQ and
VOQ switches were compared. Now we compare a hard-
ware complexity of these architectures. This comparison is
summarized in Table 1. The MOQ switch uses the same
number of buffers as VOQ switch and of the same speed
as the line rate. The OQ switch comprise only N buffers,
but they have to be N times faster than the line speed.
Table 1
The hardware complexity of different buffering strategies
Parameters OQ VOQ MOQ
Number of buffers N N2 N2
Memory speed (in line speed) N 1 1
Switch fabric capacity N×N N×N N×N2
Switch fabric speed N 1 1
Switch fabric hardware N2 N2 N2
Number of schedulers – 2N N
Wiring complexity N N2 N2
The switch fabric speed in MOQ is also the same as line
speed, and the same is true for VOQ switch, provided that
no speed-up is used to increase the performance of the
VOQ switch. In OQ switch the switch fabric is N times
faster. However, in MOQ architecture the switch fabric has
the capacity of N×N2 instead of N×N. But this greater
capacity does not result in greater hardware complexity,
since MOQ switch require the same number of switching
elements (when crossbar architecture is considered) as OQ
or VOQ switches.
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The important issue is the packet scheduling mechanism
and wiring complexity. The OQ switches do not need
packet schedulers and the wiring complexity is O(N). On
the other hand, VOQ switches need 2N schedulers when
iterative maximal matching algorithm is used (one sched-
uler in each input port and one in each output port). These
schedulers are to be connected between themselves so the
wiring complexity is O(N2). The similar complexity is
needed when one centralized scheduler is used, since each
VOQ has to be connected with the scheduler to send request
signal when it has a HOL packet. The MOQ architecture
has the same wiring complexity but lines are used to con-
nect MOQs with the switch fabric, instead of connecting
VOQs and schedulers. The MOQ switches need also N
schedulers, one for each output, but there is no need to
connect schedulers between themselves. The MOQs of the
given output are to be connected to the scheduler of this
output and this is done inside the output port (a line card
or an egress card).
Comparing the hardware complexity and the performance
of the switches we can say, that the MOQ architecture is
attractive and worth considering in constructing high-speed
and high-capacity switches. The hardware complexity is
very similar to VOQ switches but the performance of the
MOQ architecture is much better, at least when uniform
traffic is considered. Simulation results shows, that the
performance of the MOQ switch is very similar to the OQ
switch.
5. Conclusions
We have proposed the new packet switch architecture which
uses multiple output queueing. This architecture looks at-
tractive for constructing high-speed packet switches. The
hardware complexity of this architecture is very simi-
lar to VOQ switch but its performance is comparable to
OQ switch. This paper contains the first considerations
and the first results we obtained for this architecture. The
architecture is also very promising since it can naturally
support multicast traffic. Further research are needed to
evaluate the performance of the MOQ switch under other
traffic types (non-uniform, hot-spot), the buffer length eval-
uation, as well as the practical buffer implementation in
either separate chip or in the switch fabric.
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Paper Integrated analysis
of communication protocols
by means of PLA formalism
Henrikas Pranevicius
Abstract—Aggregate approach and its possibilities for speci-
fication and analysis of computer network protocols are pre-
sented. The theoretical basis of the aggregate approach is
a piece-linear aggregate (PLA) for formal specification of sys-
tems. The advantage of that approach is that it permits to
create models both for analysis correctness of specifications
and simulation. Some methods that can be used for valida-
tion and verification of aggregate specifications are presented
also.
Keywords— piece-linear aggregates, ESTELLE/Ag specification
language, validation, simulation, communication protocols.
1. Introduction
The stage of formal specification is one of the most impor-
tant during the design of software of communication proto-
cols. Such formal specification is usually used for analysis
and implementation purposes. In the stage of analysis it is
necessary to resolve two tasks: analysis of logical correct-
ness and evaluation of the system functioning parameters.
Different mathematical schemes are used for creating for-
mal descriptions of systems, such as: different automate
models, Petri-nets, data flow and state transition diagrams,
temporal logic technique, abstract communicating methods
and other [1, 2].
When a formalization method is chosen, it is desirable
that both above mentioned analysis tasks could be resolved
on the bases of a single formal description. The aggre-
gate approach has such property and it has been success-
fully used both for correctness analysis and for simulation
of computer network protocols [3–5]. Specification lan-
guage ESTELLE/Ag and the specifications analysis tool
PRANAS-2 have been created on the base of the aggre-
gate method (Ag). There are some differences between
ESTELLE/Ag and the ESTELLE standard ISO: the piece-
linear aggregate model is used in ESTELLE/Ag. The use
of such a model instead of a finite-state automate, which is
the formal background of the standard ESTELLE, enables
to create models both for validation and simulation. This is
possible due to the special structure of the piece-linear ag-
gregate. Apart from the discrete components describing the
state of the modules, there are also continuous components
to control event-sequences in the module. These continuous
components are called operations. By means of operators,
sequences of actions are described, the intermediate results
of which are invisible on the outside. If such operation
sequence is being performed at a given instance of time
the corresponding operation is called “active”. Thus, an
individual module involves two types of events: arrival of
an input signal and completion of an active operation. The
specification analysis system PRANAS-2 consists of the fol-
lowing software tools: a specification editor, a validation
subsystem and a simulation subsystem. The editor provides
the capability to create a specification in ESTELLE/Ag.
The validation subsystem permits to construct a validation
model for the program generating the reachability graph.
After completing the construction of the reachability graph,
it is possible to verify the following specification charac-
teristics: completeness, deadlock freeness, boundedness,
absence of static deadlock, absence of dynamic deadlock,
termination.
The same specification changes are carried out when the
simulation model is creating. This is necessary in order to
define the duration of operations and to introduce additional
variables for gathering statistics about the evaluated system
parameters.
Section 2 describes the general principles of piece-linear
aggregates (PLA) formalism. Methods used for correct-
ness analysis of PLA specification are presented in Sec-
tion 3. Section 4 illustrates the use PLA formalism for
formal specification and integrated analysis of event driven
local computer network protocol.
2. General principles of the aggregate
approach
In the application of the aggregate approach for system
specification, the system is represented as a set of interact-
ing piece-linear aggregates. The PLA is taken as an object
defined by a set of states Z, input signals X , and output
signals Y . The aggregate functioning is considered in a set
of time moments t ∈ T . The state z ∈ Z, the input signals
x ∈ X , and the output signals y ∈ Y are considered to be
time functions. Apart from these sets, transition H and
output G operators must be known as well.
The state z ∈ Z of the piece-linear aggregate is the same
as the state of a piece-linear Markov process, i.e., z(t) =(
υ(t), zυ(t)
)
, where υ(t) is a discrete state component tak-
ing values on a countable set of values; and zυ(t) is a con-
tinues component comprising of zυ1(t), zυ2(t), . . . , zυk(t)
co-ordinates.
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When there are no inputs, the state of the aggregate changes
in the following manner:
υ(t) = const,
dzυ(t)
dt =−αυ ,
where αυ = (αυ1, αυ2, . . . , αυk) is a constant vector.
The state of the aggregate can change in two cases only:
when an input signal arrives at the aggregate or when a con-
tinuous component acquires a definite value. The theoret-
ical basis of piece-linear aggregates is their representation
as piece-linear Markov processes.
Aggregate functioning is examined on a set of time mo-
ments T = {t0, t1, . . . , tm, . . .} at which one or several events
take place, resulting in the aggregate state alternation. The
set of events E which may take place in the aggregate
is divided into two non-intersecting subsets E ′ = E ′ ∪E ′′.
The subset E ′ = {e′1, e
′
2, . . . , e
′
N} comprises classes
of events (or simply events) e′i, i = 1,N resulting from the
arrival of input signals from the set X = {x1,x2, . . . ,xN}.
The class of events e′′i = {e
′′
i j, j = 1,2,3, . . .}, where e′′i j is
an event from the class of events e′′i taking place the jth
time since the moment t0. The events from the subset E ′
are called external events. A set of aggregate input signals
is unambiguously reflected in the subset E ′, i.e., X → E ′.
The events from the subset E ′′ = {e′′1 ,e
′′
2 , . . . ,e
′′
f } are called
internal events, where e′′i = {e
′′
i j, j = 1,2,3, . . .}, i = 1, f are
the classes of the aggregate internal events. Here, f deter-
mines the number of operations taking place in the ag-
gregate. The events in the set E ′′ indicate the end of the
operations taking place in the aggregate.
The events of the subsets E ′ and E ′′ are called the evolu-
tionary events of the aggregate. The main evolution events
are sufficient for unambiguous determination of the aggre-
gate evolution. Apart from the basic evolutionary events,
auxiliary evolutionary events may be considered, which are
simultaneous to the basic ones and determine the start of
the operations.
For every class of events e′′i from the subset E ′′, control
sequences are specified
{ξ (i)j }, where ξ (i)j – the duration
of the operation, which is followed by the event e′′i j as well
as event counters
{
r(e′′i , tm)
}
, where r(e′′i , tm), i = 1, f is
the number of events from the class e′′i taken place in the
time interval [t0, tm].
In order to determine start and end moments of operation,
taking place in the aggregate the so-called control sums{
s(e′′i , tm)
}
,
{
w(e′′i , tm)
}
, i = 1, f are introduced, where
s(e′′i , tm) – the time moment of the start of operation fol-
lowed by an event from the class e′′i . This time moment is
indeterminate if the operation was not started; w(e′′i , tm) is
the time moment of the end of the operation followed by the
event from the class e′′i . In case of no priority operations,
the control sum w(e′′i , tm) is determined in the following
way: w(e′′i , tm) = s
′(e′′i , tm)+ξr(e′′i ,tm)+1, if at moment tm an
operation is taking place, which is followed by the event ei;
in the opposite case w(e′′i , tm) = ∞. The infinity symbol (∞)
is used to denote the undefined values of the variables.
Control sums determine only the possibility conditions for
the events after the moment tm, while the event occurrence
moments are not determined.
Let us specify the meaning of the co-ordinates of the ag-
gregate state. The discrete component of the state, υ(tm) ={
υ1(tm),υ2(tm), . . . ,υp(tm)
}
, presents the system state:
zυ(tm) =
{
w(e′′i , tm),w(e
′′
2 , tm), . . . ,w(e
′′
f , tm)
}
are control co-ordinates specifying the moment of evolu-
tionary events occurrence.
The control co-ordinate w(e′′i , tm) corresponds to every
each e′′i from the subset of events E ′′, while always
w(e′′i , tm)≥ tm.
The state co-ordinates z(tm) can change their values only at
discrete time moments tm , m = 1,2, . . . of event occurrence,
remaining fixed in each interval [tm, tm+1),m = 0,1,2, . . .
where t0 – the initial moment of system functioning.
When the state of the system z(tm), m = 0,1,2, . . ., is
known, the moment tm+1 of the following event is deter-
mined by a moment of input signal arrival to the aggregate
or by the equation:
tm+1 = min
{
w(e′′i , tm)
}
, 1 ≤ i ≤ f .
Class of the next event em+1 is specified by an input signal
if it arrives at the time moment tm+1 or is determined by
the control co-ordinate, which acquire minimal value at the
moment tm, i.e., if w(e′′i , tm) acquires minimal value, then
em+1 = e
′′
i .
The operator H states the new aggregate state:
z(tm+1) = H
[
z(tm),ei
]
, ei ∈ E ′∪E ′′.
The output signals yi from the set of output signals
Y = {y1, y2, . . . , ym} can be generated by an aggregate
only at occurrence moments of events from the subsets E ′
and E ′′. The operator G determines the content of the out-
put signals:
y = G
[
z(tm),ei
]
, ei ∈ E ′∪E ′′, y ∈ Y.
Further transition and output operators will be denoted
H(ei) and G(ei).
3. Correctness analysis of aggregate
specifications
3.1. Reachable states approach for aggregate model
validation
An essence of the reachable states method is a use of the
global state which is considered as a joint state of a sys-
tem after aggregate system composition. A graph of the
reachable states is created as oriented one: its nodes stand
for global states of the system, its arcs indicate the possible
transitions from one state to another. Initial and final states
must be specified in working out the graph. The resulting
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states graph is used for an analysis of defined properties of
a system, as some of them are closely related with the graph
structure. The given validation method allows to investi-
gate general properties of a system such as boundedness,
absence of redundancy in specification, completeness, ab-
sence of static deadlocks, absence of dynamic deadlocks,
termination.
3.2. Invariant approach for aggregate model validation
A system invariant (I) is the assertion, which describes
correct system functioning and it must remain true in spite
of the events taking place and system transition from one
state to another.
The essence of the method is as follows: assertions are
formulated in relation to the co-ordinates of the aggregate
model so as to express the requirements for the system
functioning.
On the base of a conceptual model of an analysed system
we can describe system functioning by the event sequence,
which may be represented by the graph G(V ), where V is
a set of vertices and A = {ai j} is an adjacency matrix.
In this case V = {e1,e2, . . . ,en}, where ei is ith event, n is
a number of events. (eie j) 6= (e jei), i.e., the graph is ori-
ented.
The set of states, which the system may enter after the
event e1, is called as the ith set of possible states (SSi –
symbolic state). SSi =
{
z∈ Z|(∃z′)
(
(z′ ∈ Z)∧EPi(z′)∧(z =
Hi(z′,P))
)}
, where Z is a set of all possible system states,
EPi(z′) is an enabling predicate of the event ei in the state
z′, P is a set of probabilistic parameters of the system and
Hi is a transition operator determining the new system state
when the event ei occurs.
The system considered being in the symbolic state SSi only
if it is in the state z and z∈ SSi. Relying this SSi definition,
every event ei is related to the symbolic state SSi, therefore
replacing the set of vertices V in the graph G(V ) by V ′ =
{SS1,SS2, . . . ,SSn} while the adjacency matrix A remains
unchanged. We obtain the graph of symbolic states G(V ′)
which describes the system operation by determining the
possible set of states and transitions from one symbolic
state to another.
The presented formalization and analysis method will be
illustrated by example of specification and integrated anal-
ysis of timed protocol with slot reuse.
4. Specification, validation and
simulation of event-driven local
computer network protocol
4.1. Conceptual model of on event-driven local computer
network protocol
There are many computer communication applications re-
quiring high bandwidth and high reliability in operation,
which still allow simple and low cost implementation. This
type of network exists in robotics, vehicles, homes, etc.
These applications set restrictions on the system in terms
of usable hardware, cost, and cabling. Such networks are
in many cases meant for one special application and not
for a general purpose use. The number of stations is gen-
erally small compared with typical LAN applications, and
the variation in the number of stations is small during the
life cycle of the network.
Typical requirements for the media access protocols in these
applications are: high reliability of the environment, where
the electrical disturbance level is a high scalable bandwidth:
self-stabilizing properties; and simplicity combined with
low cost of implementation. Solutions based on the existing
media access standards do not meet these requirements in
many cases.
The protocol described by Sintonen is design to offer high
bandwidth while keeping the structure simple. The config-
uration is a physical bus, where stations form a logical ring.
The algorithm is based on the noticeable events on the bus
(hence the name event-driven bus protocol). The proto-
col is distributed, except in the initialization phase. Every
station listens to the bus and receives both the destination
address and the source address, and stores them in the reg-
isters DA and SA respectively. A station is also capable of
sending the bus and detecting the event frame ended. The
algorithm for sending and receiving is as follows.
Receiving:
When a station notices it’s own address in the DA field,
it receives the frame.
Sending:
When a station has a frame to send, it waits until it receives
the address of it’s predecessor in the SA of the frame. Then
it waits for the event frame ended. After that event, it waits
a time period D′,D′ ≤ 2d, where d is the end to end delay
of, the bus. Then it sends its frame, and waits for a time
delay D′,D′ > 2d to hear the next station begin sending.
When this happens, the sending phase is ended. If a station
has nothing to send its turn comes, it sends an empty no
data frame, a kind of a token, to pass the turn to next station
in sequence.
There is one station which initializes the ring, known as
the fixed control station. The control station can also detect
a failed station and is capable of executing a reconfiguration
algorithm to restore the normal operation of the ring.
5. Aggregate specification
of on event-driven local computer
network protocol
An aggregate schemes of a specification of an analyzed
event oriented protocol is depicted in Fig. 1. The aggregates
Station 0,Station 1, . . . ,Station (n− 1) depict the stations
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which are switched on to the network, and the aggre-
gate Bus describes the performance channel. Station 0 is
the controlling one. The signals that are transmitted be-
tween the aggregates have also been shown in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1. Aggregate scheme of a model.
Aggregate Station nr, nr = 1,n−1
1. Set of input signal
Xnr = { f r end(m), bus is oc, no data(m), f ail};
where: f r end(m) – end of the transmitting;
bus is oc – bus is occupied; no data (m) – no data
for transmission; st on – switching on of the station;
n – number o station; m – the number of station
where packet is sending.
2. Set of output signals Ynr = {y},
y ∈ {beg f r, end trans, no data, f ail};
where: beg f r – beginning of the frame transmitting;
end trans – end of the frame transmitting; no data –
no data for transmitting; f ail – station is switched
off.
3. Set of internal events
E ′′nr =
{
e′′1(taim DI), e′′2(taim D), e′′3(trans f r),
e′′4(arr f r), e′′5(swit o f )
}
;
where: e′′1(taim DI) – end of timer DI; e′′2(taim D) –
end of timer D; e′′3(trans f r) – end of the frame
transmitting; e′′4(arr f r) – moment of a frame arrival;
e′′5(swit o f ) – moment of the station switching.
4. Controlling sequences:
e′′i (. . .)→{ξi j}, i = 1, 5, j = 1, ∞;
where ξi j – duration of an operation, followed by the
event e′′i (. . .).
5. Discreet component of state
υ(tm) =
{
st(tm), actD(tm), sw(tm)
}
;
where: st(tm)∈ {0, 1}; 0 – no frame for transmitting,
1 – there is a frame for transmitting;
actD(tm) =
{
0, timer D is switched off;
1, timer D is switched on;
sw(tm) =
{
0, station is switched off;
1, station is switched on;
6. Initial state: st(t0) = 0; act D(t0) = 0; sw(t0) = 0;
w
(
e′′1(taim DI), t0
)
= ∞;
w
(
e′′2(taim D), t0
)
= ∞;
w
(
e′′3(trans f r), t0
)
= ∞;
w
(
e′′4(arr f r), t0
)
= t0 +ξ4 j;
w
(
e′′5(swit o f ), t0
)
= t0 +ξ5 j.
7. Transfer operators:
H
(
e′( f r end)): (The end of packet sending)
w
(
e′′1(taim DI), tm+1
)
= tm +ξ1 j
if sw(tm) = 1∧m = nr.
H
(
e′(bus is oc)
)
: (Bus is busy)
w
(
e′′2(taim D), tm+1
)
= ∞,
w
(
e′′4(arr f r), tm+1
)
= tm +ξ4 j,
act D(tm+1) = 0

 ,
if sw(tm) = 1∧act D(tm) = 1.
H
(
e′(no data)
)
: (There are no data for sending)
w
(
e′′1(taim DI), tm+1
)
= tm +ξ1 j
if sw(tm) = 1∧m = nr;
w
(
e′′2(taim D), tm+1
)
= ∞,
w
(
e′′4(arr f r), tm+1
)
= tm +ξ4 j,
act D(tm+1) = 0

 ,
if sw(tm) = 1∧act D(tm) = 1.
H
(
e′′1(taim DI)
)
: (Timer DI has expired)
w
(
e′′3(trans f r), tm+1
)
= tm +ξ3 j,
y = beg f r
}
,
if st(tm+1) = 1;
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w
(
e′′2(taim D), tm+1
)
= tm +ξ2 j,
act D(tm+1) = 1,
y = no data

 ,
if st(tm+1) 6= 1.
H
(
e′′2(taim D)
)
: (Timer D has expired)
y = f ail .
H
(
e′′3(trans f r)
)
: (The end of packet sending)
st(tm+1) = 0;
w
(
e′′2(taim D), tm+1
)
= tm +ξ2 j ;
act D(tm+1) = 1;
y = end trans .
H
(
e′′4(arr f r)
)
: (The packet has arrived)
st(tm+1) = 1 .
H
(
e′′5(swit o f )
)
: (The station is seething of)
sw(tm+1) = 0;
w
(
e′′1(taim DI), tm+1
)
= ∞ ;
w
(
e′′2(taim D), tm+1
)
= ∞ ;
w
(
e′′3(trans f r), tm+1
)
= ∞ ;
w
(
e′′4(arr f r), tm+1
)
= ∞ ;
act D(tm+1) = 0;
st(tm+1) = 1 .
Aggregate Station 0
The functioning of this aggregate is similar to that of the
aggregate Station nr. Therefore, only the differences are
presented in respect to the agregate Station nr.
1. Set of input signals:
X0 = Xnr \{st on}∪{ f ail(m)};
where: Xnr – set of input signal of aggregate Sta-
tion nr; m – is the number of the stations switched
on.
2. Set of output signals:
Y0 = Ynr \{ f ail}∪{new st(m)};
where: Ynr – set of output signal of aggregate Sta-
tion nr; m – the number of the switched on station.
3. Set of internal events:
E ′′0 = E
′′
nr \
{
e′′5(swit o f f ), e′′7(taim T )
}
∪
{
e′′8i(swit on), . . . ,e′′8,n−1(swit on)
}
;
where: e′′7(taim T ) – end of timer T ; e′′8i(swit on) –
ith station switched on.
4. Controlling sequences for the events are introduced
e′′7(. . .) and e
′′
8i(. . .):
e′′7(taim T ) 7→ {T};
e′′8i(swit on) 7→ {ξi j}, i = 1, n−1, j = 1, ∞;
where: ξ8i j – the operation duration after finishing of
which the ith station is switched on; T – the duration
of timer T .
5. Discrete component of state
υ(tm) =
{
st(tm), actD(tm)
}
.
6. Initial state:
act D(t0) = 1; st(tm) = 0;
w
(
e′′7(taim D), t0
)
= t0 +T ;
w
(
e′′8i(swit on), t0
)
= ∞, i = 1, n−1.
7. Transfer operators:
H
(
e′( f r end)): (Bus is busy)
w
(
e′′(taim DI), tm+1
)
= tm +ξ1 j,
act DI(tm+1) = 1
}
,
if m = nr ;
w
(
e′′7(taim T ), tm+1
)
= tm +T,
if m 6= nr .
H
(
e′(bus is oc)
)
: (Bus is occupied)
w
(
e′′7(taim T )
)
= tm +T
w
(
e′′2(taim D), tm+1
)
= ∞ ,
w
(
e′′4(arr f r), tm+1
)
= tm +ξ4 j
act D(tm+1) = 0

 ,
if act D(tm+1) = 1.
H
(
e′(no data)
)
: (There are no data for sending)
w
(
e′′1(taim DI), tm+1
)
= tm +ξ1 j,
w
(
e′′7(taim T ), tm+1
)
= ∞,
w
(
e′′2(taim D), tm+1
)
= ∞,
act DI(tm+1) = 1,
act D(tm+10) = 0


,
if m = 0;
w
(
e′′2(taim D), tm+1
)
= ∞,
w
(
e′′4(arr f r), tm+1
)
= tm +ξ4 j,
act D(tm+1) = 0

 ,
if m = 0∧act D(tm) = 1;
w
(
e′′7(taim T ), tm+1
)
= tm +T.
H
(
e′( f ail)): (The station is)
w
(
e′′8m
(
swit on(m)
))
= tm +ξm j.
H
(
e′′1(taim DI)
)
: (End of timer DI)
act DI = 0;
w
(
e′′3(trans f r), tm
)
= tm +ξ3 j,
y = beg f r
}
,
if st(tm+1) = 1;
w
(
e′′2(taim D), tm
)
= tm +ξ2 j,
act D(tm+1) = 1,
y = no date

 ,
if st(tm+1) 6= 1 .
H
(
e′′2(taim D)
)
: (The end of timer D)
act D(tm+1) = 0;
w
(
e′′1(taim DI), tm+1
)
= tm +ξ1 j,
act DI(tm+1) = 1;
w
(
e′′4(arr f r), tm+1
)
= tm +ξ4 j;
y = f ail .
H
(
e′′3(trans f r)
)
: (The transmission of packet has
ended)
st(tm+1) = 0;
w
(
e′′(taim D), tm+1
)
= tm +ξ2 j,
act D(tm+1) = 1;
y = end trans .
H
(
e′′4(arr f r)
)
: (The packet has arrived)
st(tm+1) = 1.
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H
(
e′′7(taim T )
)
: (The timer T has expired)
w
(
e′′1(taim DI), tm+1
)
= tm +ξ1 j ;
act DI(tm+1) = 1 .
H
(
e′′8k
(
swit on(k)
))
: (The station is switching on)
y = new st(k +1).
Aggregate Bus
1. Set of input signals:
X =
{
[beg f r, end trans, no data, new st(m)]0,
[beg f r, end trans, no data, f ail]1, . . . ,
[beg f r, end trans, no data, f ail]n−1
}
.
2. Set of output signals:
Y =
{
[ f r end(m), bus is oc, no data(m), f ail(m)]0,
[ f r end(m), bus is oc,st on, no data(m)]1, . . . ,
[ f r end(m), bus is oc,st on, no data(m)]n−1
}
.
3. Set of internal events E ′′ = ∅.
4. State υ(tm) =
{
qi(tm), i = 1, N, kan(tm)
}
;
where: qi(tm) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}; qi(t) – the number of
successor for the ith station;
kan(tm) =
{
0, channel is idle;
1, channel is occupied.
5. Initial state:
kan(t0) := 0; i := 1;
while i < n do begin qi(t0) := i+1; i := i+1; end.
6. Transfer operators:
H
[
e′1k
(
new st(p)
)]
: k = 2, n; (New station)
i := p;
if i = n then i := 0;
while qi(tm) = 0 do begin i := i+1;
if i = n
then i := 0; end;
j := 1;
while q j(tm) 6= i+1 do j := j +1;
q j(tm+1) := p; qp(tm+1) := i+1;
yp := st on .
H
[
e′2k(beg f r)
]
: k = 1, n ; (The start of packet send-
ing)
kan(tm+1) := 1;
for i := 1 to n do
if i 6= k and qi(tm) > 0 then
yi := bus is oc .
H
[
e′3k(end trans)
]
: k = 1, n (The end of packet
transmission)
kan(tm+1) := 0;
for i := 1 to n do
if i 6= k and qi(tm) > 0 then
yi := f r end
[
qk(tm)
]
.
H
[
e′4k(no data)
]
: k = 1, n (There are no data for
sending)
for i := 1 to n do
if i 6= k and qi(tm) > 0 then
yi := no data
[
qk(tm)
]
.
H
[
e′5k( f ail)
]
: k = 2, n (The station is switching of)
y1 := f ail[k];
i := 1
while q j(tm) 6= k do i := i+1;
qi(tm+1) := qk(tm);
qk(tm+1) := 0 .
5.1. Results of validation and simulation
The correctness of the created specification was investigated
by means of protocol analysis system PRANAS-2. This
system permitted one to investigate general protocol prop-
erties such as: completeness; deadlock freeness; bounded-
ness; cyclic behavior; termination.
Table 1
Example of validation
{32} L: 2 3 1 0
MO: 1 0 1 1 0 1 3
Tim T Arr fr Taim DI
M[1]: 2 0 0 0 1 1
Swit of Arr fr
M[2]: 3 0 0 0 1 1
Swit of Arr fr
↓ Taim DI in MO
{58} L: 2 3 1 1
MO: 1 0 0 1 1 1 3
Tim T Arr fr Trans fr
M[1]: 2 0 0 0 1 1
Swit of Arr fr
M[2]: 3 0 0 0 1 1
Swit of Arr fr
↓ Trans Fr in MO
{104} L: 2 3 1 0
MO: 1 1 0 1 0 0 3
Tim T Arr fr Taim D
M[1]: 2 0 0 1 1 1
Swit of Arr fr Taim DI
M[2]: 3 0 0 0 1 1
Swit of Arr fr
↓ Taim DI in M1
{79} L: 2 3 1 1
MO: 1 0 0 1 0 0 3
Tim T Arr fr Taim D
M[1]: 2 0 1 0 1 1
Swit of Arr fr Trans fr
M[2]: 3 0 0 0 1 1
Swit of Arr fr
↓ Trans fr in M1
{150} L: 2 3 1 0
MO: 1 0 0 1 0 0 3
Tim T Arr fr Taim D
M[1]: 2 1 0 0 1 0
Swit of Arr fr Taim D
M[2]: 3 0 0 1 1 1
Swit of Arr fr Taim DI
↓ Taim DI in M1
{92} L: 2 3 1 1
MO: 1 0 0 1 0 0 3
Tim T Arr fr
M[1]: 2 0 0 0 1 0
Swit of Arr fr
M[2]: 3 0 1 0 1 1
Swit of Arr fr Trans fr
In Table 1, some validation results are represented. The
numbers included in brackets {. . . } refer to the number
of the state. Numbers written after L, MO and M[i] have
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the following meanings of discrete and continuous coordi-
nates of state:
L: q1; q2; q3; kan;
MO: nr; act D; act DI; act T;
act trans fr; st; n act;
M[i],i=1,2: nr; act D;
act trans fr; act DI;sw;st.
5.2. Simulation results
Simulation results are represented in Table 2. The param-
eters of the model are the following: Taim Frame – dura-
tion of frames; Taim Head – duratin of the head of frames;
Taim D – duration of the timer D; Taim DI – duration of the
timer DI; Taim T – duration of timer T ; V – velocity of the
channel; n – number of stations; Arr Frame – parameter
of a puasonian input stream; T swit on and T swit off –
intensity of operations swit on and swit off, which
have exponential distributions.
Characteristics of the model: T Wait – the mean value of
transmitting a frame including the waiting time; L Wait –
mean value of the waiting time; K Useful – coefficient uti-
lization of a channel; K Full – coefficient of full utilization
of a channel.
Table 2
Simulation results
Taim Frame = 800 bit, Taim Head = 160 bit,
Tau Data = 4 bit, Taim D = 0.0000025 s,
Taim DI = 0.0000012 s, Taim T = 100 s,
T swit on = T swit of = 0.
1. V = 10000000 bit/s, Arr Frame = 0.001 s
n T Wait L Wait R Use f ul K Full
2 0.00011 0.00001 0.1418 0.8323
4 0.00013 0.00003 0.2806 0.8639
6 0.00016 0.00006 0.4118 0.8939
8 0.00019 0.00010 0.5297 0.9207
10 0.00025 0.00016 0.6304 0.9437
2. V = 50000000 bit/s, Arr Frame = 0.001 s
n T Wait L Wait R Use f ul K Full
2 0.00002 0.00000 0.0307 0.4639
4 0.00002 0.00001 0.0611 0.4831
6 0.00003 0.00003 0.0917 0.5025
8 0.00003 0.00001 0.1219 0.5217
10 0.00003 0.00001 0.1529 0.5413
3. V = 50000000 bit/s, Arr Frame = 0.000135 s
n T Wait L Wait R Use f ul K Full
2 0.00002 0.00000 0.0212 0.5921
4 0.00003 0.00001 0.3848 0.6882
6 0.00004 0.00002 0.5399 0.7864
8 0.00006 0.00004 0.6513 0.8569
10 0.00009 0.00007 0.7160 0.8979
6. Conclusions
The presented method of formal specification permits on
the base of single specification to carry out validation gen-
eral and individual properties and simulation. It permits to
investigate the analysed system more thoroughly.
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Paper Adaptive procedure
for automatic modulation recognition
Ferdinand Liedtke
Abstract—An adaptive procedure for automatic modulation
recognition is described. With it the automatic modulation
classification and recognition of radio communication signals
with a priori unknown parameters is possible effectively. The
results of modulation recognition are important in the context
of radio monitoring or electronic support measurements. The
special features of the procedure are the possibility to adapt
it dynamically to nearly all modulation types, and the capa-
bility to recognize continuous phase modulation (CPM) sig-
nals like Gaussian minimum-shift keying (GMSK) too. A time
synchronization to the symbol rate is not necessary.
Keywords— modulation recognition, modulation classification,
signal analysis, radio monitoring.
1. Introduction
The results of modulation recognition are important in the
context of radio monitoring or electronic support measure-
ments. Originally the research was conducted for short
wave or high frequency (HF) communication signals in the
radio frequency (RF) range between 1 and 30 MHz. In this
range there exist many different signal modulation types or
wave forms, and often the systems or signal characteris-
tics are not standardized. Furthermore, modern HF radio
systems are able to change their parameters and their mod-
ulation types continuously, dependent on the quality of the
transmission channel. The developed modulation recog-
nition procedure can be used not only for the analysis of
HF signals, but also for radio communication signals from
higher RF ranges, e.g., VHF or UHF. In those ranges lots
of military and civil mobile radios are running. Though
many of those systems are standardized with known signal
characteristics, it will be of interest to detect the activity of
specific systems and their currently used modulation types.
The additional challenge in the higher frequency ranges are
the often used CPM waveforms, e.g., GMSK with varying
B*T values. For those soft-keyed wave forms it is more
difficult to find relevant signal values suited for modulation
recognition than for wave forms with hard keying. A mod-
ulation recogniser developed for digitally modulated signals
with hard keying is described in [1]. In this context it is im-
portant to remember that in general the symbol rate or the
time points for symbol synchronization are not known for
the non-authorized receiver. In many papers about modula-
tion recognition the a priori knowledge of the exact values
for centre frequency, bandwidth, and symbol rate of ev-
ery interesting signal is assumed, e.g., [2, 3]. This will
be appropriate for an application like the adjustment of
a software radio which expects several well defined sig-
nal wave forms. In contrary to that, this presupposition
cannot be maintained in general for applications like radio
monitoring or electronic support measurements. For these
applications a special robustness against parameter inaccu-
racies is necessary. A further challenge for the modulation
recognition described here is the quantity of different wave
forms, several of which are often totally unknown from the
beginning. Therefore it is desirable to have a recognition
procedure which adapts easily to the various wave forms.
For the future, some further development of the recognition
procedure is planned.
2. Principle of the procedure
The necessary pre-processing of the received signal is
represented in Fig. 1. From the down converted and digi-
tised signal a spectrum is computed with the aim to ac-
complish a spectral segmentation, i.e., to estimate the cen-
tre frequency fc and the bandwidth B of a significant
spectrum part.
With the determined parameters the signal is appropriately
shifted in frequency and filtered to get the complex base
band signal z. On this occasion the segmentation proce-
dure is not discussed in detail. The signal z is fed into the
modulation recognition module. The essential parts of this
module are represented in Fig. 2. The figure parts marked
in grey designate the differences to the formerly used mod-
ulation recogniser [1]. The further processing is performed
in three branches: The upper two branches with the squar-
ing of absolute values, the squaring of complex values, and
the following digital Fourier transforms (DFTs) are used for
exploitation of the symbol rate information, which perhaps
may be included in the signal, by means of the spectral
line detection. The squaring of absolute values could re-
veal the appropriate spectral line, indicating the symbol rate
for digitally modulated signals with hard keying while the
squaring of complex values is provided for CPM. Within the
described modulation recogniser the symbol rate estima-
tion is not necessary for obtaining a time synchronization,
the sole aim is the estimation of the approximate symbol
dwell time T . Time T is needed for the calculation of
the appropriate values for the difference phase Dϕ within
the feature extraction module in the third branch. In fu-
ture, the spectral symbol rate information, which differs in
dependence on the modulation type, could perhaps be uti-
lized for the classification process too, but in the currently
used recogniser it is not yet used for this purpose. Before
the feature extraction is carried out, a coordinate resolving
module provides the signal in polar coordinates a and ϕ .
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Fig. 1. Signal analysis with modulation recognition.
Fig. 2. Adaptive modulation recognition, non-synchronized.
The feature extraction module provides relevant values of
the following signal parameters: amplitude a, difference
phase Dϕ , instantaneous frequency f , and derivation of
the instantaneous frequency d f . Concerning the parame-
ter ϕ , difference values and not the phase values them-
selves are used for the purpose to be resistant to a non-exact
frequency tuning.
The time difference for extracting every pair of phases for
calculating Dϕ is T . The parameter f is essential for recog-
nizing simple frequency modulated signals like frequency-
shift keying and the derivative of f is provided for chirp
signals. The procedure for extracting the relevant parameter
values is discussed in the last paragraph of this section.
After feature extraction there is a splitting into two
branches, a learning branch and a testing branch. By means
of the learning branch, it is possible to adapt to the various
modulation types or wave forms. For this aim the rele-
vant parameter values are accumulated in a learning phase
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and further processed as follows: the parameter values are
appropriately scaled and written into histograms, one his-
togram for each of the four parameters. The histograms
are then transformed into a picture domain by means of
the DFT. The transformed functions or picture functions
are a kind of characteristic functions with the property that
the interesting information is concentrated in the first part
of each function. It was found out that the use of the first
quarter of the respective picture function values is suffi-
cient. In the following text this part of a picture function
is still called “picture function”. The picture functions are
appropriately scaled and stored as reference functions, for
every modulation type a set of four functions. After hav-
ing finished the learning of all interesting wave forms, the
change-over switch following the feature extraction mod-
ule (see Fig. 2) is switched into the lower position and the
testing or working phase begins. The signal processing in
the testing branch is the same as that in the learning branch
up to the scaling of the picture functions. In the following
comparison the actual set of picture functions are com-
pared to all stored function sets and the set with the least
Fig. 3. Feature extraction, non-synchronized.
deviation determines the modulation type. The deviation
measure used here is the least mean square (LMS) and the
fusion of the results obtained from the processing of the
individual parameters is done by simply adding the LMS
results. The dashed lines in Fig. 2 refer to the intention
to search (in future) for additional features, obtained from
spectral or scaling parameters.
The extraction of the relevant parameter values for a, Dϕ , f ,
and d f is represented in Fig. 3. Because the extraction was
not intended to need the synchronization to the symbol
rate, another method had to be worked out. The relevant
values are those where the eyes of their so-called eye pat-
terns are wide open, i.e., the parameters have reached their
steady states. The way to find these values is to con-
tinuously compute the time derivative of each parameter
(in Fig. 3 depicted with (. . . )’), to compute the sliding
mean µ of these derived values, and to continuously per-
form a comparison of µ with the corresponding original
parameter value. It was found out that the relevant values
are those which are near to the mean of the derived values.
This is a similar procedure as the search for extreme values
of a function by means of its derivative. Here, the com-
parison is not carried out with the derivative value zero,
but with the mean of the derived values. The intention is
to compensate parameter trends, which normally are still
existent. Concerning the phase it has to be remembered
that always difference phase values have to be considered.
3. Experimental results
The whole procedure including signal generation, anti-
aliasing filtering, noise addition, reception filtering, and
modulation recognition was developed and tested on a PC
with the software tools of MATLAB. Successful tests were
also carried out with real signals obtained from the mobile
radio systems GSM, TETRA, and TETRAPOL.
A class space of 15 modulation types was defined, most
of them digitally modulated wave forms. The frequently
used modulation types amplitude-shift keying with two
states (ASK2), frequency-shift keying (FSK2), minimum-
shift keying (MSK) including different GMSK forms, and
phase-shift keying (PSK) with different numbers and posi-
tions of relevant phase states are considered among others.
The class space was supplemented with a white Gaussian
noise class (WGN) and a reject class (REJ). All classes
are represented in Table 1. The listed signal to noise ra-
tios (SNRs) are explained in the next paragraph. The ar-
rangement with altogether 17 classes was chosen to chal-
lenge the recognition procedure. In realistic scenarios the
class number could be reduced in many cases, which alle-
viates the classification task.
To learn the class specific reference functions 16 learning
experiments per class were carried out, whereby for every
experiment a signal segment with a length corresponding
to 256 symbols was used. The number of individual signal
samples per symbol dwell time T was chosen to be 8. In
the next step the appropriate decision levels were learned
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Table 1
Used classes/wave forms
No.
Name of
class/wave
form
Comments
SNRstart
[dB]
0 REJ Reject class —
1 WGN White Gaussian noise —
2 ASK2 Amplitude-shift keying, 15
2 states
3 FSK2 Frequency-shift keying, 12
2 states, β = 0.85
4 MSK Minimum-shift keying 12
5 GMSK05 Gaussian MSK, B*T = 0.5 12
6 GMSK03 Gaussian MSK, B*T = 0.3 12
7 PSK2 Phase-shift keying, 2 states 9
8 pi/2 DPSK2 Differential PSK2, 9
keying with +/−pi/2
9 PSK4 Phase-shift keying, 14
4 states
10 pi/4 DPSK4 Differential PSK4, 14
keying with +/−pi/4
11 OPSK4 Offset PSK4 14
12 PSK8 Phase-shift keying, 20
8 states
13 ASK2/PSK8 Hybrid digital modulation 25
type, 2 amplitude states for
each of the 8 phase states
14 CLOVER ASK2/PSK8 with Chebyshev 25
pulse weighting
15 LICHIRP Linear chirp 20
16 CHIRPKEY Chirp keying with linear up 20
and down chirp
with 16 additional experiments. The used SNRs are re-
lated to those values with which an authorized receiver
could reach a symbol error probability of 10−4 with non-
coherent or differential demodulation, whereby a coding
gain was not considered. These SNRs differ in dependence
on the modulation type and they are called SNRstart. The
use of different SNRstart values for the different modula-
tion classes was realized because the authorized receiver
expects different SNRs for different modulation types too,
compare Table 1. For example the SNRstart value for the
PSK4 types is 14 dB and that for the PSK2 types is 9 dB.
A quarter of the experiments was carried out with SNRstart,
the next quarter was performed with SNRstart− 2 dB, the
third quarter has SNRstart− 4 dB and the last quarter was
performed with SNRstart− 6 dB, i.e., the mean SNR was
SNRstart− 3 dB. In that way it was possible to take into
account different SNRs with comparatively low experiment
numbers. The testing or working phase was carried out
with 64 experiments per class, each experiment with a sig-
nal length corresponding to 256 symbols too. The prin-
ciple of choosing the SNRs was the same as that used in
the learning phase.
Fig. 4. Parameter histograms for PSK4: (a) amplitude a; (b) dif-
ference phase Dϕ; (c) instantaneous frequence f ; (d) differential
instantaneous frequency d f .
Fig. 5. Picture functions for PSK4: (a) amplitude a; (b) dif-
ference phase Dϕ; (c) instantaneous frequence f ; (d) differential
instantaneous frequency d f .
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Fig. 6. Parameter histograms for OPSK4: (a) amplitude a;
(b) difference phase Dϕ; (c) instantaneous frequence f ; (d) dif-
ferential instantaneous frequency d f .
Fig. 8. Parameter histograms for WGN: (a) amplitude a; (b) dif-
ference phase Dϕ; (c) instantaneous frequence f ; (d) differential
instantaneous frequency d f .
Fig. 7. Picture functions for OPSK4: (a) amplitude a; (b) dif-
ference phase Dϕ; (c) instantaneous frequence f ; (d) differential
instantaneous frequency d f .
Fig. 9. Picture functions for WGN: (a) amplitude a; (b) dif-
ference phase Dϕ; (c) instantaneous frequence f ; (d) differential
instantaneous frequency d f .
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Table 2
Confusion matrix, SNRstart−6 dB≤ SNR≤ SNRstart
Input
Output class
ASK2 FSK2 MSK GMSK05 GMSK03 PSK2
pi/2
DPSK2
PSK4
pi/4
DPSK4
OPSK4 PSK8 ASK2/PSK8 CLOVER LICHIRP CHIRKEY WGN REJ
ASK2 98.4 1.6
FSK2 100
MSK 70.3 23.4 4.7 1.6
GMSK05 32.8 54.7 12.5
GMSK03 21.9 75 3.1
PSK2 98.4 1.6
pi/2 DPSK2 100
PSK4 89.1 10.9
pi/4 DPSK4 98.4 1.6
OPSK4 3.1 87.5 9.4
PSK8 96.9 3.1
ASK2/PSK8 96.9 3.1
CLOVER 95.3 4.7
LICHIRP 95.3 4.7
CHIRKEY 100
WGN 85.9 14.1
Table 3
Confusion matrix, SNRstart−9 dB≤ SNR≤ SNRstart−3 dB
Input
Output class
ASK2 FSK2 MSK GMSK05 GMSK03 PSK2
pi/2
DPSK2
PSK4
pi/4
DPSK4
OPSK4 PSK8 ASK2/PSK8 CLOVER LICHIRP CHIRKEY WGN REJ
ASK2 67.2 32.8
FSK2 84.4 14.1 1.6
MSK 39.1 26.6 32.8 1.6
GMSK05 6.3 40.6 51.6 1.6
GMSK03 17.9 82.8
PSK2 68.8 4.7 26.6
pi/2 DPSK2 78.1 6.3 15.6
PSK4 1.6 1.6 64.1 1.6 31.3
pi/4 DPSK4 78.1 21.9
OPSK4 9.4 3.1 60.9 26.6
PSK8 4.7 60.9 34.4
ASK2/PSK8 71.9 28.1
CLOVER 64.1 35.9
LICHIRP 4.7 3.1 1.6 78.1 12.5
CHIRKEY 34.4 64.1 1.6
WGN 85.9 14.1
As a first demonstration example, histograms of the four
examined parameters a, Dϕ , f , and d f for a PSK4 sig-
nal are depicted in Fig. 4. The results are obtained from
16 experiments with 256 symbols per experiment, i.e., from
4096 symbols altogether. This comparatively high symbol
number was chosen to clearly depict the typical character-
istics. For a normal recognition process the exploitation
of 256 symbols is entirely sufficient. It can be seen from
Fig. 4 that the Dϕ histogram has 4 peaks. This is the main
characteristic indicating the PSK4 wave form.
The picture functions are depicted in Fig. 5. In the left col-
umn the results for the absolute values rho and in the right
column the phase results phi/pi of the histogram transforms
are depicted. The important result is the peak position at
the abscissa value 4 in Fig. 5 on the left hand side, second
row. The corresponding results of an OPSK4 signal are
depicted in Figs. 6 and 7. The peaks in the Dϕ histogram
(see Fig. 6) are less evident than those of the corresponding
PSK4 histogram. This becomes noticeable in Fig. 7, left
hand side, second row, too. However, for sufficiently good
SNRs, OPSK4 can be classified correctly. For lower SNRs
some classifications as PSK2 or pi/2 DPSK2 are possible.
For comparison with the WGN situation the corresponding
results for WGN are depicted in Figs. 8 and 9. It can be ob-
served that neither the histograms nor the picture functions
give any indication of a digitally modulated signal (with
two or more characteristic parameter positions). Therefore
it could be understood that the WGN class can be easily
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discriminated from the other classes. The principal con-
siderations concerning the other classes, not yet discussed,
are similar.
The final classification results are represented in form of so-
called confusion matrices (see Tables 2 and 3). The names
of all treated classes were entered into the left column and
into the uppermost row. The left column depicts the classes
fed into the modulation recogniser and the classification re-
sults were entered into the columns with the corresponding
output class names indicated in the uppermost row. For an
ideal recogniser all results, each 100%, are contained in the
diagonal matrix elements. These elements are indicative of
correct classifications.
The learning of the reference picture functions was per-
formed with 16 experiments per class. For every experi-
ment a signal segment length corresponding to 256 sym-
bols was used. Another 16 experiments per class were
carried out to learn the necessary variances of the devi-
ations of the test picture functions from the stored refer-
ence functions. These values were needed for arranging
the appropriate decision levels. The SNRs were chosen in
the range SNRstart− 6 dB ≤ SNR ≤ SNRstart as discussed
above. The testing phase consisted of 64 experiments for
each class. The results depicted in the confusion matri-
ces are indicated in percent related to 64. The difference
between Tables 2 and 3 is the different SNR selection in
the test experiments. While the tests for Table 2 were per-
formed with SNRstart− 6 dB ≤ SNR ≤ SNRstart the tests
for Table 3 were carried out with SNRs 3 dB worse. The
results in Table 2 show that most of the classification re-
sults are contained in the diagonal elements or in their
neighbourhood. The results for the CPM signals MSK,
GMSK05, and GMSK03 are marked with bold numbers to
indicate the close relationship between the three modula-
tion classes. In other words, the spread of classification
results is caused by the similarity of the wave forms and
could not really assessed as false classifications. Most of
the non-successfully classified signals were assigned to the
reject class REJ. This is a desired result because a rejection
or a classification as WGN is preferred to a false classifi-
cation. The classification of two OPSK4 signals (3.1%) as
pi/2 DPSK2 is caused by experiments with comparatively
low SNR. Both wave forms are similar in certain aspects.
The classification results presented in Table 3 are worse
because the SNRs were 3 dB lower. The false classifi-
cation of 34.4% of the CHIRKEY signals as GMSK03 is
not really critical because CHIRKEY is a here synthesized
artificial signal wave form, which was chosen very simi-
lar to GMSK03. The false classification of 9.4% of the
OPSK4 signals as PSK2 is not surprising because for the
smaller SNRs these wave forms are also similar. The num-
bers of the other false classifications are still comparatively
moderate.
For assessing the discussed experimental results one has
to realize that for real scenarios the class number could be
reduced in many cases. This alleviates the classification
task. For the future, further work is planned on the follow-
ing items: Test and integration of additional classification
features, appropriate evaluation and fusion of the feature pa-
rameter values, adaptation of the classification procedure,
and tests.
4. Conclusions
An automatic modulation recognition procedure is de-
scribed which is suited for many modern signal wave forms
including CPM. The automatic modulation recognition is
interesting in the context of radio monitoring or electronic
support measurements. For this application the signal pa-
rameters are often not known a priori, e.g., the centre fre-
quency, the bandwidth, and the symbol rate. As a typical
pattern recognition procedure the modulation recognition
has a learning and a testing phase. During the learning
phase an adaptation to the new wave forms is easily pos-
sible. The procedure was tested with 16 wave forms with
different SNRs. The results are comparatively good. For
the future some further improvements are planned.
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